Ambassador Turki al Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s top diplomat in the United States, was interviewed by Wolf Blitzer on CNN’s “Late Edition” on Sunday, February 5, 2006. A number of issues of the day were discussed. This SUSRIS IOI provides excerpts from the interview for your consideration. Links to reports and other materials related to the discussion are provided below.

MARITIME TRAGEDY IN THE RED SEA –

BLITZER: ..this Egyptian ship that was bringing Egyptian workers, mostly, from Saudi Arabia, your country, back to Egypt. Fourteen hundred people on board. Maybe a thousand may have died in this, so I know you’re following this. What is the latest information that you’re getting?

AL-FAISAL: I wish I could tell you more than what you can read in the papers and hear on the radio. The investigation is ongoing. The rescue attempts are continuing. Some people have been rescued from the sea on both shores, Egyptian and Saudi, but the death toll is very high, and it is a very much a tragedy as you say. It reminds me of a tragedy that happened several years ago as well on a similar ship that was crossing the Red Sea between the kingdom and Egypt. And hopefully, the authorities will get to the root of this and prevent it in the future.

BLITZER: Was there any concern, any advance word when that ship left Saudi Arabia for Egypt that perhaps there was a problem?

AL-FAISAL: None whatsoever. Not as far as I know.

BLITZER: And your suspicion this was a mechanical problem, or it was bad weather, but there was no terrorism.

AL-FAISAL: I cannot foreclose any conclusions. I’d rather wait for the results of the investigation, but it happened that during that specific day when the accident took place that there was bad weather in the Red Sea.

CARTOON CRISIS –

BLITZER: Let’s get to this issue of this cartoon of the prophet Mohammed that has sparked such anger and outrage in the Muslim and Arab world. First of all, in Saudi Arabia, I’m sure there’s a lot of anger. Are we seeing in Saudi Arabia the kind of demonstrations and anger that we’ve seen in Damascus, in Beirut, in Gaza, elsewhere in the region including in Iraq right now?

AL-FAISAL: Let me just begin by saying that the cartoons are offensive. I don’t know if you’ve seen them, Wolf, but they are absolutely horrible depictions of the prophet Mohammed, a man esteemed not just by Muslims but even by non-Muslims, and these things I think should be handled with care and with sensitivity.

From the beginning, I think there were on both sides, there were perhaps people who enter into these issues without necessarily judging the effects of them. On both sides, I think there must, there should be quiet and a return to talk rather than, as you said in your report, burning down or looting or stoning of buildings and so on.

BLITZER: Are things quiet in Saudi Arabia?

AL-FAISAL: The kingdom is not a country that is prone to violent public demonstrations. The people express their views more calmly and more discreetly, and they do call up people like officials and express their views about them. There was a group of people who went to the Danish embassy in Riyadh to protest the cartoons and the Danish embassy received them, I believe, if I’m not mistaken.

BLITZER: Is it safe for Danes and other Europeans, Westerners to be in Riyadh and Jeddah and other cities in Saudi Arabia right now?

AL-FAISAL: Absolutely, there is no danger of anybody being stoned or hauled off or lynched if that is what the fear is. And as I told you, I mean the people in Saudi Arabia are not that way inclined, but the whole issue should be dealt with more discreetly and more quietly, I think.

BLITZER: Here’s what a lot of Americans and westerners in general don’t understand. They certainly understand that there could be anger as a result of this cartoon of the prophet Mohammed, but they don’t understand why there isn’t greater anger, for example, at the video that was seen on Al Jazeera of the American journalist, this young woman, Jill Carroll, who was seen weeping surrounded by masked gunmen. Why doesn’t a picture like that generate the kind of anger in the Arab and Muslim world that you might think should be — it should generate because it’s such an awful, awful situation?

AL-FAISAL: Well, I wish I could tell you. It would take some study to do that, but, again, that picture, as you say, did not generate anger in non-Muslims as well. We didn’t see demonstrations taking place in the streets of Washington or Los Angeles or wherever this young lady came from, nor in other non-Muslim places and countries. It is something I simply cannot answer, Wolf.

BLITZER: Here’s the other thing that a lot of Americans and Westerners in general also see a double standard. They see some the cartoons that have been published in Saudi newspapers, and we’ll show of them right now. Very offensive to Westerners and to — specifically to Jews, and I’m going to show some of them. I want you to take a look at them as well. For example, this one shows a fat — it looks like an Israeli with a Star of David. That’s supposed to be blood and little children and that Israeli is supposedly drinking that blood. That’s a pretty offensive cartoon. Let me put up…

AL-FAISAL: Can I ask where that was shown?

BLITZER: That was shown in a newspaper called Al-Youm on December 4th, 2005. Are you familiar with that newspaper?

AL-FAISAL: Yes, I’m familiar with the newspaper, not familiar with the cartoon.

BLITZER: All right, let me show you another one. This one is a Nazi swastika over the Star of David. Given the history of the Holocaust, clearly very offensive. Let me put another one up there. This shows Orthodox, Hasidic Jew, basically manipulating terrorists, tying the kafiyah together, and it shows that hook nose, a very, a very ugly portrayal of a Jew. And I’ll show you one final one, and then we can talk about this. You see this sign, “born to kill,” over the Star of David. These are all in Saudi publications, Al-Watan, Al-Youm, and they go on and on and on, and it’s a source of great concern. You understand that.

AL-FAISAL: Well, of course, and I think they are offensive. And if I were in charge of the newspapers, I would not let that happen.

You have to take into account, though, that the issue of Palestine and the unresolved issue of Palestine is a generator of most of this feeling that we have in the Arab world, particularly towards Israel. And this is something that you, Wolf, have dealt with before and quite evenhandedly and quite open-mindedly. And the need for resolution of that problem, I think, will go a long way to meeting the requirements of things like that not happening.

ISRAEL-PALESTINE –

BLITZER: Last week on this program we had one of the co-founders of Hamas, Mahmoud al-Zahar, who was on “Late Edition,” and he referred to the two stripes on the Israeli flags, the blue stripes on top and the bottom of the Star of David, saying these represent the Nile River to the Euphrates River, and this is what Israel really seeks: an Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates. And that’s why he rejects this, quote, “two-state solution,” Israel living alongside a new state of Palestine, because he says the Israelis don’t accept a two-state solution.

AL-FAISAL: I can’t answer for what Mr. Zahar said or any of these people who think like that. But I do know that there is on the table in the Middle East a road map. There is Abdullah peace plan. There are commitments by the Palestinian Authority to both these peace issues, and any government that succeeds in the Palestinian Authority must deal with those realities.

BLITZER: Saudi Arabia accepts a two-state solution?

AL-FAISAL: We practically invented it with our peace plan that King Abdullah presented in 2002 to the Arab League, and he got the commitment of all Arab countries to Israel and Palestine living side by side with Israel withdrawing from Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem, in return for full recognition and normalization of relations between the Arabs — all the Arabs states and Israel, including the Palestinian Authority.

BLITZER; Is it your sense that all that is done with now, that Hamas apparently is going to lead the Palestinian Authority, be the dominant political player among the Palestinians? Is there — in other words, is this the end of the road?

AL-FAISAL: I don’t think so. I’ve always been an optimist and despite the realities on the ground, I think the people of Palestine — if you will look at all of the surveys that have been made in the last few years, have always expressed their view that there should be a two-state solution. And I think Hamas, when and if they take the helm in the next government in Palestine, will have to deal with that issue. It is not something that they can run away from.

Nor do I think that the Palestinian people will let them run away from things like that, things like electricity, water, transport, movement of people from one place to another, all have to do with dealing with Israeli occupation authorities. So that occupation must be dealt with as a reality and once the occupation is lifted, then the Palestinian people can form their state and the Israelis can continue from there.

BLITZER: Is it your government’s position that you will continue to help fund the Palestinian Authority even if Hamas controls it? Because as you know, the U.S. government, the European Union say they’re not going to give money to Hamas or the Palestinian Authority if the — unless Hamas really changes its attitude, renounces terrorism and accepts Israel’s right to exist.

AL-FAISAL: Well, let’s not put the horse before the cart. Situation now is that the U.S. and the European union and the rest of the world are still supporting the Palestinian Authority. There is a transitory government now in place that runs things until the next government takes over, and we still don’t know what the composition of the next government is. We will deal with the situation as it arises.

BLITZER: How much money does the Saudi government provide the Palestinians on an annual basis?

AL-FAISAL: We provide through the Arab League, I think something like $200 million, and through international organizations perhaps slightly more than that, through the United Nations and other relief organizations.

WAR ON TERROR –

BLITZER: All right. So let me read to you from The Los Angeles Times from January 15th, “Millions of dollars continue to flow from wealthy Saudis through Saudi-based Islamic charitable and relief organizations to Al Qaida and other suspected terrorist groups abroad, aided by what the U.S. officials call Riyadh’s failure to set up a government commission to police such groups as promised.”

This is a sensitive subject that you’re very much involved with. And a top U.S. treasury official undersecretary for terrorism financial crimes said this last year, “The challenges posed by terrorist financing from within Saudi Arabia are among the most serious we have faced. Even today we believe that private Saudi donors may be a significant source of terrorist funding, including for the insurgency in Iraq.”

What’s going on, because Saudi Arabia promised it was going to cut that off?

AL-FAISAL: And Saudi Arabia has implemented the cutoff. No single penny leaves Saudi Arabia today through any group or organization for any charitable or other activity at all.

All the bank accounts of all charities in Saudi Arabia have been stopped from exporting any money anywhere. Regardless of the nonformation of this commission that is still a work in progress. We have invited people from your treasury department to come, although we have a standing committee there, as you know, with your treasury people looking over these issues. And just a couple of weeks ago Stuart Levy from your treasury department…

BLITZER: He’s the man we quoted.

AL-FAISAL: His quote was last here…

BLITZER: Yes.

AL-FAISAL: But he — just two weeks ago he visited the kingdom, and he looked at all of these measures that we have taken, and when I saw him in Riyadh, he told me that he was happy with the visit, that he would still have to review what he looked at. And we are going to get together to see what conclusions he has reached.

BLITZER: How did you…

We are — Wolf, we are committed to the fight against terrorism in its global scale. We are a victim of Al Qaida. We are not the sponsor or the creator of Al Qaida.

So, some of the rhetoric that is used, as in that L.A. article, I think, is offensive to us. Here is a victim who is accused of putting the knife to his throat. I think that is unfair and that if they looked at the facts that perhaps they would change their mind.

U.S. POLICY ON ENERGY –

BLITZER: Here’s what the president said the other day. And I’m not going to play the sound bite. You’ve heard it many times, but basically, the president, in his State of the Union address said the United States is addicted to oil and this must stop.

A lot of that oil comes from your kingdom.

AL-FAISAL: Not true. Most of the oil you receive comes from other places.

BLITZER: But a lot comes from Saudi Arabia.

AL-FAISAL: We export to the United States only 15 percent of the United States’ imports. I would hardly call that a lot.

BLITZER: So, how did you react when you heard the president say the United States must end its addiction to oil?

AL-FAISAL: Well, he went further than that, actually, and said “Middle East oil.” I was taken aback and I raised this point with government officials.

BLITZER; You were sitting in the chamber when he said that.

AL-FAISAL: I was, indeed, and the next day had a very good meeting at the White House with National Security Council Director Stephen Hadley. And we are talking through that issue, both governments.

BLITZER: Well, what does that mean — we’re talking through that issue? Because, as you know, you’re developing your oil fields assuming there’s going to be an appetite for that oil?

AL-FAISAL: And stemming from a joint communiqué that came out of King Abdullah’s visit to Texas last year in which both he and the president agreed on a joint energy policy that includes the increase in Saudi oil output and working together to increase refining capacity to provide oil products and so on.

It is something that is of serious concern to us because oil is our major income earner.

BLITZER: So, what happens now? You and Stephen Hadley, the president’s national security adviser met. Where do you go from here?

AL-FAISAL: We’re talking about these issues and that’s where we’re going.

BLITZER: We have to leave it right there, unfortunately. Mr. Ambassador, this was a good discussion. Welcome to Washington. Once again, you have a huge job ahead of you and we hope you’ll be a frequent guest on our program.

AL-FAISAL: Thank you. Well, you told me I was going to talk about reform which you didn’t leave me time to do that — next time.

BLITZER: Next time, then. We always want to leave our viewers with more — they’ll want more. We’ll definitely have you back.

AL-FAISAL: Thanks very much, Wolf.

BLITZER: Kind of you to come into our studio.

AL-FAISAL: Not at all.

[Complete interview: click here]

MARITIME TRAGEDY IN THE RED SEA –

Series of Tragic Errors Doomed Egypt Ferry – AP – Feb. 5, 2006

Ferry Goes Down With 1,400 Aboard – Washington Post Foreign Service – Feb. 4, 2006

CARTOON CRISIS –

Developments in Cartoon Protests – AP – Feb. 6, 2006

Cartoons Spark Burning of Embassies – Washington Post Foreign Service – Feb 5, 2006

Clash Over Cartoons Is a Caricature Of Civilization – Washington Post – Feb 4, 2006

Protests Over Muhammad Cartoons Escalate – AP – Feb 3, 2006

ISRAEL-PALESTINE –

Official: Hamas Won’t Recognize Israel – AP – Feb. 6, 2006

Israel Will Work With Abbas, but Not Hamas – AP – Feb. 6, 2006

WAR ON TERROR –

U.S. Faults Saudi Efforts on Terrorism – Los Angeles Times – Jan. 15, 2006

“Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror” – Testimony of Anthony Cordesman Before the US Senate Judiciary Committee – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 9, 2006

U.S. POLICY ON ENERGY –

News in Depth – President Bush and the State of the Union – SUSRIS NID – Feb. 6, 2006

Bush: U.S. Must Get Free of Mideast Oil – AP – Feb. 1, 2006

Community and Cooperation – Prince Turki Al-Faisal – SUSRIS IOI – December 2, 2005

The Global Scourge of Terrorism: Ambassador Prince Turki al Faisal Shares His Outlook – SUSRIS Item of Interest – Nov. 8, 2005

Saudi ambassador’s credentials accepted by United States

Transcript of interview with Prince Turki Al-Faisal in the New York Times Magazine

Prince Turki Al-Faisal interviewed on CNN’s ‘Wolf Blitzer reports’

About Prince Turki al Faisal

Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Bio

BBC Profile

Global Security.org

Discuss This Issue on SUSRIS

For Information on the Discussion Forum

Editor’s Note:

One of the benefits of attending the Arab-US Policymakers Conferences (AUSPC) in recent years has been the opportunity to talk with H.E. Usamah al Kurdi, a member of Saudi Arabia’s Majlis Ash Shura, the Consultative Council. His background in the private sector and business related government organizations prepared him well to serve as a Vice Chairman of the Financial Committee and other business and finance roles in the Shura.

Majlis Member al Kurdi has generously given his time to SUSRIS in the past and again this year, last month in Washington on the sidelines of the AUSPC, he talked to us about developments in the Saudi-US relationship, reforms in Saudi Arabia and other issues of importance to SUSRIS readers. As always we thank him for his time, his insight and his candor.

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SUSRIS: Thank you for taking the time to update our readers on developments in the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Our previous conversations have been on the occasions of your visits to Washington for the annual Arab-US Policymakers Conference. Let’s start by talking about this year’s event. What were the highlights of the conference for you?

Usamah Al-Kurdi

H.E. Usamah al Kurdi: Thank you. I was delighted to be asked by the National Council on US-Arab Relations to participate in the conference, the fifteenth such event. This year’s conference was the most successful by far. There were very interesting issues addressed in the agenda and the lineup of speakers was unparalleled, whether in the oil sector, the Saudi-American relations areas, or the many other areas the conference addressed.

In addition I think taking one full day of the conference to focus on GCC-US relations was an extremely important twist to the conference, adding knowledge and excitement for the participants. I have to congratulate the National Council on this conference, but it is going to be a challenge to do a better job next year. It is not going to be easy but I am confident they can do it.

SUSRIS: There were quite a number of topics covered at the conference. What was the most interesting area for you?

Kurdi: Actually all of the panels were interesting and important. The area I would highlight is the session on oil. The participation of Aramco and all the other major oil companies from the United States and other countries was quite impressive. The discussions, the free and frank discussions, which took place during the sessions were very interesting for me and they reflected directly on Saudi Arabia and its standing in the world.

SUSRIS: The first day of the conference was devoted to the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States. What were some of the more important points in the discussions?

Kurdi: We covered many different parts of the relationship, of course, but one area that I believe is important is the fact that the two countries have no alternative but to strengthen their relations. The importance of the United States is its role as the superpower of the world. The importance of Saudi Arabia is its international role, its good standing around the world, and its important voice among the Muslim countries as the host of the two holiest cities in all of Islam — Mecca and Medina. There is also its importance as a major source of energy to the rest of the world.

One of the important subjects discussed was the issue of visas for Saudis to come to the United States, which stood as the single most important issue because of its long-term impact on the relationship. Saudis and Americans, I have to admit, find it difficult to go into each other’s country, but we have heard assuring statements from American participants that this is an issue they consider important.

SUSRIS: Many Americans may not be familiar with the component of the Saudi-US relationship that has to do with the Kingdom’s standing in the world. Can you expand on Saudi Arabia’s international role?

Kurdi: Saudi Arabia’s standing in the world is a result of the policies it has followed over the past 50 or 60 years. We have shown ourselves to be important players, balanced players in world affairs. We don’t move on impulse and we always look at the short-, medium- and long-term impacts of our policies. I think the most important indicator of this is the fact that Saudi Arabia was one of the signatories to the United Nations Charter in 1945 in San Francisco. This is an indication of the global role fulfilled by Saudi Arabia.

If you look at Saudi Arabia’s relationship with countries like the United States, the European Union, other Arab countries and other Islamic countries, you can conclude that Saudi Arabia commands a lot of respect with these countries because of its balanced policies. As an example of Saudi Arabia’s role as a responsible member of the international community I would remind you that on two occasions the Kingdom produced proposals for peace agreements between the Palestinians and the Israelis. King Fahd’s proposal was made in 1982 at the Arab Summit in Fez. In 2002 then Crown Prince Abdullah produced a proposal for the Arab League Summit in Beirut. It won agreement from every Arab state on a peace initiative with Israel. Unfortunately the Israeli position did not push this process ahead. We think that the rest of the world needs to understand that the matter of peace between the Palestinians and Israelis sits in the Israeli hands now and they should try to move it forward.

SUSRIS: An obvious, and important, part of Saudi Arabia’s position in the international community is as a source of energy for the world market. How do you view the role the Kingdom plays in this regard?

Kurdi: Saudi Arabia has always made it clear in words and in practice that it wants oil to be available at fair prices. Fair prices meaning that it does not want to disrupt the economies of any countries involved. To meet this commitment Saudi Arabia has made a significant investment to ensure that production and reserve capacities are maintained at levels that will keep the price of oil at reasonable levels — affordable by the different economies around the world.

Unfortunately there are other players in the market, and I mean the commodities market, who have a different agenda. No matter what others may choose to do Saudi Arabia has always had this policy and has always practiced this policy. That is another reason why Saudi Arabia has a good standing around the world.

SUSRIS: In what other areas does Saudi Arabia influence international developments?

Kurdi: There is, of course area, its position in the Islamic world, and Saudi Arabia has been playing an important role with other Islamic countries through its actions and policies as I have mentioned. But Saudi Arabia is also a solid partner with the United States and the international community in the war on terrorism. An important sign in its commitment here is the success that Saudi Arabia has had in fighting terrorism inside the country and the assistance it provides in fighting terrorism around the world.

Let us not forget the Saudi initiative of organizing the International Counter Terrorism Conference in Saudi Arabia and the proposal to create the Center to Counter Terrorism, including the proposal to finance and host this conference.

One more note on the question about Saudi Arabia’s role as a steward of world energy resources. You should recall the Saudi proposal to create, finance and host the International Energy Forum that came as a result of the petroleum ministers meeting from around the world to improve dialogue between producers and consumers. This organization is now operational in Saudi Arabia.

SUSRIS: In previous conversations you outlined the progress the Kingdom was making in political, economic and social reforms. You said the process was a long-term commitment. How would you describe the progress so far?

Kurdi: Reform in Saudi Arabia is serious business and we have addressed many different aspects of Saudi life. Almost every area has been touched by reform and I would like to highlight the latest step taken in Saudi Arabia. That was the issuance of the Succession Law. It clearly shows Saudi intentions regarding reform. It shows that it doesn’t matter what issue we are talking about. It doesn’t matter how sensitive it is. The Saudis want to address and produce steps that will improve what is happening in Saudi Arabia. The issuance of the Succession Law shows our boldness and seriousness in the area of reform. When it touches such an important issue, you know reform is taken seriously.

Reform has touched many other areas in Saudi Arabian life, such as in the area of the economy. In my opinion that is where we have seen the most significant and comprehensive efforts at reform. There have been three different axes of economic reform. One was the issuance of new laws and updating old laws. We have produced a competitiveness law. We have issued a new foreign investment law. We have issued a new tax law, reducing tax on foreign investors to a mere 20 percent. We are now looking at a companies law and other new business laws. Of course we cannot forget Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO, which has made a big difference in the openness and transparency of the Saudi economy.

The second axis was the way new organizations were created in Saudi Arabia to support the decision making process in the private sector and to assist the private sector — whether it is foreign or local — to do business in Saudi Arabia. We saw the creation of the Supreme Economic Council. We saw the creation of the General Investment Authority. We saw the creation of the Tourism Authority. There are other organizations that support the activities of the private sector.

The third axis was the opening up of new sectors in the Saudi economy for investments — private sector investors whether foreign or local. We saw the mining sector, the power generation sector and the water desalination sector open to private investments. We have seen the opening of the railroad sector for investment by the private sector. We have even seen changes in higher education and the introduction of foreign universities into Saudi Arabia in collaboration with local private universities. So this is the third axis — different investment possibilities in the country.

Another area where there has been extensive reform is the political area. It started many years ago with the issuance of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance. We have seen the creation of new regional councils in the different provinces of Saudi Arabia. There are thirteen different provinces and now each has its own council. We have seen the issuance of the Shura Council Law. The creation of the Shura Council is, in my opinion, the most important political reform that has taken place in Saudi Arabia. We have seen the establishment of municipal councils and the open election of half of the members. I am hopeful we will see even more political reform in Saudi Arabia.

We also saw the creation of a new labor law and increased attention given to the indigenization of the labor forces of each sector in the Saudi economy by giving the local labor force more opportunities to work. Many people know that a large number, about 27 percent, of the people living in Saudi Arabia are foreigners and the percentage gets higher when we are talking about the labor force.

We have also seen reform in the judicial area by the issuance of the due process law, by issuing a law requiring appointment of a lawyer for each accused individual. We also saw the creation of the Attorney General organization or the Public Prosecutor as it is called sometimes. We also saw the plans to create labor courts, to create traffic courts, and to create commercial courts, in addition to training and preparing more judges to serve in the different courts that have been created. So even in the judicial area there has been considerable development and improvement in Saudi Arabia.

SUSRIS: What are the current developments in the Shura Council, where you serve?

Kurdi: The Shura council continues to perform the duties prescribed by the law. An important development in the past couple of years was when the Shura council was accepted in the International Parliamentary Union, indicating that the council is actually the parliament of Saudi Arabia. That was done after due consideration of what the Shura Council does. The latest change in the Shura law allowed it to put items on its own agenda and I think in my opinion that is a major improvement. This change signifies the importance given to the Shura Council activities.

In March the Shura Council received its first visit by a foreign dignitary when President Chirac of France delivered a speech there. It was the first occasion where a head of state made an address to the Shura Council — the first in the Council’s history of 15 years. In April we received Chinese President Hu Jintao who also delivered a speech in the Shura Council. These two visits, I think, signify the importance of the Shura Council as the parliament in Saudi Arabia and that its role is gaining momentum.

SUSRIS: What is your position in the Council.

Kurdi: I’ve served as Vice Chairman of the Financial Committee and currently serve as a member of the Financial Committee. I usually follow economic and financial matters.

SUSRIS: Can you tell us more about the visit of the President of China to Saudi Arabia?

Kurdi: I think this shows the importance the Chinese give to Saudi Arabia. This is an important sign, it shows the kind of relationship Saudi Arabia has with all the countries around the world — more significantly the important, bigger countries. It is not necessary to explain the important economic progress that’s taking place in China and how quickly it is becoming an important trading partner with many different countries in the world. Saudi Arabia is keen to develop, to further develop, its relations with China, with India, and with many other countries around the world.

As you know on the GCC level we are starting to negotiate a free trade agreement with China with the [United] States, with the European Union and with Japan. I think the signing of such agreements will dramatically improve not only the trade and business between signatories but also world trade.

SUSRIS: During his visit President Hu and King Abdullah talked about a strategic oil reserve in China, agreements on oil refineries and increasing bilateral relations. Should that be of concern to Americans?

Kurdi: It should not be at all. In whatever Saudi Arabia does in the oil sector there is always attention to the global situation. We never emphasize any specific country or any specific region, especially knowing that oil is a freely traded commodity. In the commodities market it is nearly impossible for any country to play a dominant role.

But lets not forget that Saudi Arabia is also expanding its ventures related to oil in other countries, in many countries around the world. This includes the United States, Europe, China, Japan and countries like the Philippines and those of North Africa. The idea here is to ensure internal supply, global energy supply and also provide additional value added to Saudi Arabia. So you can see this is nothing more than a win-win situation for Saudi Arabia and the world.

SUSRIS: Last question has to do with the fundamentals of the Saudi-US relationship. What should Americans be thinking about Saudi Arabia?

Kurdi: I think we are a friendly country that is careful in supporting a well-developed global economy. Saudi Arabia is a country that wants world peace in every part in the world. Saudi Arabia has shown that, not only in its words but also in its actions.

SUSRIS: Thank you for taking time to share your insights with our readers.

Kurdi: Well, thank you.

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About Usamah Al-Kurdi

Usamah Al-Kurdi is President of Alagat, a business-consulting firm based in Riyadh and a member of Saudi Arabia’s Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura). He serves as a Board Member of Saudi Arabian Airlines and an Executive Committee member of the national U.S. Arab Chamber of Commerce.

From 1990-2001, Mr. Al-Kurdi served as Secretary General of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce, as well as Vice President of Saudi Consulting House, a forerunner of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA). He has also served on the Boards of Saudi Arabia’s National Industrialization Committee and the Royal Commission on Jubail & Yanbu (industrial cities).

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By and About Usamah Al-Kurdi on SUSRIS:

• Business Forum Perspectives: A Conversation with Usamah Al-Kurdi – SUSRIS Exclusive – Apr 28, 2010
• Developments in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Al-Kurdi (MEI) – SUSRIS – Jul 11, 2008
• The View from a Majlis Ash-Shura Member: A Conversation with Usamah al-Kurdi – SUSRIS Exclusive – Dec 31, 2006
• On Relations and Reforms: A Conversation with Usamah al-Kurdi – SUSRIS Exclusive – May 30, 2006 (Reprint)
• On Relations and Reforms: A Conversation with Usamah al Kurdi – SUSRIS Exclusive – Sep 30, 2005
• Political, Social and Economic Reform in Saudi Arabia: Interview with Usamah Al-Kurdi – Part 2 – SUSRIS Exclusive – Dec 15, 2004
• A Strong Relationship is the Only Path: Interview with Usamah Al-Kurdi – Part 1 – SUSRIS Exclusive – Dec 9, 2004
• The Dynamics of Economic and Commercial Reform: Near-Term Prognoses – Usamah Al-Kurdi – SUSRIS – Sep 27, 2004
• How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists – Part 2 – SUSRIS
• How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists – Part 1 – SUSRIS
• Economic Reform in Saudi Arabia – Summary of Remarks by Usamah Al-Kurdi – June 4, 2004

Journey of a Lifetime Begins
Arab News Team

MINA, 29 December 2006 — Pilgrims braved chilly weather conditions yesterday busying themselves in prayers and contemplation in the tent city of Mina on the first day of the five-day journey of a lifetime.

The valley was reverberating with verses from the Holy Qur’an. Pilgrims from nearly 170 countries were in the city. The Haj will climax today on the Plains of Arafat where the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) gave his last sermon more than 14 centuries ago.

Traffic from all around the Kingdom flowed smoothly into the city but there were huge queues at the entrance to Mina until late afternoon yesterday. Security forces checked every vehicle to keep pilgrims without permits away.

Thousands of police officers and reserved forces cleared the pedestrian pathway in Mina where thousands of pilgrims, including Saudis, were camping illegally. The officers started to clear the pathway at approximately 9 p.m. They formed a human block around the area to prevent pilgrims from camping in the place again.

The pilgrims were removed safely and peacefully from the pathway.

The police blamed Saudis for not following instructions, saying foreign pilgrims could be excused for not being aware of local laws, but not Saudis who are well aware of the dangers of squatting.

At the newly designed Jamrat Bridge, hundreds of security forces were successful in keeping the squatters away.

Security was noticeably higher this year, as authorities hope to prevent past calamities associated with overcrowding. Security forces have tightened measures on all entry points to the holy city to prevent pilgrims without valid permits from entering. At a press conference in Mina, Maj. Gen. Mansour Al-Turki, Interior Ministry spokesman, said security forces went into full action yesterday. He dismissed the possibility of sectarian violence that has spiraled out of control in Iraq spilling over into the Haj.

“There is no indication that pilgrims arrived for anything other than to perform Haj,” he said.

The center of activity as always was in and around the historic Masjid Al-Khaif. Pilgrims who came in early pitched their tents in the shadow of the mosque and immediately settled into reading verses from the Holy Qur’an.

“This is the command of our Prophet,” said one pilgrim. “I don’t know much about these rituals. I only know that the Prophet undertook a similar journey and I am doing this to express my love for my beloved Prophet.”

“Words can’t describe how I feel,” said Ismail Attiyeh, 45, from Syria, choking with emotion. “To see all these people from around the world responding to the call and speaking in one voice to our creator gives me unprecedented feelings.”

Elderly men and women were seen huddling in their tents. Passing pilgrims waved and smiled at them.

Considerable physical strength is demanded of pilgrims during Haj. Salamat Bhuiyan, a Bangladeshi performing the Haj for the first time, said: “From beginning to end, the rituals demand a great deal of strength and endurance. We can eat during the Haj, but many of us use the occasion to fast. The constant crush of hundreds of thousands of other pilgrims, each trying to perform the same rites at the same time in limited space and in hot weather compounds the stress and heightens the requirement for good physical conditions and mental toughness.”

For all pilgrims, the aim is always to seek the peace of Allah. “It teaches us that all of life is a spiritual quest,” said Sultan Abdullah from Pakistan.

Every pilgrim that Arab News spoke to talked about the cold weather. “This is unbearable. But then this is what Haj is all about,” said Abdullah Al-Qahtani from the Kingdom’s Northern Province. “We have to sacrifice. Haj is no picnic as some people think. It is an arduous journey.” He remembered the last Haj that he performed 11 years ago. “It was very tough during those days,” he said. “Mina and Makkah have changed for the better. There are many more facilities now.”

Doctors at the local hospitals reported an increased number of patients coming down with flu. “It is because of the weather. It is very cold,” said Dr. Muhammad Hai at a Ministry of Health dispensary in Mina. The spokesman of the Ministry of Health, Dr. Khaled Al-Mirghalani, said: “No serious infectious or communicable diseases have been detected so far.” Some pilgrims from South Asia were a little nervous because of their location. “We are on the edge of Muzdalifah. Yet where we are there are the old signs saying that this is where Mina ends. I don’t know what to think. This is a question that has been the cause of dispute in our camp. Some have gone deeper into Mina and want to pray there. Some pilgrims are asking if their Haj is being performed correctly or not. The Saudi government must remove the huge sign boards and erect new ones on the edge of extended Mina,” said Anwar Abdul Rahman from India.

“Praying in Masjid Al-Khaif has a special place in the performance of Haj, though it’s not a part of Haj rituals. But everyone wants to pray in it. And I feel myself fortunate enough to get a chance to see this majestic mosque and pray inside it,” said Abdur Rehman Abdul Wahab, a Kuwaiti.

“Haj is never tiring but always rewarding. Whoever performs it becomes as pure and innocent as a newborn child. This is Allah’s way of showering His choicest blessings on the believers,” said Saleh Al-Sheikh, a Syrian.

“I’m here to answer the call of Allah and pray for the peace and tranquility in my motherland. Those planning to harm us should never succeed in their mission. I also prayed for the unity of the Muslim Ummah, which is the need of the hour, said,” Iranian pilgrim Haider Ali Najafi.

The number of foreign pilgrims participating in this year’s Haj has reached a record 1,654,407, according to Interior Minister Prince Naif. Of them, 1,500,519 came by air, 129,903 by land and 23,985 by sea and they came from 187 countries, the Saudi Press Agency quoted the minister as saying.

Director General of Civil Defense Saad Al-Towaijeri said last night that the pilgrims had successfully completed the rites for the Yaum Al-Tarwiya, the first day of the Haj at Mina. No emergency case of accident was reported. All arrangements for the journey to Arafat are in place, he added.

– With inputs from Syed Faisal Ali, Samir Al-Saadi, Zainy Abbas, Galal Fakkar, Siraj Wahab and Saeed Al-Khotani

[Reprinted with permission of Arab News]

Also see: ‘God Will Ensure Our Safety’ – Syed Faisal Ali, Arab News

On SUSRIS
The Hajj – SUSRIS NID – January 4, 2006

The Hajj in Perspective: A Conversation with David Long – SUSRIS Interview – Jan 23, 2005

Pilgrims Bid Farewell to Makkah – SUSRIS IOI – Jan. 25, 2005

A Hajj Diary – By Faiza Saleh Ambah – SUSRIS IOI:
Part 1 – The Pilgrimage to Mecca: One Woman’s Journey
Part 2 – On Hajj, Battling Sin and Doubt
Part 3 – A Pilgrim Fends Off Temptation with Pebbles and Prayers
Part 4 – Pelting the Pillars, Again
Part 5 – The Reluctant Pilgrim’s Grudging Return Home
Related Material
Virtual Hajj – PBS.org [from "Muhammad: Legacy of a Prophet]

Mecca: Behind Geographic TV’s Rare Look Inside [NGS]

In pictures: Hajj preparations

Diary of the Hajj – BBC

Hajj Information Center

Graphical Representation of the Hajj Journey

Editor’s Note
[Originally published by SUSRIS in January 2005]

EDITOR’S NOTE:

The Hajj [in January 2006] drew over two million pilgrims to Makkah, Saudi Arabia for a joyous profession of their faith. Today we are pleased to mark the Hajj with an interview with Dr. David E. Long. For more on the Hajj we suggest you read Dr. Long’s essay “The Hajj and Its Impact on Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World.”

A career foreign service officer before retiring to become a consultant on Middle East affairs, he is author of numerous books on the Middle East and his Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is among the definitive texts on the subject. Dr. Long has recently finished Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia.

Dr. Long was interviewed by telephone from his home in Northern Virginia on January 14, 2005.

["Standing Day" will be observed on Friday, December 29, 2006. The four-day Eid al Adha will start on Saturday, December 30, 2006]

The Hajj in Perspective: A Conversation with David Long

SUSRIS: Thank you, Dr. Long for taking time today to talk with us about the Hajj. What is the Hajj and why do people do it?

Dr. Long: The Hajj is one of the five pillars or the foundation of Islam and therefore it is the obligation of everyone who is physically and financially able to do so to make the Hajj once in their lifetimes. Pilgrimages to Makkah actually predate Islam, but the Hajj is considered by all Muslims to be divinely inspired by God as set down in the Qur’an and the Sunna. It is one of the Five Pillars of Islam, the others being: the profession of faith – “there is no God but God and Mohammed is the messenger of God”; Zakat or charity; prayer five times a day, and fasting during Ramadan. The rites are based on the instructions Muhammad gave in his Farewell Hajj just before he died. They have remained virtually unchanged to this day.

SUSRIS: What role has Saudi Arabia played in hosting the pilgrims?

Dr. Long: That is a fascinating question. There was great fear when the Saudis took Makkah and annexed the Hijaz that they would do things that were not in line with the established practices. The fear first arose when the puritanical Islamic revival movement of Muhammed Ibn Abu Wahhab spread from Najd throughout Arabia, beginning in the 18th century.

Ibn Abu Wahhab preached that all sorts of innovations had been introduced into Islam since the time of Mohammed; his reform movement was basically a movement to get back to the original Islam. The centerpiece of his reform movement was Tawhid, or monotheism. The religious establishment who ran the Hajj feared that if the people followed the reform movement, it would cost them both economically and influence they held with the people. For example, one of the things that the movement called for was banning the practice of seeking intercession with God through Muslim saints by making pilgrimages to their tombs – very lucrative for those who controlled the tombs. Mohammed Ibn Abu Wahhab considered intercession heretical as it denigrated the sovereignty and omnipotence of God.

But when the Al Sauds annexed the Hijaz and took over the administration of the Hajj in 1925-1926, it soon became apparent that the fears were unfounded. From that time to this, the Saudi regime has gone all out to make sure it was available to all those who were able to attend. As a token of this responsibility, King Fahd assumed the title Khadim al-Haramain (Custodian of the Two Holy Places, i.e. Makkah and al-Madinah).
The job has not always been easy. Not only are the administrative tasks of providing services to over two million pilgrims enormous, but there have been all sorts or political divisions and problems that posed dilemmas for the Saudis.

For example, during the period of Nasserism and secular Arab nationalism there were many people who wanted to use the Hajj as a platform for political protest and the Saudis absolutely forbade that. They said it was not a time for politics; the Hajj was purely religious and they wanted to keep it that way. They would not allow protest over secular political issues — even if they agreed with them — that they did not feel were legitimately in the context of religious celebration.

After the 1979 revolution, Iranian provocateurs stirred up trouble at the Hajj. It was partly religious but it was mostly political. It was an attempt to undermine the Islamic world’s acceptance of Saudi custodianship, to undermine their reputation for running Hajj. But it backfired; it did not work, in fact, just the opposite. On the whole, I think that the record of the Saudis has been fairly good in terms of their striving to help people meet the obligation to come to the Hajj without being subjected to political protest.

Now that’s on the political side. The administrative problems the Saudis have had to encounter have in many ways been even more daunting. In the beginning, the Saudi Government was far less advanced than the former Hijazi government and not capable of administering such a huge task. What they came up with, I think, was pretty ingenious: a public utility concept — my term not theirs – similar to public utilities in the United States. The Hajj is administered primarily by the private sector but it is closely regulated by the government, which even collects the fees from the Hajjis and remits it to the private Hajj service sector to insure that the pilgrims are being fairly treated. Had the government tried to nationalize Hajj administration, there would likely have been chaos. But instead, they allowed private guilds (somewhat like guilds in medieval Europe) that had been guiding pilgrims for centuries, to continue to administer the Hajj but under strict supervision.

The principal guild consists of mutawwiffin (sing. mutawwif). They are sort of like family-run religious tour guide companies, if you will. Collectively, the mutawwiffin are responsible for pilgrims from every country in the world. For example, there is a mutawwif responsible for all the pilgrims coming from the United States. Closely associated with the mutawwifin are the Wukala’ (sing Wakil), or Agents. Located in the port city of Jiddah, they are responsible for meeting pilgrims arriving by air or sea, seeing them safely off to Makkah and seeing them off on the return trip home. (With the creation of an all-weather road system, an increasing number once again travel overland by car or bus.)

There is another guild in Makkah, the Zamazimah (sing. Zamzami). Historically, their task was to provide pilgrims with the holy water of Zamzam, a well inside the Haram Mosque. That has become a major undertaking with the great increase in numbers. Can you imagine when you have two million people who want to drink Zamzam water that’s a pretty big task? They do that, but their skill has expanded and that is why they are called Zamazimah. In fact they bottle Zamzam water — the real Zamzam water — send it all over the world. It is a non-profit foundation to raise money for worthy causes.

Finally, to meet, guide and see off the Hajjis that visit al-Madinah, the guild of Adilla (sing. Dalil) are located in al-Madinah where they meet, guide and see off the Hajjis that visit that city.

Compare the Hajj to a city of two million people. Over two million people attend the Hajj each year. Think about it – providing transportation, sanitation, health care, food, and drink. What happens if somebody gets lost and speaks an uncommon language? There are some pilgrims in their 60s and 70s who have saved up for a lifetime to make the Hajj. The chances of a medical emergency among this group are high, particularly in the summer months when the temperature can reach 135 degrees Fahrenheit, and they are usually outside or living in a tent. Throughout the area, the government has installed high overhead sprinklers to lower the chances of heat stroke. These are not conditions on the magnitude of the South Asia tsunami, but they must be dealt with on a yearly basis. It is truly a mind-boggling task.

SUSRIS: Your analogy of a population, an overnight collection, of two million people, equivalent to a US metropolitan region is interesting. Can you give us a sense of the magnitude of the event?

Dr. Long: I think that puts it in the right perspective. When you have that many people, there are bound to be glitches here and there. What is amazing is that there aren’t more. For example, let’s talk about transportation. Let me walk you through the Hajj.

When pilgrims near Makkah, whether by air, land or sea, they must enter a ritual state of purification called Ihram. It includes wearing Hajj garments — women do not wear veils – and refraining from cutting hair or nails, or having sex. Those in Ihram are easily recognizable by the garments they wear – two seamless pieces of white terry cloth for men and a long white robe for women. Women do not wear veils.

Upon reaching Makkah, one goes to the great Haram Mosque. The first rite is the Tawaf, the seven-fold circumambulation of the Kaaba, the dark stone cubic building in the center of the main mosque area. One then takes a drink of holy Zamzam water and then makes seven one way trips between Safa and Marwah, which are two little hills that are now incorporated into the mosque complex. That commemorates when Hagar was frantically looking for water for her infant son, Isma’il. In response, according to Islamic tradition, God struck open a rock and out came the water of Zamzam.

The logistics of moving the pilgrims through these rites are not particularly difficult. They are done ad seriatim as people arrive, not all at the same time. Afterwards, all the pilgrims travel east of Makkah to the Plain of Arafat. The choicest place to be is a small hill called the Mount of Mercy, but as all two million arrive, a tent city to accommodate them, replete with shops, first aid stations, fire stations, sanitations facilities, communications and transportation, stretches for miles across the plain.

It is at the Plain of Arafat that the Hajj culminates at sunset on Standing Day, the ninth day of the Muslim lunar month of Thul-Hijjah (which occurs eleven days earlier each year on the solar calendar – this year on January 20). Everyone – all two million plus– must say prayers at Arafat at sunset on that day else the Hajj is forfeited.

Following prayers, everyone must travel back toward Makkah to another location, Mina for the beginning of the Eid al-Adha (The Great Feast of the Sacrifice), which is celebrated throughout the Muslim world. The trek is called the Rush (Nafrah), but it takes about 12 hours to get everyone there. Think about two million people leaving from the same place at the same time, and going to the same place. Think about the Super Bowl or a World Series game, and what kind of traffic jam that causes. Multiply that by twenty, but instead of going north, south, east and west think of them all going in the same direction and out of piety many of them want to walk. We’re talking about the biggest traffic jam ever.

So transportation, the problems they have to address are mind-boggling. They have everything from taxicabs to big buses that come down from Turkey and Central Asia with the Hajis living in them. Think of all the fender benders and that’s just one thing.

SUSRIS: And they are from all corners of the globe?

Dr. Long: Yes, from all corners of the globe. And speaking over 100 languages or dialects and a large number of them up in years. But the gargantuan logistical task does not end there. During the Eid al Adha each family is supposed to sacrifice an animal. Of course many insist on a sheep, nothing smaller. For years, hundreds of thousands of sheep were slaughtered, and after families took what they could use, the rest was simply buried because of the lack of processing facilities for sheep sacrificed one day of the year. But the goal of the Eid is to give up something valuable, not blood sacrifice, and so now it is possible to purchase a sheep, have it slaughtered in the correct way and have the meat distributed worldwide to the needy. It is both practical and a suitable act of piety.

These are just some of the logistical problems that confront the Saudis. It is a Herculean job. One of the things that makes it all work is the attitude of the people. The Hajj is an incredibly and deeply joyous time — not the sort of the manufactured happiness of New Year’s Eve West where everyone goes out and tries to pretend they are having a great time. People from all over the Muslim world who attend are overflowing with good will.

One can feel it feel it even watching on Saudi television where it is broadcast. Watching the broadcast, one can hear a spontaneous chanting of the Talbiyyah, a ritual prayer repeated throughout the Hajj. First will come one or two voices, then a dozen, and then thousands are chanting it. Even for those not physically present, it is hard not to have chills run up and down your back

SUSRIS: How does the role of Saudi Arabia as the custodian of the two holy places and the role as host for the pilgrimage effect the thinking of the people and government of Saudi Arabia?

Dr. Long: The attitude toward the Hajj in Saudi Arabia may be somewhat analogous to being a Catholic living in Rome. You might take it for granted, but at the same time it permeates your whole life. Proximity to the Muslim holy places can indeed be taken for granted by Saudis, particularly those who live in Makkah and al-Madinah and nearby towns and cities. But on the other hand, Islam in all its dimensions is just a part of one’s daily life in a way that is difficult to duplicate in many other places throughout the Muslim world.

One of the issues now facing Saudis and others from the Gulf is that physically there are only so many people who can do this each year and they are about to max out. They have spent literally millions of dollars expanding the capacity of the holy cities and the holy mosques to accommodate these people. You remember when I said the two little hills that were incorporated into the complex — Safa and Marwah. You’ve seen pictures of the Prophet’s Mosque in Al-Madinah. These are huge places, and they can accommodate over a million people at the same time — that is just mind-boggling.

But still, the government has had to say to people who live in Saudi Arabia and neighboring states that they cannot go to the Hajj more than once every five years. Because there are so many people living in Saudi Arabia, there are three million people living in nearby Jeddah — what if they all showed up? It is a difficult dilemma for the government to limit local attendance at the holy places during the Hajj, but it must be done to make room for those attending for the first and perhaps last time in their lives.

SUSRIS: A news report said this year’s visa quota for the Hajj was 1.2 million.

Dr. Long: Yes they do limit visas. They have to. The people in the Arabian Peninsula don’t need a Hajj visa.

They have to do this in order to accommodate people because it is a religious obligation and they take it very seriously. Again that is another logistic problem they have to address. Security is the same way. As people found out back during the Arab nationalist era and as the Iranians discovered after the Islamic revolution, there is a backlash against people who try to use the Hajj for political purposes. This is a very holy celebration and anybody who tries to stir up trouble is subject to a backlash, a feeling against them.

SUSRIS: Does Saudi Arabia exercise any special place in the Islamic world since it is the home of the holy sites?

Dr. Long: I think that it would be precise to say that Saudi Arabia feels a special responsibility to the rest of the Muslim world as the birthplace of Islam and the location of its two holiest places. They do place great importance on their relations with other Muslim states, and to increase good relations throughout the Muslim world they created the OIC [Organization of the Islamic Conference]. It is probably fair to say that they do exercise a special place in the Islamic world, but it is not an ‘imperial’ thing. They feel that as the keepers of the holy places and the birthplace of Islam they have to be concerned about the hearts and minds of Muslims. But that doesn’t translate into Saudi hegemony over anything because it wouldn’t be Saudi hegemony, it would be God’s hegemony over the world in an Islamic context.

SUSRIS: How does the Hajj fit into the changing security posture in the Kingdom – given the Al Qaeda attacks of recent years?

Dr. Long: People should always be mindful of the security situation anywhere they go. But there are two other considerations here: one, any terrorist group that seeks legitimacy from some Muslim constituency would be foolish indeed to commit an act of violence at such a holy celebration. Those who have tried in past years have found it overwhelmingly counterproductive. One must assume that they seek to recruit followers and it is not going to win hearts and influence people to kill your own people during the holiest gathering of the year.

SUSRIS: Is there potential for some activity to embarrass the Saudis as the hosts.

Dr. Long: There is always that potential but as the Iranians found out the odds that it would be totally counterproductive and backfiring are huge. The terrorists in Saudi Arabia have found out that the people turned against them when they started killing Muslims. One of the reasons they went for the Interior Ministry last month was to isolate them in the minds of people as the enemy rather than as Muslims.

Al-Qaeda is expounding a cause, but no matter how fanatical they might be, they cannot succeed by alienating the very people you are supposedly trying to protect from the outside enemy. There may be some organization with a kind of Jim Jones mentality that does something really irrational, but Al-Qaeda does not appear to me to be that irrational. They may be zealots but they think rationally. You can’t rule it out but I would find it incredible that they would be so stupid.

SUSRIS: So the security challenges are just the physical accommodation of over two million people.

Dr. Long: Nothing of the magnitude of the Hajj is that simple, and of course, the Saudis are going to have to worry about political security. But Hajj administration is such a gigantic undertaking that they will have plenty of other, more mundane forms of security to worry about.

SUSRIS: What is it about the Hajj that people should understand? How should people put it in the context of world events?

Dr. Long: There are many ways you can do that. The first that comes to mind is that the Hajj creates an opportunity for non Muslims and people who don’t know much about Islam — particularly those people who have a totally negative view of Muslims as terrorists and the other images that are prominently displayed in the media — that this is a gathering of 2 million faithful people in a joyous time in the 21st century. With all the strife and all the suffering going on in the world it is just absolutely amazing.

It shows as much as anything can, the collective heart of the largest religious group in the world — 1.2 billion people, more of them than anyone else. That in itself is not the lesson, the lesson is to get along in this world with anybody you need a sense of perspective. This is a great way of gaining perspective by looking at how so many people do an act of piety and religious obligation in an atmosphere of joy every year regardless of what’s going on in Iraq, or anywhere, and I think that would be a lesson to contemplate.

SUSRIS: That’s a great observation. Thank you, Dr. Long for sharing your insight on the Hajj with us today.

About David Long
David E. Long is a consultant on Middle East and Gulf affairs and international terrorism. He joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1962 and served in Washington and abroad until 1993, with assignments in the Sudan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. His Washington assignments included Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Counter Terrorism for Regional Policy, a member of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, and Chief of the Near East Research Division in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Bureau. He was also detailed to the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, 1991-92, and to the United States Coast Guard Academy, 1989-91, where he served as Visiting Professor of International Relations and in 1990-91 as Acting Head of the Humanities Department.

A native of Florida, he received an AB in history from Davidson College, an MA in political science from the University of North Carolina, an MA in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the George Washington University.

In 1974 -1975, Dr. Long was an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and concurrently a Senior Fellow at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. While on leave of absence from the State Department, he was the first Executive Director of the Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1974-1975. In 1982-1983, he was a Senior Fellow of the Middle East Research Institute and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and in 1987-1989, he was a Diplomat in Residence and Research Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown.

Dr. Long has been an adjunct professor at several Washington area universities, including Georgetown, George Washington and American Universities and the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He has also lectured extensively in the United States and abroad on topics relating to the Islam, the Middle East and terrorism.

His publications include The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (co-editor with Bernard Reich, 4th ed. 2002), Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century (co-editor with Christian Koch, 1998), The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1997), The Anatomy of Terrorism (1990), The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (1985), Saudi Arabian Modernization (with John Shaw, 1982), The Hajj Today: A Survey of the Contemporary Makkah Pilgrimage (1979), Saudi Arabia (1976) and The Persian Gulf (1976, revised 1978).

On SUSRIS
The Hajj – SUSRIS NID – January 4, 2006

The Hajj and Its Impact on Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World – By David E. Long – SUSRIS IOI – Jan 19, 2005

Pilgrims Bid Farewell to Makkah – SUSRIS IOI – Jan. 25, 2005

A Hajj Diary – By Faiza Saleh Ambah – SUSRIS IOI:
Part 1 – The Pilgrimage to Mecca: One Woman’s Journey
Part 2 – On Hajj, Battling Sin and Doubt
Part 3 – A Pilgrim Fends Off Temptation with Pebbles and Prayers
Part 4 – Pelting the Pillars, Again
Part 5 – The Reluctant Pilgrim’s Grudging Return Home
Related Material
In pictures: Hajj preparations

Diary of the Hajj – BBC

Hajj Information Center

Graphical Representation of the Hajj Journey

Editor’s Note
[Reprinted from SUSRIS]

Hundreds of thousands of Muslims flooded the ports of entry in western Saudi Arabia this week to start the pilgrimage to Makkah. On the occasion of the Hajj, we are pleased to present this essay from Dr. David E. Long which appeared in the Saudi-American Forum in February 2003. This essay will be followed by a previously published interview with Dr. Long on the subject of the Hajj.

["Standing Day" will be observed on Friday, December 29, 2006. The four-day Eid al Adha will start on Saturday, December 30, 2006]

Executive Summary

Each year, 2 million Muslims perform the Hajj, or Great Pilgrimage to Makkah. One of the Five Pillars of Islam, the Hajj is required of all believers once in their lifetimes provided they are physically, mentally and financially able.

For the duration of the Hajj and the traditional visit to al-Madinah afterward, the Saudi government must insure that the Hajjis are provided with adequate housing (mainly in tents), food, water, health and sanitation, ground transportation, and public safety and security.

The government has spent billions of dollars on Hajj infrastructure from the two special Hajj air terminals which are the largest structures under a single roof in the world, to the extensive preventative and curative health and sanitation facilities at all the major Hajj locations. The Saudi government has also maintained a strict policy banning political activity so that militants do not desecrate this peaceful and joyous occasion. It is a task of almost unimaginable proportions.

The Hajj and Its Impact on Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World
By David E. Long

Each year, 2 million Muslims perform the Hajj, or Great Pilgrimage to Makkah, the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad and where the Qur’an was first revealed to him. One of the Five Pillars of Islam,1 the Hajj is required of all believers once in their lifetimes provided they are physically, mentally and financially able. Sura (Chapter) 3: 90-91 of the Qur’an states: “And the Pilgrimage to the Temple (the Hajj) is an obligation to God from those who are able to journey there.” Although it is not technically a part of the Hajj, most Hajjis then visit al-Madinah, 450 kilometers to the north. In 622 AD, Muhammad and his followers fled to al-Madinah from mounting persecution in Makkah. The flight, known as the Hijrah, marks the beginning of the Muslim, or Hijriyyah calendar.2 Many of the chapters (suras) of the Qur’an were written down in al-Madinah.

Although many religions have pilgrimages, the Hajj is virtually unique in its worldwide participation and sheer size. It is hard for anyone who has not been in the Kingdom during the Hajj to appreciate its full scope. How can a country with a relatively small population such as Saudi Arabia maintain such a good record in administering it each year? The following is a brief overview of administrative, political, economic, and social significance of the Hajj on Saudi Arabia and indeed the entire Muslim world. But first, for those not familiar with the rites of the Hajj, it would be instructive follow the pilgrims through the rites.

The Religious Significance of the Hajj

The Hajj takes place each year during the month of Dhu al-Hijja, the last month of the Muslim calendar. It is virtually impossible to describe the deep emotions generated during the Hajj, even by watching it on Saudi television which annually records it. Each rite has a special significance. The principal rites are Ihram, Tawaf, Sa`y, Wuquf, Nafrah, Rajm, and the `Id al-Adha:3

Ihram is a ritual cleansing and consecration and declaration of intent to perform the Hajj, performed before entering Makkah. Afterwards, pilgrim don special Irham garb of white terrycloth representing the equality of all believers before God, regardless of race, gender, age or social standing. Men wear two coverings for the upper and lower body, and women wear white robes but need not cover their faces.

Tawaf, performed on arrival in the great Haram Mosque in Makkah, is completed by circling seven times around the Ka`bah, located in a great open area in the Haram Mosque. The Ka`bah is considered the spiritual and geographical center of Islam, toward which Muslims face in prayer. Tradition has it that the Ka`bah, a dark stone structure, was originally built by the Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) and his son Ismail (Ishmael) as a place of worship of the one true God, and symbolizes monotheism which is at the heart of Islam. Each year just before the Hajj, the Ka`bah is covered with a new black velvet and gold drape called the Kiswah. Following the Arrival Tawaf, pilgrims say prayers at the Maqam Ibraham, a station near the Ka`bah, and also drink water from the holy well of Zamzam. Tradition has it that God created the well by striking a stone so that Hajar (Hagar) and Ismail might drink when they were about to die of thirst.

Sa`y consists of seven laps on foot between two elevations formerly adjacent to the mosque but now a part of the mosque complex. It commemorates Hagar’s frantic search for water. Sa`y and Tawaf together are called the Umrah (Lesser pilgrimage) and can be performed any time during the year but do not meet the obligation of Hajj.

Wuquf is performed in a ceremony of “Standing” on the Plain of Arafat, about 20 kilometers east of Makkah beginning at noon on the ninth day of Dhu al-Hijjah, called Yawm al-Wuquf, “Standing Day.” The favored spot to stand is Jabal al-Rahma, the Mount of Mercy, a rocky hill rising about 150 feet above the plain and crowned by a tall white stone obelisk. According to Islamic tradition, the Wuquf is the Hajj – the supreme hours. Everyone must literally be present at `Arafat at maghrib (sunset) or the Hajj is forfeited.

Nafrah: The word literally means “the Rush” in Arabic. As the sun finally disappears over the horizon, in its wake some 2 million Hajjis surge forth from `Arafat to Mina, some 17 kilometers away. They travel by bus, car, truck, and for many as an act of piety, by foot. With so many people, the Nafrah is one of the most chaotic and stressful exercises in this or any other religious observance. The first stop is Muzdalifa about seven kilometers west, where Sunset and Evening prayers (Salat al-Maghrib and al-`Isha) are traditionally said, and a special prayer can be said at a roofless mosque called al-Mash`ar al-Haram (the Sacred Grove). Because of the great crowds, now only the earliest to depart `Arafat usually arrive in Muzdalifa in time for Maghrib prayer, and many say them before leaving Arafat. After midnight and saying Early Morning prayer (Salat al-Fajr), the Hajjis travel on to Mina, a small town about ten kilometers farther west, where they will stay for three days.

Rajm: In Mina, Hajjis perform Rajm over the next three days, the ritual throwing of seven stones at three pillars, called Jamras which represent Shaytans (devils). The tenth through the twelfth of Dhu al-Hijja is also the `Id al-Adha (the Feast of the Sacrifice) which includes the sacramental sacrifice of a blemishless animal, usually a sheep. The `Id is celebrated not only at the Hajj but also throughout the Muslim world where it is a joyous time to visit family and friends.

On the thirteenth, Hajjis return to Makkah for a Farewell Tawaf and are free from all Ihram restrictions. At that point, the Hajj is technically over, and Hajjis are free to travel home or on to visit al-Madinah. There the pace is more relaxed and people can take more time to see the sights, principally the Prophet’s Mosque.

The Impact of the Hajj on Saudi Public Administration

Due to tremendous advances in transportation and communications technology, the Hajj has changed more in the past eight decades since Saudi Arabia formally became guardians of the Holy Places in 1926 than it had in the previous 1300 years of Islamic history.4 In 1927, an estimated 300 to 350 thousand attended with only about 150,000 from outside the Kingdom. In 1972, there was a total of 1,042,007 Hajjis, including 353,460 Saudis, 209,208 non-Saudi residents, and 479,339 from abroad.5 Today, an estimated 2 million perform the Hajj.

The unprecedented increase in the numbers of pilgrims has greatly increased the complexity of Hajj administration. Just to make room for foreign Hajjis, the Saudi government has restricted attendance by Saudis, many of whom formerly often attended every year, to once every five years, and has negotiated visa quotas for foreign Hajjis with their countries of origin.

Another huge logistical problem is how to dispose of the remains of the thousands of sheep annually sacrificed at Mina. For years, families were allowed to keep only what they consumed during the `Id and the rest was buried in huge pits. In recent years, however, an abattoir has been constructed to preserve the meat, and Hajjis may now purchase a sheep from an Islamic bank to be sacrificed in accordance with Islamic practice, with the meat then distributed to the poor throughout the Muslim world. Increasing numbers of Hajjis are choosing this option, which combines piety with charity.

Providing Zamzam water for so many Hajjis is a major task. Traditionally, the Zamzamis roamed the Haram Mosque providing water to all who asked. But with so many pilgrims today, they must now store the water well in advance, replenish portable containers and paper cups in numerous, strategically located places around the mosque, and continuously refill them as needed. A charitable foundation also bottles Zamzam water for sale throughout the world.

To meet these administrative needs, the Saudi government has established a combination of public services and government regulated privately administered Hajj services:

The Hajj Private Service Industry

For centuries, Hajj administration was largely in the hands of ancient, family-organized guilds that arranged for food, lodging and transportation, and also guided pilgrims through the Hajj rites: Wakils, or Agents, who guided them to Makkah, usually from the nearby port city of Jiddah; the Mutawwifs (from the word Tawaf), who guided Hajjis through the Hajj rites; Zamzamis, who distributed Zamzam water; and Dallils, or Guides, who guided visitors to al-Madinah. Lacking the resources to take over these tasks, King Abd al-Aziz (“Ibn Saud”) left them in the hands of the guilds. As the Hajj was the backbone of the economy of the Hijaz, the guilds had traditionally charged literally whatever the Hajj traffic would bear. However, the Saudi government, which takes its responsibility as custodian of the Two Holy Places very seriously, strictly regulates the guilds in order to insure that the Hajjis not be overcharged. Today, the guilds function much as public utilities. To the present day, the principal responsibility for providing personal services to the Hajjis rests with the Mutawwifs, who act essentially as religious tour guide companies for designated countries of origin. They are responsible for looking after the Hajjis under their care from the time they leave home for Saudi Arabia until they return home again.

The Hajj service industry also includes other regulated private sector enterprises. Overland bus transportation is provided by a combination of foreign and Saudi public and private companies. Of the 11,5000 buses in service in the 2002 Hajj, the Saudi Transportation Syndicate, made up of several private companies, provided 7,000, and the Saudi Arabian Public Transportation Company (SAPTCO) provided 600. SAPTCO is a publicly traded, government-managed company whose board of directors is chaired by the Undersecretary of Communications. It was created 24 years ago to provide bus scheduled intercity and international service and chartered service for the Hajj and Umrah. The rest of the buses come from foreign countries.6

In 1945, Saudi Arabia established Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) as a national air carrier. In addition to providing domestic and international air service, it was also given the mission to provide service “for Moslems on pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of Islam in Saudi Arabia.”7 In the 2003 Hajj, Saudia plans to carry 893,702 Hajjis on 1,754 flights from 70 international destinations.8 Most Hajjis will enter the Kingdom at Jiddah, the main Hajj port of entry, where two special Hajj air terminals await them, the largest structures under a single roof in the world.

Public and private Islamic foundations also are involved in operations such as providing and distributing sacrificed meat and Zamzam water. The Ministry of Awqaf (Islamic foundations; sing. Waqf)) also acts as a repository for those who wish to donate charitable contributions as a part of their Hajj experience.

Hajj Public Services

In addition to government-regulated and government-owned Hajj service companies, Saudi Arabia must also provide extensive direct government services for the Hajj. Overall services are coordinated by the Hajj Ministry and the inter-agency Central Hajj Committee. Public safety, public security and traffic control are provided by the Ministry of Interior, and were a special crisis to arise, it can also call on the National Guard. It is responsible for regulating entry and exit from the Kingdom at all land, sea and air ports of entry, and insuring their safe overland travel to and from Makkah and al-Madinah. For the most part, overland traffic is spread out over a number of weeks, but during the Nafrah, all 2 million Hajjis set out at the same time for the same place. It has become one of the greatest traffic gridlocks in the world. Despite Herculean efforts by the traffic police, supplied with the most up-to-date equipment; the journey from Arafat to Mina can take over 12 hours. By comparison, consider a dozen Super Bowl games getting out at the same time and place, everyone all heading in the same direction.

Public health is another Herculean task. Modern health services were originally created in the 19th century because of fear in Europe and America over the spread of cholera. Asian Hajjis brought cholera to Makkah, and North African Hajjis spread it from there to Europe and America. The Western powers pressured the Ottoman sultan to create an international organization called the Paris Office of Hygiene to oversee the health and sanitation aspects of the Hajj. After World War II, the newly formed World Health Organization assumed this responsibility after absorbing the Paris Office. In 1956, the Saudi Ministry of Health assumed responsibility for Hajj health and sanitation and now operates extensive preventative and curative health and sanitation facilities at all major Hajj locations.9 The Saudi Red Crescent Society also participates, operating first aid and other facilities.

Of lesser magnitude but equally important, personnel in Saudi Embassies and Consulates abroad must be augmented each year to process foreign Hajj visa applications. At home, the Foreign Ministry also plays host to VIPs making the Hajj, including cabinet ministers, heads of state and other important personages.

Hajj Infrastructure

The government has also spent billions of dollars on Hajj infrastructure. This has included major expansions of the two holy mosques in Makkah and al-Madinah. The Haram Mosque can now comfortably accommodate a million worshipers, and during the Hajj, twice that number pack into it. There are also two new levels to increase capacity for performing the Sa`y. The Prophet’s Mosque in al-Madinah has also been expanded, although the crowds are smaller there during the Hajj.10 In Mina, the space for throwing stones at the three Jamras has been increased to three tiers.

To accommodate overland transportation at the Hajj, the Saudi government has constructed hundreds of miles of all weather, four lane highways, particularly between Arafat and Mina. It has also installed created a fully computerized traffic control system. Each year, portable tent cities are set up at `Arafat and Mina to provide housing, food, water, health and sanitation, transportation, telecommunications, public safety, banking facilities, markets – indeed all amenities of a city of 2 million people. All in all, nearly every Saudi government agency and ministry becomes involved one way or another in making the Hajj an administrative success.

The Political Significance of the Hajj

The Saudi government has always maintained a strict policy banning political activity under the pretext of attending the Hajj, welcoming Muslims regardless of their political persuasion. Nevertheless, over the years there have been a number of political activists that have tried to use the occasion to press their political agendas. During the height of Arab socialism, radical Arab nationalists made periodic attempts to embarrass the Saudi regime by disrupting the Hajj, but none of them were successful. In an attempt to challenge Saudi Arabia’s role of leadership in the Muslim world and discredit its custodianship of the Islamic holy places, the Khomeini regime in Iran sent provocateurs to disrupt 1982 Hajj in an attempt. Tensions mounted in subsequent years, until 1987 when 400 people were killed and Saudi security services had to be called in to quell violent agitation by Iranian Hajjis.11 Muslims throughout the world condemned the agitation as a desecration of the Hajj.

Since then, the Hajj has remained a peaceful and joyous occasion as it was intended to be. However, in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the threat of violent political activity has increased as militant Muslims put forward the claim that anti-American and anti-Zionist demonstrations would be in the name of Islam, not politics.

The Economic Impact of the Hajj:

Prior to the oil era, the Hajj was the economic backbone of the Saudi economy. With vast oil wealth, the government no longer depend on Hajj revenue, but it is still a major source of income for the private sector. In addition to the Hajj service industry, the Hajj is a major season for the consumer retail season as well, somewhat analogous to the Christmas season in the United States. Hajjis from third world countries in particular buy items that are hard to get or highly taxed at home, such as medicines and luxury items such as perfumes and jewelry. For the 2003 Hajj, about 1500 young Saudis have been hired and trained to accompany the Hajjis on their sacred journey. According the project director, the aim of the project is to create employment for Saudi youth while helping guests and serving in the worship of God.12

In recent years, Islamic religious tourism has been expanded far beyond the Hajj. Many Muslims from all over the world now perform the Umrah year round. The fasting month of Ramadhan is particularly busy season, as many Saudi residents also flock to the Holy Places. At the month draws to an end, Muslims celebrate the anniversary of the first revelation of the Qur’an. On this lailat al-qadir, or “night of power,” some three million people perform tarawih prayers in the Haram Mosque, more than at the Hajj.13

With year round visits now to the two Holy Places, there are no published figures that break out gross revenues generated by the Hajj, but they are estimated to be in the billions of dollars, including annual government expenditures.

The Social Impact of the Hajj

In its size and global scope, the Hajj is the greatest single ritual celebration, not just of Islam, but of any religion anywhere. As one of the Five Pillars of Islam, it is an obligation for one-fifth of world’s population. During the month of Dhu al-Hijjah, virtually the entire population of Saudi Arabia is intimately touched by the Hajj, whether directly in its administration, its service industry, as a purveyor of personal goods and services, or indirectly by observing it on television. The `Id al-Adha, observed at the end of the Hajj, is celebrated throughout the Muslim world as a time of worship and fellowship with family and friends.

Unlike the impact of the Hajj on many foreign visitors, whose journey is a mystical, once in a lifetime experience, the Saudi experience while visiting the Islamic Holy Places, during the Hajj or at any other time of year, is a local, accessible reality. The sites are the physical and geographical manifestation of the birth of Islam. This blending of the highly sacred and the familiar commonplace has permeated Saudi society to such an extraordinary degree that it can be felt in virtually every human endeavor from politics to business to simple recreation.

Notes:

1. The other pillars are the Shahada, or Profession of Faith: “There is no god but God and Muhammad is the Prophet of God”; Salah: regular prayer five times a day while facing Makkah; Zakat: charitable giving; and Sawm: fasting from sunup to sundown during the Muslim month of Ramadhan.
2. The Muslim, or Hijriyyah calendar, designated “AH,” began on July 16, 622. Its lunar years are eleven days shorter than the solar year, resulting in the Hajj beginning earlier each solar year.
3. It is important to note that this description is highly abbreviated. The actual rites are somewhat more complicated and include numerous variations and details.
4. The Saudis were actually in control of Makkah in 1925, and allowed to perform the Hajj, though numbers were greatly reduced.
5. Long, The Hajj Today, p. 135. Figures are derived from collating multiple sources.
6. The Saudi Arabian Information Resource, 18 December 2002,
(http://www.saudinf.com/main/y5068.htm ).
7. Saudi Arabian Airlines, “The Story of Saudi Arabian Airlines,” (pamphlet, 1970), pages unnumbered.
8. Ibid. 6 January 2003, ( http://www.saudinf.com/main/y5159.htm ).
9. See David E. Long, The Hajj Today, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1979), pp. 76-87.
10. Greg Noakes, “The Servants of God’s House,” Aramco World, January/February 1999, pp. 48, ff.
11. John L. Esposito, “The Iranian Revolution: A Ten Year Perspective,” in John L. Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), pp. 34-35.
12. Saudi Arabian Information Resource, 14 January 2003, ( http://www.saudinfo.com/main/y5204 )
13. Noakes, Loc. cit.

About the Author
David E. Long is a consultant on Middle East and Gulf affairs and international terrorism. He joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1962 and served in Washington and abroad until 1993, with assignments in the Sudan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. His Washington assignments included Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Counter Terrorism for Regional Policy, a member of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, and Chief of the Near East Research Division in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Bureau. He was also detailed to the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, 1991-92, and to the United States Coast Guard Academy, 1989-91, where he served as Visiting Professor of International Relations and in 1990-91 as Acting Head of the Humanities Department.
A native of Florida, he received an AB in history from Davidson College, an MA in political science from the University of North Carolina, an MA in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the George Washington University.

In 1974 -1975, Dr. Long was an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and concurrently a Senior Fellow at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. While on leave of absence from the State Department, he was the first Executive Director of the Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1974-1975. In 1982-1983, he was a Senior Fellow of the Middle East Research Institute and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and in 1987-1989, he was a Diplomat in Residence and Research Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown.

Dr. Long has been an adjunct professor at several Washington area universities, including Georgetown, George Washington and American Universities and the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He has also lectured extensively in the United States and abroad on topics relating to the Islam, the Middle East and terrorism.

His publications include The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (co-editor with Bernard Reich, 4th ed. 2002), Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century (co-editor with Christian Koch, 1998), The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1997), The Anatomy of Terrorism (1990), The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (1985), Saudi Arabian Modernization (with John Shaw, 1982), The Hajj Today: A Survey of the Contemporary Makkah Pilgrimage (1979), Saudi Arabia (1976) and The Persian Gulf (1976, revised 1978).

On SUSRIS
The Hajj – SUSRIS NID – January 4, 2006

The Hajj in Perspective: A Conversation with David Long – SUSRIS Interview – Jan 23, 2005

Pilgrims Bid Farewell to Makkah – SUSRIS IOI – Jan. 25, 2005

A Hajj Diary – By Faiza Saleh Ambah – SUSRIS IOI:
Part 1 – The Pilgrimage to Mecca: One Woman’s Journey
Part 2 – On Hajj, Battling Sin and Doubt
Part 3 – A Pilgrim Fends Off Temptation with Pebbles and Prayers
Part 4 – Pelting the Pillars, Again
Part 5 – The Reluctant Pilgrim’s Grudging Return Home
Related Material
Virtual Hajj – PBS.org [from "Muhammad: Legacy of a Prophet]

Mecca: Behind Geographic TV’s Rare Look Inside [NGS]

In pictures: Hajj preparations

Diary of the Hajj – BBC

Hajj Information Center

Graphical Representation of the Hajj Journey

Editor’s Note
Today for your consideration we present a Samba report on the Saudi economy, “Saudi Arabia’s 2007 Budget, 2006 Performance.” The report is the latest in a series of insightful documents prepared by the office of Samba’s Chief Economist Brad Bourland. [Links to previous reports and related items below.] This SUSRIS IOI provides the summary from the Samba report and links to the complete document.

We thank Samba and Mr. Bourland for producing these informative reports and allowing us to share them with you.

Summary

On Monday, December 18, 2006 the Council of Ministers endorsed the government’s budget for fiscal year 2007 (31 Dec. 2006 – 30 Dec. 2007) and announced economic and fiscal results for 2006. With oil revenues assumed to remain strong, the budgetary focus on enhancing expenditure on education, healthcare and infrastructural development as well as reducing debt is maintained. The highlights are:
A budget surplus of SR 265 billion ($70.7 billion) was recorded in 2006 due to spending of SR 390 billion ($104 billion) and revenues of SR 655 billion ($174.7 billion). The surplus was nearly five times larger than the surplus of SR 55 billion ($14.7 billion) projected in the 2006 budget, which was based on expenditure of SR 355 billion ($89.3 billion) and revenues of SR 390 billion ($10.4 billion). Oil receipts well in excess of target boosted revenues and allowed spending to grow beyond the budget. The bulk of the surplus was used to increase central bank foreign assets and repay debt.
For 2007, spending is budgeted at SR 380 billion ($101.3 billion) compared to revenues of SR 400 billion ($106.7 billion), resulting in a projected surplus of SR 20 billion ($5.3 billion). Our preliminary forecast is that actual expenditures and revenues will exceed their budgeted levels and another substantial budget surplus is likely.
Preliminary data show that economic performance remained healthy in 2006. Real GDP growth slowed to 4.2 percent owing to a fall in oil production in the second half of the year. Nonoil private sector growth was 6.3 percent. Inflation rose to an 11-year high of 1.8 percent from 0.4 percent in 2005. We expect further inflationary pressure in 2007.

In line with past practice, it appears that the budget is based on conservative oil price and revenue assumptions. A Samba-estimated average price for Saudi oil of $42.5 per barrel at an average 2007 production of 8.9 million barrels per day (b/d; current production is 9.1 million b/d) would meet the budget projection. The 2007 budget is set to impart a significant stimulus to the economy. With private sector investment strong, 2007 is likely to be another year of healthy economic performance, though this may be masked somewhat by a weaker oil market.

Complete Report – Click Here (PDF)

Related Items:

Samba Economy Watch – Office of the Chief Economist

The Saudi Economy at Mid-Year 2006 – Office of the Chief Economist, Samba – SUSRIS IOI – Oct. 13, 2006

Saudi Arabia’s Accession to the WTO: Is a “Revolution” Brewing? – Middle East Policy Council Capitol Hill Conference Series on US Middle East Policy – Introduction by Ambassador Chas Freeman – SUSRIS IOI – Jan 22, 2006

The Saudi and Gulf Stock Markets: Irrational Exuberance or Markets Efficiency? – Khalid R. Al-Rodhan – SUSRIS IOI – Dec. 21, 2005

Saudi Arabia’s 2006 Budget, 2005 Economic Performance – SUSRIS IOI – Dec. 16, 2005

Saudi Arabia Economic Update – An Economy Watch Report From Samba – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 3, 2005

Saudi Economic Performance: A Conversation with SAMBA Chief Economist Brad Bourland – SUSRIS Interview – Feb. 27, 2005

WTO Accession: One Step Closer – SUSRIS IOI – Oct. 12, 2005

World Trade Organization Accession: Saudi Arabia Gets “Green Light” – SUSRIS NID – Oct. 28, 2005

SUSRIS Topic Section – Saudi Arabia’s Accession to the WTO

The Implications of WTO Membership: A View from the Kingdom – SUSRIS IOI – Oct. 30, 2005

World Trade Organization Accession – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 10, 2005

Arab World Economies: Prosperity Amidst Political Uncertainty – Brad Bourland – SUSRIS IOI – Sep. 23, 2004

Brad Bourland, CFA

Since 1999 Brad has been the Chief Economist at Samba Financial Group, formerly Saudi American Bank, in Riyadh, where he publishes regularly on issues related to the Saudi and global economies and the world oil market. He appears frequently in the domestic and international media and is a regular public speaker. Brad is also head of country risk management for the bank, which involves managing the bank’s cross-border risks. Before joining Samba, Brad spent an 18-year career as diplomat, economist, and manager with the U.S. Department of State. During the last three years of his diplomatic career he was in Riyadh as the American Embassy’s First Secretary responsible for financial affairs, where he analyzed the Saudi economy for the U.S. Government and conducted financial aspects of US-Saudi relations. Brad has his BA and MA magna cum laude from the University of Utah, and is a CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst) charterholder.

Adel al-Jubeir will be the next Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States according to a report on “The Washington Note” a US-based blog authored by Mr. Steven Clemons, Senior Fellow and Director, American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation.

Mr. Jubeir served as Foreign Affairs Advisor to King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz following a long tenure at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC. He is well known among observers of Saudi-US affairs and has served as spokesman on numerous occasions representing the Kingdom’s policies and positions to the media.

It is noteworthy that Mr. Jubeir is not a member of the Saudi Royal Family as has been typical of such high profile portfolios as chief Saudi diplomat in Washington. His brother Nail al-Jubeir currently serves as Director of Communications in the Washington embassy, a position Adel al-Jubeir previously held.

The Washington embassy top post has been vacant since December 11, 2006 when Prince Turki al-Faisal abruptly departed the United States after informing Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice he was resigning. According to press reports he told his staff he wanted to devote more time with his family. He assumed the post in 2005 after serving for two years as Saudi Ambassador to the UK. Prince Turki served as Director General of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate from 1977 to 2001.

Prince Turki’s departure came less than two weeks after a controversial op-ed in the Washington Post by Nawaf Obaid, a consultant to the Ambassador, warned that Saudi Arabia would intervene on behalf of Sunni Arabs in Iraq if the United States withdrew prematurely. Mr. Obaid said his November 29 op-ed did not represent Saudi Arabian officials but he was subsequently released from his contract according to Prince Turki. On December 13 the New York Times, citing American and Arab diplomats, echoed Mr. Obaid’s claims that Saudi Arabia was prepared to support Iraqi Sunnis against Shiites. However, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, Prince Turki’s brother, reiterated Riyadh’s position in a December 19 press conference that Saudi Arabia would not back Sunni Arabs against Shiites in Iraq if the US departs.

Adding to the speculation about Prince Turki’s sudden departure was reporting on a meeting between Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s National Security Advisor and Prince Turki’s predecessor as Ambassador to the US, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The Washington Post and other press reports have suggested Prince Bandar urged US officials to avoid talks with Iran and Syria, a position contrary to views Prince Turki’s has made in recent public appearances.

More to come, we’re sure..

The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East
Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan

Washington, DC, December 15, 2006- The recent rise in global demand for energy and the resulting spike in energy prices have illustrated just how important Middle Eastern energy exports are. This book, the first on the subject since the hike in energy prices impacted the global energy market, outlines current facts that shape the ability of Middle Eastern producers to supply energy exports. It explores the possible future causes both of major interruptions in supply, and failures to maintain and expand export capacity, and, though it does not predict a major energy crisis, it does describe factors that could produce one.

Cordesman and Al-Rodhan analyze the plans of each country in the region, compare those plans with the forecasting models of international organizations, and study each country’s prospects for stability. They also analyze how importing countries such as the United States, Europe, China, and India are dealing with the changing nature of global dependence upon MENA oil. Offering the most comprehensive data on current energy resources, production capacities estimates, import dependence, and national plans and strategies, The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East analyzes current energy modeling, and shows how the lack of supply-driven models has had a negative impact on the understanding of policy makers and strategic thinkers. The book concludes its analysis with possible strategic, economic, and demographic scenarios for the Middle East, projecting the impact of each scenario on future energy developments.

Source: CSIS

For more information and to order click here.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS and is an analyst and commentator for ABC News. He has written extensively on energy and Middle Eastern politics, economics, demographics, and security. He a has served in a number of senior positions in the US government, including the Department of Energy, and several assignments in the Middle East.

Khalid R. Al-Rodhan is a visiting fellow at CSIS. With Cordesman, he is the coauthor of several books, including Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real and Potential Threat (CSIS, 2006), The Global Oil Market: Risks and Uncertainties (CSIS, 2006), and Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars (Praeger/CSIS, 2006).

By Anthony Cordesman:

Saudi Arabia and the Struggle Against Terrorism – by Dr. Anthony Cordesman – SUSRIS IOI – Apr. 11, 2005

“The Prospects for Stability in 2004 — The Issue of Political, Economic and Social Reform,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi US Relations Information Service Item of Interest, Feb. 23, 2004

The 9/11 Commission Report: Strengths and Weaknesses,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi US Relations Information Service Item of Interest, Jul. 29, 2004

Developments in Iraq at the End of 2003: Adapting U.S. Policy to Stay the Course,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, January 7, 2004

“Four Wars and Counting: Rethinking the Strategic Meaning of the Iraq War,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, December 5, 2003

“Iraq: Too Uncertain to Call,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, November 18, 2003

“Saudi Redeployment of the F-15 to Tabuk,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi-US Relations Information Service Item of Interest, November 1, 2003

“Iranian Security Threats and US Policy: Finding the Proper Response,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, October 28, 2003

“What is Next in Iraq? Military Developments, Military Requirements and Armed Nation Building,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, August 22, 2003

“Saudi Government Counterterrorism – Counter Extremism Actions,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi-US Relations Information Service Item of Interest, August 4, 2003

“Saudi Arabia: Don’t Let Bin Laden Win!”, by Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi-American Forum Item of Interest, May 16, 2003

“Postwar Iraq: The New Old Middle East,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, April 16, 2003

“Iraq’s Warfighting Strategy,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, March 11, 2003

“Reforming the Middle East: President Bush’s Neo-Con Logic Versus Regional Reality,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, February 27, 2003

“The Great Iraq Missile Mystery,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, February 26, 2003

“Iraq Security Roundtable at CSFS: A Discussion With Dr. Anthony Cordesman,” Center for Strategic and Future Studies, GulfWire Perspectives, January 28, 2003

“A Coalition of the Unwilling: Arms Control as an Extension of War By Other Means,” By Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, January 25, 2003

“Is Iraq In Material Breach? What Hans Blix, Colin Powell, And Jack Straw Actually Said,” By Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, December 20, 2002

“Saudi Arabia: Opposition, Islamic Extremism And Terrorism,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, December 1, 2002

“Planning For A Self-Inflicted Wound: U.S. Policy To Reshape A Post-Saddam Iraq,” by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, November 24, 2002

“The West And The Arab World – Partnership Or A ‘Clash Of Civilizations?’” By Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, November 12, 2002

“Strategy In The Middle East: The Gap Between Strategic Theory And Operational Reality,” by Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, October 22, 2002

“A Firsthand Look At Saudi Arabia Since 9-11,” GulfWire’s Interview With Dr. Anthony Cordesman In Saudi Arabia, GulfWire Perspectives October 10, 2002

“Escalating To Nowhere: The Israeli And Palestinian Strategic Failure,” By Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, April 8, 2002

“Reforging The U.S. And Saudi Strategic Partnership,” by Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, January 28, 2002

Books

Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real and Potential Threat – Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. al-Rodhan, Jun 1, 2006 (see below for more info)

The Global Oil Market: Risks And Uncertainties – Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. al-Rodhan, Mar 20, 2006

On SUSRIS

The Impact of the Abqaiq Attack on Saudi Energy Security – Khalid R. al-Rodhan – SUSRIS IOI – Feb. 28, 2006

The Saudi and Gulf Stock Markets: Irrational Exuberance or Markets Efficiency? – Khalid R. al-Rodhan – Dec. 21, 2005

CSIS Publications

Iran’s Missiles and Possible Delivery Systems – Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. al-Rodhan – CSIS – Apr. 17, 2006 (PDF)

Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Uncertain Nature of Iran’s Nuclear Programs – Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. al-Rodhan – CSIS – Apr. 12, 2006 (PDF)

Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if Diplomacy Fails – Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. al-Rodhan – CSIS – Apr. 7, 2006 (PDF)

Saudi Arabia’s “Sustainable” Capacity and Global Energy Supply and Demand – Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. al-Rodhan – CSIS – May 4, 2005 (PDF)

Global Energy Demand and Capacity Building in Saudi Arabia’s Petroleum Sector – Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. al-Rodhan – CSIS – May 2, 2005 (PDF)

Kingdom Won’t Take Sides in Iraq, Says Saud
P.K. Abdul Ghafour, Arab News —

JEDDAH, 20 December 2006 — Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal said yesterday that Saudi Arabia would not take sides in Iraqi sectarian violence, denying press reports that Riyadh would support Sunnis in the wake of a US withdrawal from the war-torn country.

“Since the start of the crisis in Iraq.. ..the Kingdom has said it will stand at an equal distance from all Iraqi groups and does not describe itself as the guardian of any group or sect,” he said to reporters in Riyadh.

He said Saudi Arabia would continue its efforts to bring about security and stability in Iraq. “We cooperate with all those who want a united, independent and sovereign Iraq,” he said. “And we hope all Iraqi citizens receive equal rights and duties under the law.”

Asked whether Saudi Arabia would support the call by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas for early elections, Saud said it is a matter that should be decided by the Palestinians. He said the Kingdom would support every effort to promote Palestinian unity.

“Disunity will lead to losing of rights and the nation,” the Saudi Press Agency quoted him as saying. “We hope that unity will return to Palestinian ranks and they follow the path of international and Arab legitimacy.”

Prince Saud dismissed as “baseless” British press reports on corruption charges against an arms deal between Saudi Arabia and BAE Systems. “Old stories are repeated now and then in order to create some kind of suspicion not only about the deal but also bilateral relations,” he said.

He confirmed the resignation of Saudi Ambassador to the US Prince Turki Al-Faisal on the basis of personal reasons. He praised Turki’s contributions in the service of the Kingdom during his tenure. Asked about the possibility of Turki becoming his successor, the minister replied jokingly: “If the royal highness is coming to take my post, then he should be ready for a fight.”

He welcomed Iran’s offer to assist GCC countries to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. “We are against proliferation of nuclear weapons,” he said.

Reprinted with permission of Arab News

Related Items:

Riyadh and Washington Maneuver Over Iraq Fears – SUSRIS IOI – Dec. 13, 2006

Background on the News – Leading Saudi Arabian Diplomats – SUSRIS Special Report – Dec. 12, 2006

Saudi Ambassador Abruptly Resigns, Leaves Washington – Robin Wright – SUSRIS Special Report – Dec. 12, 2006

Iran and Iraq in Focus on Eve of Riyadh GCC Summit – SUSRIS IOI – Dec. 8, 2006

Perspective on Regional Developments A Conversation with Gregory Gause – SUSRIS Interview – Nov. 30, 2006

Stepping Into Iraq: Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 29, 2006

Making Sense of Regional Developments – A Conversation with Rami Khouri – SUSRIS Interview – Nov 8, 2006

SUSRIS Articles, Interviews and Special Reports

Adel al-Jubeir will be the next Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States according to a report on “The Washington Note” a US-based blog authored by Mr. Steven Clemons, Senior Fellow and Director, American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation.

Mr. Jubeir served as Foreign Affairs Advisor to King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz following a long tenure at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC. He is well known among observers of Saudi-US affairs and has served as spokesman on numerous occasions representing the Kingdom’s policies and positions to the media.

It is noteworthy that Mr. Jubeir is not a member of the Saudi Royal Family as has been typical of such high profile portfolios as chief Saudi diplomat in Washington. His brother Nail al-Jubeir currently serves as Director of Communications in the Washington embassy, a position Adel al-Jubeir previously held.

The Washington embassy top post has been vacant since December 11, 2006 when Prince Turki al-Faisal abruptly departed the United States after informing Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice he was resigning. According to press reports he told his staff he wanted to devote more time with his family. He assumed the post in 2005 after serving for two years as Saudi Ambassador to the UK. Prince Turki served as Director General of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate from 1977 to 2001.

Prince Turki’s departure came less than two weeks after a controversial op-ed in the Washington Post by Nawaf Obaid, a consultant to the Ambassador, warned that Saudi Arabia would intervene on behalf of Sunni Arabs in Iraq if the United States withdrew prematurely. Mr. Obaid said his November 29 op-ed did not represent Saudi Arabian officials but he was subsequently released from his contract according to Prince Turki. On December 13 the New York Times, citing American and Arab diplomats, echoed Mr. Obaid’s claims that Saudi Arabia was prepared to support Iraqi Sunnis against Shiites. However, Saudi Foreign MinisterPrince Saud al-Faisal, Prince Turki’s brother, reiterated Riyadh’s position in a December 19 press conference that Saudi Arabia would not back Sunni Arabs against Shiites in Iraq if the US departs.

Adding to the speculation about Prince Turki’s sudden departure was reporting on a meeting between Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s National Security Advisor and Prince Turki’s predecessor as Ambassador to the US, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.  The Washington Post and other press reports have suggested Prince Bandar urged US officials to avoid talks with Iran and Syria, a position contrary to views Prince Turki’s has made in recent public appearances.

More to come, we’re sure..

• SCOOP: Pragmatic Non-Royal to be Next Saudi Ambassador to the United States – The Washington Note – Dec. 20, 2006
• Prince Bandar Allegedly Advocating Military Response Against Iran
• Saudi ex-ambassador urged no US talks with Iran: report
• Riyadh and Washington Maneuver Over Iraq Fears – SUSRIS IOI – Dec. 13, 2006
• Saudi Ambassador Abruptly Resigns, Leaves Washington – By Robin Wright – SUSRIS Special Report – Dec. 12, 2006
• Stepping Into Iraq: Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS IOI – Nov 29, 2006
• Summit Press Briefing: Adel Al-Jubeir – SUSRIS IOI – Apr. 26, 2005
• Counter Terrorism International Conference – Feb 5-8, 2005 – SUSRIS Fact Sheet
• Person of the Week: Adel al-Jubeir – Time Magazine – Dec. 5, 2002
• Prince Turki Bio

Rice Says U.S. Support for Middle East Democracy Is Nonnegotiable
By David McKeeby
USINFO Staff Writer

Washington — Responding to calls for the United States to engage Iran and Syria to help secure Iraq, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said December 14 that even though diplomatic negotiation may be built on artful compromise, Iran and Syria must understand that U.S. support for democracy in the region is nonnegotiable.

“If they have an interest in a stable Iraq, they’ll do it anyway,” Rice told the Washington Post editorial board, and should not expect “compensation,” such as support for Syria’s hope of international acceptance of a rollback of Lebanon’s democratic government by Hezbollah, or for Iran’s desire to end U.N. deliberations over sanctions on Tehran’s suspected nuclear weapons program.

Rice also said that although the White House continues its comprehensive review of U.S. policy in Iraq and any new course might be a departure and an evolution in current operations, there will be no change in the Bush administration’s central objective: a democratic Iraq that can sustain, govern and defend itself. (See related article)

To this end, she said, Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish political leaders are working with Iraq’s prime minister to build a moderate center and to move together to confront the forces of extremism perpetrating sectarian violence in and around Baghdad, Iraq. (See related article)

“Iraqis are really the only ones, ultimately, who can solve the sectarian problem,” Rice said. “We can help. We can support. We can do a lot of things. But ultimately they are the ones who can solve it.”

The region’s new strategic context also gives rise to another top U.S. priority, Rice said: the pursuit of a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians.

“We’re going to go to the Middle East a lot next year,” Rice said.

Today, she said, mainstream Arab states would like to see a resolution to the long-standing conflict, and President Bush’s policy since 2001 of a two-state solution, which also has been accepted by Israel, is the way to move forward. (See related article)

It will be a long road of tough negotiations, Rice said, but “in the next two years nothing would be better than to really put the time and energy into trying … to show people in the international community that this new strategic context has the capability of being a truly more stable and democratic one than the one that was left.”

U.S. COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY IN REGION UNCHANGED

The United States remains committed to supporting people across the Middle East who reject extremism and embrace democracy, Rice said.

Across the region, she said, a “new strategic context” is taking shape from the convergence of greater political freedoms and a debate within Islam about the role of religion in politics and society.

As a result, mainstream states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf states that are committed to progressive reforms now find themselves confronted by more extreme views from countries such as Iran and Syria as well as from groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. (See related article)

This new strategic context unites several seemingly disparate conflicts in the region, Rice said, including the ongoing violence between Iraq’s Shiites and Sunnis, efforts to topple Lebanon’s democratically elected government, and moves to block a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians.

In contrast to these products of extremism, democratic reforms, such as municipal elections in Saudi Arabia, qualifying women to vote in Kuwait, and similar developments in Bahrain, Oman, Morocco and Jordan, are bringing greater stability and prosperity to mainstream Arab states. (See related article)

A transcript of Rice’s remarks is available on the State Department Web site.

For more information, see Middle East and North Africa

The Washington File is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State Web site.

Iraq Update

Iraq’s Political Process

The US – GCC Relationship
Dr. John Duke Anthony

The recently concluded GCC annual heads of state Summit in Riyadh marks the 25th anniversary of the GCC since its establishment in 1981. On this occasion SUSRIS is pleased to present the following essay by SUSRIS publisher of record and National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations founding president and chief executive officer Dr. John Duke Anthony.

As the heads of state and foreign ministers of six countries that collectively possess half the world’s oil reserves and produce the lion’s share of hydrocarbon fuels traded in the international market place, Dr. Anthony’s analysis of what the GCC is, what it is not, and its role in regional and global affairs could hardly be more timely or relevant. Dr. Anthony acknowledges that most international observers remain unimpressed with what the organization has accomplished since its founding, but proceeds to point out few people are specialists in such matters, the length of memories is often exceptionally limited, information about the GCC’s achievements, as well as its failures, tends not to be readily accessible to generalists, and that, in any case, the organization’s member-countries have tended to let their successes speak for themselves rather than boast of their accomplishments.

Among the several facts and uncommon perspectives Dr. Anthony provides are the facts that: (1) despite the GCC’s recognizable limitations and self-imposed constraints, it nonetheless represents the world’s most successful sub-regional organization in modern Arab history; (2) the linkages presently being denied by portions of the American media and think tank communities that there has been and is no linkage between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the morass in which the United States presently finds itself in Iraq and in its relations with Iran are, to the contrary, real, multifaceted, and longstanding; (3) of relevance to the current uncertain and untenable regional security situation in the Gulf as a whole, the GCC has provided powerful precedents of finding ways in which sovereign and independent Arab countries have endorsed foreign military protection and mutually beneficial defense cooperation; (4) the GCC, like few other experiments in regional cooperation in the developing world, has consistently demonstrated the efficacy of diplomacy, dialogue, and working patiently and persistently with and through other international organizations and the norms of interstate legitimacy in pursuit of its own and its allies’ common or similar geopolitical objectives; and (5) the organization’s member-countries constitute living evidence that, despite the plummeting of America’s moral and political standing in the hearts and minds of the GCC people and their counterparts throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, American defense systems, science, technology, equipment, pre-positioned equipment, training, maintenance, and strategic as well as tactical doctrine have given the members little in the way of alternatives as to a fundamentally different direction in the immediately foreseeable future.

[This SUSRIS Item of Interest presents the introduction and links to the complete essay which is a 28 page PDF document posted on-line.]

The US – GCC Relationship
Dr. John Duke Anthony

Looking at the development of US-GCC relations over the past 25 years, it is worth considering just how long ties have been established.

Context

Although some would go back as far as the granting of Saudi Arabian oil concessions to the Americans in 1933 as the start of what would become the US relationship with the six countries that joined to forge the GCC, the foundations for the (‘official’) relationship in the modern era were laid over sixty years ago when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz, met aboard the USS Quincy on Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, on the 14th February, 1945. That was the date when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and King Abdalaziz met for the first and only time.

The meeting took place aboard the USS Quincy in the Bitter Lakes of the Suez Canal. Roosevelt was returning from a war conference in Tehran attended by Churchill and Stalin, America’s two most important World War II Allies. At that meeting the American and Saudi Arabian heads of state launched a multifaceted strategic relationship that, despite its ups and downs, remains in tact to this day. Since then, the US has sought to build on this initial meeting of minds, pursuing strong strategic relationships with countries throughout the Gulf, as it has helped to develop and increasingly defend the region’s energy resources.

In the ensuing years, one particular development catapulted the United States into an unprecedented position and role with regard to the GCC region. Presaging the establishment of the GCC in ways that eclipsed all other events was Great Britain’s December 1967 decision to abrogate no later than December 1971 its nearly century and a half old treaty relationships with nine Gulf principalities by which it administered their foreign relations and defence. This set in motion the steps that led to Bahrain and Qatar joining Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which were already independent states, and the formation of the United Arab Emirates – in some ways a microcosm of what the GCC could and may yet one day become.

Like no other single factor, Great Britain’s decision drove the transition from these polities’ protected-state status to national sovereignty and political independence. The process itself marked the ending of two eras and the beginning of two others. In the first, the termination of British hegemony in these entities’ external and domestic affairs enabled them to meet, intermingle, and explore the possibilities of a common future together to a greater extent than at any other time in modern history. In the second, Britain’s abrogation of its special treaty relationships and obligations cleared the way for the United States to become the pre-eminent military and geo-political power in the Gulf as a whole, a role it has been keen to strengthen and expand ever since.

Additional key historical turning points occurring shortly before the GCC’s establishment were three events that occurred in 1979 – the attack on the Grand Mosque in Makkah, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (that led to the rise of Al-Qaeda), and the onset of the Iranian Revolution. Of more recent vintage, the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Iraq’s 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, and 2004 forecasts by some geologists and financial advisers that world oil reserves had either already peaked or would soon do so, contributing, along with the chaos and uncertainties associated with the U.S. invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, to $60 a barrel.

But the one catalyst that most shaped the founding of the GCC and the need for the United States and other Great Power allies to reformulate their policies towards the GCC region was the overthrow of the government headed by the Shah of Iran in late December 1978. The Shah’s replacement by a radical extremist regime marked a major turning point not only in the strategic calculus of Gulf defence but also with regard to the foundation upon which six of the Gulf’s member-countries would place their international relations and further economic development. The entire Gulf region thereby entered an era that was at once more uncertain, yet laced with unprecedented possibilities, than any in recent memory.

In the immediate aftermath of the Iranian government’s demise, the implications for regional defence and security were uppermost on everyone’s minds. Of particular concern was that whereas Iran, along with Saudi Arabia, had served as the larger and more militarily powerful partner in a “twin pillar” strategy to enhance Gulf peace and stability, the situation soon became one in which the Iranian revolution threatened to spread to Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula.

The outbreak of armed hostilities between Iran-and Iraq 19 months later marked the beginning of one of the 20th century’s longest wars, 1980-88, and further underscored the potential for greater regional turmoil [[[OR: for greater levels of two kinds of oil, as it were: turmoil and the other kind.]]]. The onset of major armed conflict between these two countries, whose populations and armed forces were both larger than those of all six of the east Arabian countries combined and whose leaders vied with one another to have their country become the paramount power in the Gulf, represented an immediate challenge to regional order and prosperity.

The six Gulf countries that would eventually combine to form the GCC, together with representatives of fellow Arab countries Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, and others, met in Jordan in November, 1980, to ponder how best to respond to the most serious challenge to Gulf defence in modern times. The countries that would establish the GCC resisted the temptation to endorse a particular idea advanced by representatives of other Arab governments. They refused to enter then and there into any formally organised effort to deal with matters of regional defence cooperation as a means of preventing the conflict from spreading to the Arab side of the Gulf. Instead, the Sultan of Oman, backed by the other five Arabian Peninsula monarchies, persuaded his colleagues to postpone any further deliberations about what their collective response might be until they met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, at an OIC summit scheduled for January 1981.

Upon the conclusion of the Taif Summit, the leaders of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed to remain behind and meet among themselves. The purpose was to conduct their own deliberations on how best to proceed cooperatively with a view to preventing the spread of any aspect of the Iran-Iraq war or the Iranian revolution to their countries.

The fact that Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen were not invited to be part of these discussions was interpreted by Baghdad, Amman, and Sana’a as a major geopolitical setback. (Six years later, these three countries, plus Egypt, would form their own sub-regional organisation called the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC). The ACC disbanded shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait, when Egypt, together with the six GCC member-states plus five other Arab countries, sided with Kuwait but Jordan, Yemen, and six other Arab other nations did not).

Click here for the complete essay [PDF]

Arab-US Policymakers Conference Discussions on the GCC
The 25th Anniversary of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): A Forum on the Future of the GCC
[audio files of speakers - courtesy of ArabiaLink.com ]

Oct 31 – The Gulf Cooperation Council: 25 Years of Accomplishments and Challenges
Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, (USN, Ret.)
H.E. Shaikh Terky bin Rashid Al-Khalifah
Dr. Michael Collins Dunn
Dr. Kenneth Katzman
Dr. Joseph Moynihan

Oct 31 – What Future for the GCC Region?
Ms. Anne Joyce
HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal
Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman
The Hon. Gordon Gray

Oct 31 – Luncheon Keynote Address: A Vision of the Future of the GCC
Dr. Hussein Al-Athel
HE Nasser bin Hamad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa
Lt. Gen. David Barno (USA, Ret.)
The Hon. W. Chas Freeman, Jr.

Editor’s Note
In the midst of the GCC’s annual ministerial and Heads of State Summit in Riyadh [Dec. 9-10], SUSRIS publisher of record and President of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations Dr. John Duke Anthony, who attended the summit, offered an on the spot and end-of-year reflection.

In the essay that follows, he provides unique information and insight to all of the principal players, much of it privileged and derived from his many visits to the region over a period spanning four decades and counting.

Dr. Anthony casts his net wide. He focuses not only on how the United States, Saudi Arabia, the other GCC countries, Iraq, and Iraq have figured into and related to issues including their respective interstate relationships in the period before the issuance of the Iraq Study Group’s report this past week. He also examines how they have been associated with and addressed such issues as the ongoing insurgency in Iraq, the continuing international impasse over nuclear developments as they involve Iran, and matters pertaining to terrorism and oil as well as a host of additional issues relating to the eastern Mediterranean and lands further east.
Portions of this essay appeared in the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center’s 2005 Yearbook, to which the author and SUSRIS are indebted for permission to publish this edited and revised version.

[This SUSRIS Item of Interest presents the introduction and links to the complete essay which is a 27 page PDF document posted on-line.]

Through a Looking Glass Darkly: Perspectives on the U.S.-Gulf Relationship with the Benefit of Hindsight from the Year Before
John Duke Anthony

In looking back over the year that is rapidly coming to a close, a glance in the rear view mirror as to what had occurred during the immediately preceding twelve months is illuminative. It reveals insight into not only the highlights and low lights of what transpired in terms of major events and developments. It also enhances understanding of what happened, for which the implications and ramifications were not clearly perceived or assessed at the time. The exercise provides numerous signposts, warnings, and indications of what would continue to unfold, and in some cases would suddenly erupt, in the period that followed which have led to the uncertain and in many ways dangerous and unsettling present.

As 2006 began, it did so against the backdrop of an immediately previous year of significant change amidst constancy in America’s relations with the eight Gulf countries. In the broadest terms, the major areas in which Gulf-US interests and policies were affected the most included Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, oil, and terrorism. This essay addresses the more prominent pluses and minuses registered in these five categories. Overall, Washington and most Gulf governments made major efforts to improve their strategies and tactics for addressing violent extremism, found ways to place their relations on a firmer foundation for the future, and where this seemed impossible in the near term, sought the means to sustain what all agreed was an unstable status quo.

Although certain issues dating from the previous year and before remained unresolved, efforts to address certain other challenges met with varying degrees of success. One example of this was the December elections in Iraq, which resulted in the installation of Iraq’s fourth, and by design, most “permanent” government since the American-led invasion and occupation of the country in March 2003. Four other successes were Saudi Arabia’s holding of its first nationwide municipal elections, the peaceful transition of power to King Abdullah following the death of King Fahd, the Kingdom’s admission into the World Trade Organization, and the establishment in Riyadh of the first international center devoted to continuous real-time dialogue between representatives of the world’s major oil-producing and oil-consuming nations. Two more breakthroughs were Bahrain’s and Oman’s success in entering into free trade agreements with the United States. Finally, in addition to women obtaining the right to vote and run for public office in Kuwait, procedures were agreed there for an orderly and peaceful transition to a new ruler, following the death of the long-ailing Amir and the abdication of the country’s crown prince for health reasons.

Several intractable issues continued to threaten the near-term prospects for Gulf stability and security while remaining at the center of regional and international public attention. The most prominent case in point was the ongoing insurgency in Iraq as well as the political and economic instability there. The country veered ever closer to full-fledged geographic, ethnic, and religious civil war, and the trouble there showed no sign of abating anytime soon. In addition, tensions related to Iran increased dramatically following the mid-year election of a new head of state who seemed intent on pursuing a more hard-line foreign policy than any of his predecessors had since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. The new president’s controversial comments about the Holocaust and Israel were to provoke an international outcry. By year’s end, the standing of the Islamic Republic’s government in world affairs was worsened as a result of Tehran’s unwillingness, as a matter of principle, to accommodate foreign concerns about the uses to which it might potentially put its programs of nuclear research and development. All was not well with the Saudi-American relationship despite numerous examples of heightened cooperation between the two countries’ executive branches in matters related to terrorism, commercial issues, defense cooperation, and the security of oil supplies. Large sectors of the American public continued to view the Kingdom not exactly as a foe, but also not exactly as a firm and favored friend, an unalloyed ally, or a preferred partner. This was despite the continuing extraordinary range of strategic advantages and economic gains that both Saudi Arabia and the US derived from their ties with one another.

On balance there remained no doubt that Gulf-US relations in general remained as important to the Gulf countries as they did to the United States. The ongoing and multifaceted challenges notwithstanding, this was partly out of a mutual preference associated with a natural tendency to perpetuate certain aspects of the relationship from comfortable years in the past. But it was also partly the result of the two sides’ awareness that there were no viable short-term alternatives. For this reason, if no other, they remained committed to trying to find more successful and cost-effective ways to strengthen and expand the positive features of their relations while reducing the large number of unhealthy – and in some cases dangerous – points of contention and divergence.

Click here for the complete essay [PDF]

Arab-US Policymakers Conference Discussions on the GCC
The 25th Anniversary of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): A Forum on the Future of the GCC
[audio files of speakers - courtesy of ArabiaLink.com ]

Oct 31 – The Gulf Cooperation Council: 25 Years of Accomplishments and Challenges
Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, (USN, Ret.)
H.E. Shaikh Terky bin Rashid Al-Khalifah
Dr. Michael Collins Dunn
Dr. Kenneth Katzman
Dr. Joseph Moynihan

Oct 31 – What Future for the GCC Region?
Ms. Anne Joyce
HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal
Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman
The Hon. Gordon Gray

Oct 31 – Luncheon Keynote Address: A Vision of the Future of the GCC
Dr. Hussein Al-Athel
HE Nasser bin Hamad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa
Lt. Gen. David Barno (USA, Ret.)
The Hon. W. Chas Freeman, Jr.

Editor’s Note

Today’s New York Times carried an article outlining recent moves between the United States and Saudi Arabia over worries that the deteriorating situation in Iraq would open the way for increased Iranian influence and put Iraqi Sunnis at risk. In the New York Times article, Helene Cooper cited American and Arab diplomats as saying the warning from Riyadh suggested financial backing would be provided Iraqi Sunnis if US forces are withdrawn, similar to the views circulated in a Washington Post op-ed by Nawaf Obaid on November 29, 2006 (link below). Mr. Obaid’s assertions were discounted by the Saudi government and he was released from his consultancy with the Saudi embassy in Washington. For your consideration we are reprinting the New York Times article on these developments.

***

Saudis Say They Might Back Sunnis if U.S. Leaves Iraq
By Helene Cooper

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 — Saudi Arabia has told the Bush administration that it might provide financial backing to Iraqi Sunnis in any war against Iraq’s Shiites if the United States pulls its troops out of Iraq, according to American and Arab diplomats.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia conveyed that message to Vice President Dick Cheney two weeks ago during Mr. Cheney’s whirlwind visit to Riyadh, the officials said. During the visit, King Abdullah also expressed strong opposition to diplomatic talks between the United States and Iran, and pushed for Washington to encourage the resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, senior Bush administration officials said.

The Saudi warning reflects fears among America’s Sunni Arab allies about Iran’s rising influence in Iraq, coupled with Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. King Abdullah II of Jordan has also expressed concern about rising Shiite influence, and about the prospect that the Shiite-dominated government would use Iraqi troops against the Sunni population.

A senior Bush administration official said Tuesday that part of the administration’s review of Iraq policy involved the question of how to harness a coalition of moderate Iraqi Sunnis with centrist Shiites to back the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.

The Saudis have argued strenuously against an American pullout from Iraq, citing fears that Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab population would be massacred. Those fears, United States officials said, have become more pronounced as a growing chorus in Washington has advocated a draw-down of American troops in Iraq, coupled with diplomatic outreach to Iran, which is largely Shiite.

“It’s a hypothetical situation, and we’d work hard to avoid such a structure,” one Arab diplomat in Washington said. But, he added, “If things become so bad in Iraq, like an ethnic cleansing, we will feel we are pulled into the war.”

The Bush administration is also working on a way to form a coalition of Sunni Arab nations and a moderate Shiite government in Iraq, along with the United States and Europe, to stand against “Iran, Syria and the terrorists,” another senior administration official said Tuesday.

Until now Saudi officials have promised their counterparts in the United States that they would refrain from aiding Iraq’s Sunni insurgency. But that pledge holds only as long as the United States remains in Iraq.

The Saudis have been wary of supporting Sunnis in Iraq because their insurgency there has been led by extremists of Al Qaeda, who are opposed to the kingdom’s monarchy. But if Iraq’s sectarian war worsened, the Saudis would line up with Sunni tribal leaders.

The Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal, who told his staff on Monday that he was resigning his post, recently fired Nawaf Obaid, a consultant who wrote an opinion piece in The Washington Post two weeks ago contending that “one of the first consequences” of an American pullout of Iraq would “be massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shiite militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis.”

Mr. Obaid also suggested that Saudi Arabia could cut world oil prices in half by raising its production, a move that he said “would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even with today’s high oil prices.” The Saudi government disavowed Mr. Obaid’s column, and Prince Turki canceled his contract.

But Arab diplomats said Tuesday that Mr. Obaid’s column reflected the view of the Saudi government, which has made clear its opposition to an American pullout from Iraq.

In a speech in Philadelphia last week, Prince Turki reiterated the Saudi position against an American withdrawal from Iraq. “Just picking up and leaving is going to create a huge vacuum,” he told the World Affairs Council. “The U.S. must underline its support for the Maliki government because there is no other game in town.”

Prince Turki said Saudi Arabia did not want Iraq to fracture along ethnic or religious lines. On Monday a group of prominent Saudi clerics called on Sunni Muslims around the world to mobilize against Shiites in Iraq. The statement called the “murder, torture and displacement of Sunnis” an “outrage.”

The resignation of Prince Turki, a former Saudi intelligence chief and a son of the late King Faisal, was supposed to be formally announced Monday, officials said, but that had not happened by late Tuesday.

“They’re keeping us very puzzled,” a Saudi official said. Prince Turki’s resignation was first reported Monday in The Washington Post.

If Prince Turki does depart, he will leave after 15 months on the job, in contrast to the 22 years that his predecessor, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, spent as ambassador in Washington.

In Riyadh, there was a sense of disarray over Prince Turki’s resignation that was difficult to hide. A former adviser to the royal family said that Prince Turki had submitted his resignation several months ago but that it was refused. Rumors had circulated ever since that Prince Turki intended to resign, as talk of a possible government shake-up grew.

Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister and Prince Turki’s brother, has been in poor health for some time. He is described as eager to resign, with his wife’s health failing, too, just as the United States has been prodding Saudi Arabia to take a more active role in Iraq and with Iran.

The former adviser said Prince Turki’s resignation came amid a growing rivalry between the ambassador and Prince Bandar, who is now Saudi Arabia’s national security adviser. Prince Bandar, well known in Washington for his access to the White House, has vied to become the next foreign minister.

“This is a very high-level problem; this is about Turki, the king and Bandar,” said the former adviser to the royal family. “Let’s say the men don’t have a lot of professional admiration for each other.”

Hassan M. Fattah contributed reporting from Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

From The New York Times on the Web (c) The New York Times Company. Reprinted with Permission.

***

On SUSRIS:

• Is Riyadh Ready to Recalibrate the Relationship – Nawaf Obaid – May 15, 2011
• Energy Infrastructure Threat Assessments Hyped – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Apr 18, 2011
• “Conspicuously quiet” in Saudi Arabia – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS –April 10, 2011
• Saudi Arabia “not ripe for revolution” – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – March 10, 2011
• Assessing Saudi Power – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Nov 14, 2007
• Riyadh and Washington Maneuver Over Iraq Fears – SUSRIS – Dec 13, 2006
• Leading Saudi Arabian Diplomats – SUSRIS – Dec 12, 2006
• Saudi Ambassador Abruptly Resigns, Leaves Washington – SUSRIS Special Report- Dec 12, 2006
• Official Source Refutes Report of Nawaf Obaid in “Washington Post” – SUSRIS – Dec 2, 2006
• Stepping Into Iraq – Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves – SUSRIS – Nov 29, 2006
• Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Role: New Strategic Initiatives – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Nov 6, 2006 (PDF)
• Remnants of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Current Assessment – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Nov 3, 2006 (PDF)
• Disintegrating Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Oct 30, 2006 (PDF)
• Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SUSRIS – Oct 16, 2006
• The Saudis and Containing Iran in Lebanon – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Aug 30, 2006
• Dampened Trust – SUSRIS Exclusive Interivew – Nawaf Obaid – Aug 22, 2006
• Region in Crisis: Saudi Arabia’s Critical Role in Lebanon – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Aug 8, 2008
• Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Energy Initiative: Safeguarding Against Supply Disruptions – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jul 29, 2006 (PDF)
• Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Leadership Role in the Region – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jul 24, 2006 (PDF)
• Fractured Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jun 23, 2006 (PDF)
• Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Mar 15, 2006 (PDF)
• Saudi National Security Assessment Project – SUSRIS Special Section 2006
• National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses and Challenges – Cordesman / Obaid – SUSRIS – Oct 25, 2005

***

Editor’s Note
The 27th Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council met December 9-10, 2006 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The gathering, dubbed the Sheikh Jaber Summit after the ruler of Kuwait who died in January, included the leaders of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE.

A broad field of topics were headlined in the media as each being the highlight of the two-day annual council session: regional issues, a common market, a monetary union — even the focus on Gulf citizenship was touted by the press as the summit’s hot issue. However, few could deny that regional security questions were the centerpieces of discussions, especially after King Abdullah, in his opening remarks said, “Our Arab region is besieged by a number of dangers, as if it was a powder keg waiting for a spark to explode.” The summit did provide the six heads of state the opportunity to address economic unity issues but the most pressing questions were how to address the troubles in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq, and relations with Iran.

In this special report SUSRIS has compiled reports from SaudiEmbassy.net and Arab News along with the highlights of the press reporting to provide an overview of this important meeting of Gulf leaders and links to ArabiaLink.com’s audio files from the Arab-US Policymakers Conference focus on the GCC.

Sheikh Jaber Summit concludes in Riyadh

The 27th summit of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) concluded in Riyadh [Dec. 10]. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz opened the summit, known as the Sheikh Jaber Summit, in a ceremony [Dec. 9].

In a final communiqué, the Supreme Council said that the summit reviewed the achievements in all areas since the last meeting in Abu Dhabi, and conducted a comprehensive assessment of regional and international political and security issues.

On steps toward GCC economic integration, the Supreme Council accredited a unified guide for controls on imported food, an important requirement for a GCC customs union. The Council also instructed that the necessary measures should be taken to announce the establishment of the GCC common market by the end of 2007.

Further studies are needed for the establishment of a monetary union with a single currency as well as for an integrated water and railway grid, the communiqué said. It endorsed a study on a peninsula shield force submitted by King Abdullah. The Council was also briefed on the steps needed to allow Yemen to integrate into the GCC economies.

The communiqué highlighted the GCC’s firm renunciation of terrorism in all its forms. Terrorism is a global crime that requires regional and international cooperation to combat it, the Council said. The communiqué also stressed that terrorism is an extremist phenomenon that has nothing to do with religion or identity, and that all peoples are responsible for confronting the causes of terrorism.

On the issue of Iran, the Council reiterated its call for a peaceful resolution of the crisis and called on Iran to continue dialogue and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It also urged Iran to consider the environmental aspects of the issue.

In related matters, the Council renewed its call for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, and commissioned a joint study on the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes according to international criteria. It also urged Israel to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

On Iraq, the Council expressed its profound sadness at the deteriorating situation there and denounced all terrorist actions, killing and sectarian violence in the country. It called for the support of Iraq’s unity, sovereignty, identity and independence. It also emphasized the need for non-interference in Iraqi internal affairs. National reconciliation is the solution to Iraq’s problems and a basic requirement for stability, the Council stated.

Turning to the Palestinian issue, the communiqué strongly condemned Israel’s aggressions against the Palestinian people. The Council stressed its support for the Palestinian people and called on the international community to end the repeated Israeli attacks. It affirmed the need to convene an international conference to halt Israel’s attacks and to restart the peace process according to the Abdullah peace plan, the Road Map for peace and international law.

The Council called on the Palestinian leadership to exert more efforts towards establishing unity and to speedily form a national unity government. It welcomed the cease-fire between Israelis and the Palestinians as an important step towards dialogue and the resumption of the peace process.

The communiqué said that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East will only be achieved by the establishment of a viable Palestinian state with Al-Quds as its capital and with the Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms in southern Lebanon.

The Council concluded that the absence of a just solution to the Palestinian issue and the suffering of the Palestinian people have aggravated disputes in the Middle East, and called on the international community to make resolving the conflict a priority.

On Lebanon, the Council strongly denounced the violence their and the political assassination of Lebanese Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel. Such actions increase tension, it said. The Council reiterated its support for Lebanon and called on the Lebanese people to unify in order to overcome the current critical situation.

Turning to Sudan, the Council expressed regret for the ongoing humanitarian tragedy in Darfur and urged the Sudanese government and the various warring factions to opt for dialogue in the national interest. The international community should assist Sudan in resolving this issue, the Council said, noting that the Sudanese government has taken a number of positive steps.

The Council called on warring factions in Somalia to negotiate a resolution to their differences; urged the United Nations to address the issue of missing Kuwaiti POWs; and reiterated its support for the UAE’s claim to the Tunb islands and Abu Musa. It also renewed the term of office for GCC Secretary-General Abdulrahman Al-Attiyah for three years, effective April 1, 2008.

Source: SaudiEmbassy.net

GCC to Develop Civilian Nuclear Energy
Raid Qusti, Arab News

RIYADH, 11 December 2006 — The six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) yesterday announced plans to seek nuclear energy technology for peaceful purposes while repeating its demand to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. “The states of the Gulf region have a right to possess nuclear energy technology for peaceful purposes,” the final communiqué issued after the GCC summit said.

GCC leaders said they had ordered a “GCC-wide study be conducted to formulate a joint program in the field of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, in keeping with international standards and regulations,” said the communiqué read out by GCC Secretary-General Abdul Rahman Al-Attiyah.

The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program, and demanded that Israel, the only country in the Middle East believed to have nuclear weapons, join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Speaking to reporters after the summit, Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal said the GCC states’ intention to pursue civilian nuclear technology was not a “threat” to anyone. “We are announcing our intention to pursue the ownership of nuclear technology for peaceful (purposes),” he said.

“It is not a threat.. It is an announcement so that there will be no misinterpretation of what we are doing. We are not doing this secretly. We are doing it openly,” he said.

“We want no bombs.. Our policy is to have a region free of weapons of mass destruction,” the prince added. “This is why we call on Israel to renounce (nuclear weapons).” The “original sin” was from Israel as it established a nuclear reactor with the only purpose of producing nuclear weapons, Prince Saud said.

Prince Saud said the summit had endorsed a proposal made by King Abdullah to develop the Peninsula Shield, a joint military force of the GCC, in order to strengthen its combined defense capabilities.

Asked about the Baker report, Prince Saud said he believed the report contained both positive and negative things. “The so-called Baker report said some good things and some unclear things,” he said.

The positive thing is that it calls for the renewal of a policy that leads obviously to the settlement in Iraq.

“It has not touched on the issue of the nonofficial military formation there, whether from this side or that side, and therefore it has left out one dangerous element,” he said, while speaking about the negative aspects of the report.

The report, he said, puts too much burden on the government of Iraq that “we do not see how they are going to achieve.”

“The report also indicated that all Iraqis should share the wealth of Iraq,,” he said, adding that all Iraqis should have the same rights, whether they are Sunni, Shiite, or Kurd. “The important thing is not the publication of the report but the follow-up measures,” he pointed out.

The two-day summit, attended by all GCC leaders, adopted a number of economic, political, military and security resolutions. According to Al-Attiyah, all GCC citizens will be able to travel freely between GCC states by next year. “Some countries have issued a “smart card” and others have not, but by the first quarter of 2007, all GCC countries will have to finalize this matter,” he told reporters.

The summit leaders also agreed to finalize the GCC customs union, which is due to be ready by next year. “The summit ordered that all requirements of a GCC common market be fulfilled by the end of 2007,” he said, adding that the opening of GCC markets has increased inter-GCC trade by 20 percent.

The meeting agreed to establish a unified guide for importing food products to be followed by customs departments in the member countries.

Other decisions taken by GCC leaders included the opening up of economic sectors such as transport and insurance. According to the agreement, Gulf citizens will now be able to trade in these sectors in all GCC countries without hindrance.

Referring to the GCC railway project, which aims at linking all member countries by railroads, Al-Attiyah said the summit had asked the departments concerned to complete studying the projects and identify the companies to carry out the project. He did not give further details.

On the issue of health care, GCC leaders have agreed to unify import price of medicine, Al-Attiyah said.

The meeting welcomed the proposal submitted by GCC interior ministers on the formation of a specialized security committee to combat terrorism.

The summit denounced the repeated Israeli aggression on the Palestinians and called for an international conference to “put an end to the arbitrary Israeli measures and criminal actions and activate the Middle East peace process on the basis of Arab peace proposals, the Middle East road map and UN resolutions.”

The meeting urged Israel to release all Palestinian prisoners from its jails. It called on Palestinian leaders to continue their efforts to establish a national unity government. The GCC reiterated that peace and stability would not prevail in the Middle East without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

The summit leaders urged the international community to find a quick solution to the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. “The international community should give priority to finding a just solution to the Palestinian issue.”

The summit expressed “regret” that Iran has not adhered to direct and indirect international calls to solve the issue of its occupation to three UAE islands. “The Supreme Council reaffirms its support to the UAE in its ownership of the three islands as part and parcel of the country,” the statement said.

As for the long-awaited unified Gulf currency, the statement said the summit had authorized GCC monetary agencies and central banks to pinpoint areas of mutual economic performance. It said ministries of finance would have to agree to the draft before submitting it for final approval by the supreme council of GCC states.

The statement did not mention Oman’s intention to opt out of GCC monetary union.

The GCC leaders also agreed on a system to unify trademarks in GCC states. “This would be an obligatory system which would organize trademarks for registration and protect them and their ownership,” the statement said.

The leaders looked into proposals made by the GCC consultative committee on “economic citizenship‚” in order to promote economic relations among the member countries.

It passed the proposals onto GCC finance ministers to draw out necessary regulations to implement them. Al-Attiyah said the summit agreed on 28 of 30 proposed educational programs to be implemented by the member states. These programs would be supervised by the Arab Gulf Education Bureau.

Referring to the worsening security situation in Iraq, the leaders called for an immediate disarmament of all militias in the war-torn country.

Replying to a question about whether the Kingdom would mediate a peace proposal between Lebanon and Syria, the Saudi foreign minister said the Lebanese “were better off by handling their own issues themselves.” He called on Lebanese political leaders to return to discussions and noted that it was the only way to solve the crisis. He also condemned the assassinations and violence in the country. “Lebanon does not need another tragedy,” he said.

Commenting on Iran’s initiative to break the economic embargo by offering funds to the Palestinian government, Saud said the Kingdom continued to support the Palestinian government through official means. “We support them in official ways and not through briefcases that go in and out,” he said.

“The issue of the Palestinians has poisoned the air,” Prince Saud said. “We hope that in coming to decisions about what is to be done … the realities of the region will be taken into account and the counsel of the countries of the region will be taken into consideration.”

The summit also extended the term of Al-Attiyah to another three years in appreciation of his efforts. The next summit will be held in Oman.

Reprinted with permission of Arab News

Related Reporting:

GCC Summit News – Saudi Press Agency

GCC Summit Photos – Saudi Press Agency

SUMMIT WARNS! – Gulf Daily News – Dec. 11, 2006

Gulf region in grip of critical developments – Kuwait Times – Dec. 11, 2006

Call for peace and security in region – GulfNews – Dec. 11, 2006

Leaders pledge support to Iraqis – GulfNews – Dec. 11, 2006

Arab Nations Plan to Start Joint Nuclear Energy Program – NY Times – Dec. 11, 2006

GCC seeks nuclear energy – Gulf News – Dec. 11, 2006

Gulf Arab states to seek peaceful nuclear technology – People’s Daily – Dec. 11, 2006

King Abdullah opens 27th GCC meeting – SaudiEmbassy.net – Dec. 9, 2006

Israel supports Arabs on N-power – The Australian – Dec. 12, 2006

GCC summit’s Kuwaiti media exhibition witnesses high turn-up of visitors – KUNA – Dec. 11, 2006

GCC common market top agenda at summit – Gulf Daily News – Dec. 9, 2006

Delays may hit currency union – GulfNews – Dec. 11, 2006

Gulf Arabs to signal if 2010 monetary union can work – Reuters – Dec. 10, 2006

Oman drops plan to join Gulf single currency by 2010 – People’s Daily – Dec. 10, 2006

Backgrounder: The 27th Gulf Cooperation Council summit – People’s Daily – Dec. 10, 2006

Saudi urges Gulf Arabs to back economic union – Khaleej Times – Dec. 9, 2006

Gulf alliance GCC outlines agenda for weekend summit – People’s Daily – Dec. 9, 2006

Saudi newspapers hails “Jaber Summit” – KUNA – Dec. 10, 2006

GCC summit to focus on instilling Gulf citizenship – Attiya – KUNA – Dec. 9, 2006

Iran-Iraq crises to dominate summit – Gulf Daily News – Dec. 9, 2006

GCC common market top agenda at summit – Gulf Daily News – Dec. 9, 2006

Summit to Focus on Regional Security – Arab News – Dec. 9, 2006

Saudi Arabia hosts Saturday Supreme GCC Council session – SPA – Dec. 9, 2006

Riyadh Summit to Explore Ways of Bolstering GCC Ties – Arab News – Nov. 19, 2006

Arab-US Policymakers Conference Discussions on the GCC
The 25th Anniversary of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): A Forum on the Future of the GCC
[audio files of speakers - courtesy of ArabiaLink.com ]

Oct 31 – The Gulf Cooperation Council: 25 Years of Accomplishments and Challenges
Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, (USN, Ret.)
H.E. Shaikh Terky bin Rashid Al-Khalifah
Dr. Michael Collins Dunn
Dr. Kenneth Katzman
Dr. Joseph Moynihan

Oct 31 – What Future for the GCC Region?
Ms. Anne Joyce
HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal
Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman
The Hon. Gordon Gray

Oct 31 – Luncheon Keynote Address: A Vision of the Future of the GCC
Dr. Hussein Al-Athel
HE Nasser bin Hamad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa
Lt. Gen. David Barno (USA, Ret.)
The Hon. W. Chas Freeman, Jr.

Saudi Ambassador Abruptly Resigns, Leaves Washington
By Robin Wright
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, December 12, 2006; A23

Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States, flew out of Washington yesterday after informing Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and his staff that he would be leaving the post after only 15 months on the job, according to U.S. officials and foreign envoys. There has been no formal announcement from the kingdom.

The abrupt departure is particularly striking because his predecessor, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, spent 22 years on the job. The Saudi ambassador is one of the most influential diplomatic positions in Washington and is arguably the most important overseas post for the oil-rich desert kingdom.

Turki, a long-serving former intelligence chief, told his staff yesterday afternoon that he wanted to spend more time with his family, according to Arab diplomats. Colleagues said they were shocked at the decision.

The exit — without the fanfare, parties and tributes that normally accompany a leading envoy’s departure, much less a public statement — comes as his brother, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the highly influential Saudi foreign minister, is ailing.

Saud, who was appointed in 1975, has held the position of foreign minister longer than any of his counterparts anywhere in the world — dating back to Henry Kissinger’s tenure as secretary of state.

Saudi officials have not commented on Saud’s condition, but he has suffered from tremors for years. Last year, he slipped in the shower and fractured a shoulder. After attending the opening of the U.N. General Assembly in September, he flew to Los Angeles for surgery and quietly remained in the United States until shortly before Thanksgiving, according to an Arab official.

As Saud’s health has declined, Turki has increasingly been rumored as a possible replacement for his older brother. He would symbolize continuity in Saudi foreign policy at a moment of tension over Iraq between Riyadh and Washington, two long-standing allies in forging common political and economic policy in the Middle East. King Abdullah summoned Vice President Cheney after Thanksgiving for talks on Iraq and other Middle East flashpoints.

Turki has been the subject of both high praise and controversy. In the 1980s, while he was intelligence chief, he reportedly met al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden several times during the U.S.- and Saudi-backed support of mujaheddin fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He subsequently denounced bin Laden.

Turki later served as ambassador to Britain. “He was regarded as being one of the most effective ambassadors from any country and was held in very high regard,” a British diplomat said yesterday.

Saudi Arabia, the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites and a predominantly Sunni country, has been deeply concerned about the change in the balance of power in Iraq, with which it shares a 500-mile border. Riyadh has been alarmed by the rise of the Shiite majority in Iraq and the marginalization of the traditional Sunni elite. Young Saudi men have joined the Sunni insurgency as foreign fighters, while there have been persistent reports that Saudi citizens have provided financial aid to the Sunni insurgency.

The kingdom announced earlier this year that it will build an elaborate barrier along the remote desert frontier, with ultraviolet night-vision cameras, underground sensor cables and command posts.

Turki, a 1968 graduate of Georgetown University, will return briefly in January after the Hajj pilgrimage, the busiest time of the year in the kingdom, to say formal goodbyes, according to an Arab official.

Copyright 2006, Washingtonpost Newsweek Interactive and The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.

Editor’s Note

Earlier today SUSRIS provided news of Prince Turki al Faisal’s resignation as Ambassador to the United States. Robin Wright in a Washington Post report reprinted by SUSRIS mentioned the illness of Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal. The Saudi government is expected to confirm the departure of Prince Turki from his Washington Post later today.

This SUSRIS Item of Interest provides background information on personalities connected with this story: Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal, Prince Turki al Faisal and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the immediate predecessor to Prince Turki as top Saudi diplomat in Washington.

***

Saud Al Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud

Place and Date of Birth: Taif, Saudi Arabia , 1358H (1940)
Scientific Qualifications: B.Sc. In Economics, Princeton University, New Jersey, USA. (1964)
Marital Status: Married; has 3 sons and 3 daughters
Experience:
Joined the Ministry of Petroleum as an economic consultant and a member of the High Coordination Committee.
He was transferred to the General Organization for Petroleum and Mineral Resources (Petromin) on 26/02/1386H as responsible for the Petroleum Relations’ Office, with a mandate to monitor relations between the Ministry and Petromin.
He was appointed as Deputy Governor of Petromin for Planning Affairs, on 14/01/1390 H. (22/02/1970)
He was appointed as Deputy Minister, Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (21/04/1391H corresponding to 15/06/1971)
He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs upon a royal decree as of 08/10/1395H corresponding to 13/10/1975)
Other Assignments:
Vice President, High Council for information.
Member of High Council of Petroleum.
Managing Director, National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development (NCWCD)

As a Minister of Foreign Affairs, he is a member of many committees for Arab and Islamic Affairs such as the Lebanon Arab Committee, Arabian Solidarity Committee, the 7-Member Arab Committee, the Jerusalem Committee and the Tripartite Committee for Lebanon.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KSA Web Site

***

Saud: Iran Must Address Nuke Safety
Arab News

RIYADH, 8 December 2006 — Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal yesterday said that the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states will express their concern to Iran about the prospect of nuclear power plants being developed on its side of the Arabian Gulf coast.

“We hope that Iran would take this into account and cooperate with GCC countries in order to take necessary measures against any calamity, which is likely even in the best of circumstances,” said the minister at a press conference after a closed-door session in preparation for tomorrow’s summit of the GCC heads of state. “Cooperation between all parties is required as the region is sensitive and linked with various interests.”

GCC Secretary-General Abdulrahman Al-Attiya also attended the press conference. The GCC comprises Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman.

Prior to the closed-door meeting, Prince Saud also addressed the situation in Iraq, and warned against sectarian violence and the “perils of partition.” The minister called for ending outside interferences in Iraq. “I appeal on the basis of the decision taken in a special ministerial committee meeting recently held in Cairo with regard to holding an Iraqi conference for national harmony,” he said.

“It requires coordinating with the Iraqi government and various Iraqi groups. The meeting is essential to protect Iraq from the perils of a partition and sectarian violence threatening regional security.”

The minister said that the current situation in Iraq required that countries of the region try their best to bring about peace, stability and territorial integrity of Iraq, the Saudi Press Agency reported.

The GCC Ministerial Council met last month and discussed several important issues concerning the future of the group, enhancing coordination, cooperation and integration between the member states in political, economic, cultural, security and military fields in its march toward a common Gulf citizenship.

Prince Saud also stressed the need for the Lebanese people to strive for their national unity and “strengthening the security, stability and prevalence of the law, sanity and wisdom besides engaging in a national dialogue. Or else the country’s political stability, integrity and independence will be in jeopardy.”

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah issued a directive to name tomorrow’s summit in Riyadh as the “Sheikh Jaber Summit” in honor of the late emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah.

Prince Saud also called for expediting moves to treat all GCC citizens equally in all areas.

Those who arrived in Riyadh to participate in the meeting earlier yesterday included Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khaled ibn Mohammed Al-Khalifah, United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Abdullah ibn Zaid Al-Nahayan. Those who attended the meeting also included the Omani minister responsible for foreign affairs, Yousuf ibn Alawi Abdullah, and Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed ibn Abdullah Al-Mahmoud.

[Reprinted with permission.]

Related Items:

GCC Home Page (English)

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): 25 Years of Accomplishments and Challenges – Panel Discussions – Arab-US Policymakers Conference – Oct. 31, 2006 (ArabiaLink.com) [audio]

What Future for the GCC Region? – Panel Discussions – Arab-US Policymakers Conference – Oct. 31, 2006 (ArabiaLink.com) [audio]

A Vision of the Future of the GCC – Panel Discussions – Arab-US Policymakers Conference – Oct. 31, 2006 (ArabiaLink.com) [audio]
Saudi FM calls GCC summit “Jaber Summit” (KUNA)

GCC Nationals Optimistic on Riyadh Summit (BNA)

Urgent need seen to further GCC economic coordination (Arab Times)

GCC foreign ministers wind up Riyadh session (Gulf News)

Detecting chain effect in economic union (Gulf News)

GCC marching steadily toward economic integration (KUNA)

GCC Summit plans to tackle challenges facing Gulf region (Arab Times/KUNA)

Editor’s Note
When Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al Faisal, stepped to the podium at the Arab-US Policymakers Conference on October 30, 2006 the audience in the Ronald Reagan Building and across the C-SPAN television network was prepared to hear him address “A Vision for the Future of U.S. Saudi Relations.” Instead they heard him speak about a current event that had not received much attention in the media up to that point. He said, “I was going to speak initially at this conference on a vision for the future of Saudi-U.S. relations, but I changed that because of an event that took place last week in Saudi Arabia, which was the formation of the Bay’ah Council, which is an important constitutional revolution in the governing of Saudi Arabia.” He continued with an address he called, “Saudi Arabian Constitutional Evolution” that described the process for addressing succession in the Kingdom.

Thomas Lippman, adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute, veteran journalist, author of “Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Relationship with Saudi Arabia,” and occasional contributor to SUSRIS, took a look at the question of succession in the Kingdom and the establishment of the “Bay’ah Council.” We are pleased to share his insights today.

So, right now, we are in something of a crossroads because they recognize that they are entering a phase when there could be rapid turnover of rulers. So, this one was smooth, but there is no guarantee that the next one will be.

– MSNBC News Report, Aug 2, 2005 – On the occasion of King Abdullah’s Ascension

Solving the Saudi Succession Puzzle
Thomas W. Lippman

If there is one thing the ruling princes of Saudi Arabia have shown they are good at, it is self-preservation. They demonstrated their skill once again last month with an adroit political maneuver that drew little media notice in this country because of the carnage in Iraq, but could have long-term significance for the Gulf region and for the United States.

King ‘Abdullah announced a new system for choosing future kings, designed to ensure smooth continuity whenever the monarchy is vacated. He issued a new “Allegiance Institution Law” designed to cover every eventuality: death of the king; simultaneous death of the king and crown prince; temporary incapacity because of illness; and long-term disability.

This news can only be encouraging to those who wish to see long-term political and economic stability in that vital country. But it will not be encouraging to those who believe in promoting democratic reform in the Arab world because the purpose of ‘Abdullah’s move was to fortify the monarchy, not to open up the country’s political process. Its aim is not to give the Saudi people any voice in selecting their leader, but rather to codify the existing informal system in which the king and his brothers have the absolute power to designate the next in line for the throne, without any explanation of their decision.

The new procedure is more like the selection of a Roman Catholic pope, chosen in a secret conclave by princes of the church, than it is like any democratic system. Just as some cardinals are deemed “papabile,” or suitable to become pontiff in the event of a vacancy, a handful of the many sons and grandsons of Saudi Arabia’s founding King, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, are understood to be in the running as future kings.

No one outside the House of Saud has any real knowledge of who might be on the list. Any speculation by scholars or think-tank analysts about the line of succession is just that — speculation.

Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal — sometimes mentioned himself as a possible future king — told a Washington audience on October 30 that the new law represents “a contract between the ruler and ruled. The ruler obliges himself to protect, promote and enhance the lives and property of the ruled; and the ruled oblige themselves to protect, promote and obey the ruler in everything but that which counters the teachings of God.” He did not say how the “ruled” took on this obligation to obey; in fact they have no choice in the matter.

This won’t matter much to American policymakers, to whom the new law will come as something of a relief because it eliminates a possible source of trouble in Saudi Arabia. Public input is irrelevant. It has been clear since ‘Abdullah met with President Bush at his Texas ranch in April 2005 that Washington was not going to press the Saudis for political liberalization because the Saudi regime is too valuable on other fronts. The Saudi regime has persuaded Bush and his advisers that it is part of the solution on the “war on terror,” not part of the problem, and therefore stability trumps reform, as it almost always has in the 60 years of the US-Saudi alliance.

In case anyone doubted that the Saudis regard themselves as beyond the reach of Bush’s quest for democratization in the Arab world, Prince Turki proclaimed it: “We are not in a hurry to experiment with foreign interpretations of democracy or methods of government,” he said.

Until the new law was issued, the question of who would become king after ‘Abdullah and his designated successor, Defense Minister Prince Sultan, was a gnawing point of concern about the Kingdom’s future. Both men are more than 80 years old, Sultan has reportedly been treated for cancer, and no one has been selected to become ruler after them.

They and other senior princes — all sons of King Abdul Aziz — have many sons of their own in positions of influence who might aspire to take over after Sultan passes from the scene. To outsiders, the potential jockeying among the princes of this “grandsons generation” has raised questions about the cohesion of the House of Saud and thus about the stability of the country.

There appears to be no other imminent threat to the ongoing rule of the al-Saud family. The wave of extremist violence that broke out in 2003 has receded. The perpetrators of the bombings that wracked Riyadh and other cities and frightened foreigners out of the country have been killed or rounded up by the security forces, and they never gained support among the general Saudi population. Moreover, because ‘Abdullah has curbed the corruption that inspired popular anger and has reached out to the country’s Shi’a Muslim minority and other marginalized groups, the House of Saud is less unpopular than it appeared to be before ‘Abdullah took over last year.

The al-Saud family has ruled what is now Saudi Arabia since the 1920s, when Abdul Aziz overpowered rivals from other tribes and unified the country. The root of the succession problem lies in the fact that Abdul Aziz fathered some 45 sons, of whom 23 are still alive, and did not specify how his successors were to be chosen. Until now it has been an informal process among the princes; it is not based on birth order, but upon negotiation and compromise within the family.

Thus, the most serious threat to stability appeared to be the possibility that the princes would split in a power struggle, as they did in the 1960’s. The contest of that decade pitted two other sons of Abdul Aziz, Faisal and Saud, against each other and traumatized the family. Ever since then such matters have been thrashed out among the princes, out of public view. When ‘Abdullah became king upon the death of his half-brother Fahd last year, he promptly named another half-brother, Sultan, as crown prince. Many Saudi-watchers believe the likeliest candidate after Sultan is Prince Salman, a half-brother of ‘Abdullah and a full brother of Sultan. Salman, aged 70, is the longtime governor of Riyadh.

Under a 1992 law, “Rule passes to the sons of the founding king.. ..and to their children’s children. The most upright among them is to receive allegiance in accordance with the principles of the Holy Koran and the tradition of the Venerable Prophet,” Muhammad. But the law also gave the king the power to choose his successor. What would happen if other princes did not accept the designated heir as the “most upright” was not clear.

Now King Abdullah has established a more formal system. He created a committee of princes, called the “Allegiance Institution,” to designate future crown princes. Because Sultan has already been chosen as next in line after Abdullah, the new system will take effect only after Sultan becomes king. Once that happens, and in all future cases, the new king is to nominate one, two or three candidates to be his successor. Committee members may accept a nominee or reject all three. “If the committee rejects all the nominees, it will name a Crown Prince whom it considers to be suitable,” according to a translation provided by the embassy.

This process is to be completed within 30 days. In the past, long intervals of uncertainty have sometimes ensued as a new king has delayed naming a successor.

Perhaps more important, the new law specifies the procedures to be followed if the king is incapacitated. This is clearly intended to avoid a repetition of the uncomfortable period between 1995 and 2005, when Fahd was disabled by a stroke. ‘Abdullah was de facto ruler, but his power was limited because he was not king; many important reforms were delayed or set aside because of that vacuum.

Some Saudis have said the new law is important also for what it does not say. There is no mention of the country’s religious leadership, or ulema. The law does not preclude consultation with the religious leadership, traditional partners in power of the House of Saud, but neither does it command it. Some analysts believe this is part of a gradual process in which the senior princes have been almost imperceptibly separating their power from the often troublesome input of the ulema.

The official announcement of the new system does not answer all questions — it says members of the Allegiance Institution must be “capable and known for their integrity” but does not say how those qualities are to be determined, nor does it specify what happens after the passing of all the grandsons, many already approaching old age. Nevertheless, given the way the House of Saud operates, it can be assumed that ‘Abdullah issued his decree only after extensive discussion with his brothers and probably some of the key nephews, and that they have signed off on it. That means the family will not allow or encourage any aspirant to stake a claim outside the system when the time comes.

Once again the House of Saud displays its talent for survival.

Tom Lippman is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. A former Middle East bureau chief of the Washington Post, he is the author of “Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Relationship with Saudi Arabia.”

[more]

Succession Issue Related Reporting:

Prince Turki al Faisal Address on the Bay’ah Council – Oct 30, 2006 – ArabiaLink.com (audio and transcript)

A Vision for the Future of Saudi-US Relations – Prince Turki al Faisal (prepared remarks) – SUSRIS IOI – Nov 4, 2006

Saudi succession stable, for now – MSNBC – Aug. 2, 2005

Thomas Lippman Related Items:

Region in Crisis: Fine Lines and Consequences – A Conversation with Thomas W. Lippman – SUSRIS Interview – Aug 2, 2006

Crawford Summit Perspective: A Conversation with Thomas Lippman – SUSRIS Interview – May 9, 2005

Insight on the Kingdom from the Author of Inside the Mirage — A Conversation with Thomas Lippman – Part One – SUSRIS Interview – March 30, 2005

Insight on the Kingdom from the Author of Inside the Mirage — A Conversation with Thomas Lippman – Part Two – SUSRIS Interview – Apr 18, 2005

Thomas Lippman – “Inside The Mirage” – US-Saudi Relations — SAIS Panel – SUSRIS IOI – Dec 16, 2003

Riyadh, SPA — An official source, in a statement to Saudi Press Agency, has said a report published in the American newspaper “Washington Post,” in its edition of Wednesday, November 29, 2006, attributing to writer Nawaf Obaid, “is absolutely not true.” “This writer does not represent any official Saudi authority. What has been published (in the newspaper) represents only his own view. It also does not represent in any way the Kingdom’s policy and stand to support security, unity and stability of Iraq with all its sects and doctrines,” the official source said.

***

On SUSRIS:

• Is Riyadh Ready to Recalibrate the Relationship – Nawaf Obaid – May 15, 2011
• Energy Infrastructure Threat Assessments Hyped – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Apr 18, 2011
• “Conspicuously quiet” in Saudi Arabia – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS –April 10, 2011
• Saudi Arabia “not ripe for revolution” – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – March 10, 2011
• Assessing Saudi Power – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Nov 14, 2007
• Riyadh and Washington Maneuver Over Iraq Fears – SUSRIS – Dec 13, 2006
• Leading Saudi Arabian Diplomats – SUSRIS – Dec 12, 2006
• Saudi Ambassador Abruptly Resigns, Leaves Washington – SUSRIS Special Report- Dec 12, 2006
• Stepping Into Iraq – Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves – SUSRIS – Nov 29, 2006
• Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Role: New Strategic Initiatives – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Nov 6, 2006
• Remnants of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Current Assessment – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Nov 3, 2006
• Disintegrating Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Oct 30, 2006
• Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SUSRIS – Oct 16, 2006
• The Saudis and Containing Iran in Lebanon – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Aug 30, 2006
• Dampened Trust – SUSRIS Exclusive Interivew – Nawaf Obaid – Aug 22, 2006
• Region in Crisis: Saudi Arabia’s Critical Role in Lebanon – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Aug 8, 2008
• Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Energy Initiative: Safeguarding Against Supply Disruptions – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jul 29, 2006
• Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Leadership Role in the Region – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jul 24, 2006 (PDF)
• Fractured Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jun 23, 2006 (PDF)
• Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Mar 15, 2006
• Saudi National Security Assessment Project – SUSRIS Special Section 2006
• National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses and Challenges – Cordesman / Obaid – SUSRIS – Oct 25, 2005

***

A Voice of Peace; A Move Towards Stability
Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States
University of Scranton, Pennsylvania
November 28, 2006

Thank you, Father Pilarz, for the kind introduction. Both of us share common roots at Georgetown University — a place where I was a student, and you were a professor, prior to coming here. We also have shared time together during your tour of the Kingdom. We must do that again. I’m glad to see this school under such strong leadership, and I thank you for the opportunity to be with you today.

I always find it rewarding to share remarks at colleges and universities. They offer an opportunity for a free exchange of ideas, and a campus always seems alive with the energy of those who wish to make contributions to the world. Today, and in our world, there are plenty of opportunities for all of us to contribute.

I want to talk specifically about the potential for contributions in the Middle East, an area that unfortunately has its share of problems.

It concerns me that so many of Saudi Arabia’s neighbors are struggling to find peace and stability. Terrorism continues to plague us all. Al Qaeda and its offshoots take advantage of the political turmoil to advance their agenda and ethos. We have worked with your government and other allies to bring them to heel. By taking a global approach, that includes police action, financial tracking and religious challenges to them, we can definitely defeat the terrorists.

In Lebanon, the threat of greater instability increased with the assassination of cabinet minister Pierre Gemayel. In Palestine, the Israeli occupation continues to humiliate the Palestinians and deny them their inalienable rights to an identity and a country. Iran’s nuclear program continues to create concern for the world. And we all know of the daily turmoil and suffering of the Iraqi people.

When looking at these situations — many of them lasting years, even decades – we can only ask ourselves: where can we find hope?

Robert Kennedy once said: “Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope.”

For decades, Saudi Arabia has worked to fulfill this mission. The Kingdom, in fact, has been a leading voice of peace and stability in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia wants to see the full potential of this beautiful region realized. There is no reason why the Middle East can not flourish into a vibrant and prosperous region, as it once was.

To see this accomplished, and to witness a lasting peace, we must take a comprehensive and coordinated approach.

With regard to Iran, Saudi Arabia has consistently engaged them in an open discourse. Our experience has been that talking with the Iranians is better than not talking with them.

In Lebanon, we see a nation that was just coming out from underneath the devastation of over twenty years of civil war. Assassinations of important leaders such as Rafiq Hariri and Pierre Gemayel serve to undermine the spirit of the Lebanese people. Unjust bombardments, such as Israel’s unlawful incursion last summer, destroy the infrastructure and progress that has been made.

So as a way to help, the Kingdom continues to support the ideals of the Lebanese people. We have donated aid in the amount of $250 million to help Lebanon rebuild Beirut and other areas after this summer’s Israeli bombardments, and we deposited one billion dollars in the Lebanese central bank to stabilize the currency and economy. We continue to monitor their needs and work with them to bring peace and stability.

Establishing peace has been a challenge as well in Iraq. Once again, Saudi Arabia has stood up for the ideals of peace and justice. We continue to support the Arab League in bringing all Iraqi factions together, and we support the Maliki government in its efforts to overcome the sectarian strife that is taking so many innocent lives.

To alleviate the burden the war has taken on the nation, Saudi Arabia has pledged one billion dollars in support. Of this total, $500 million are to be provided through the Saudi Development Fund to finance development projects in the areas of education, health, infrastructure and housing, in response to direct requests submitted by the Iraqi Government. The remaining $500 million are to finance trade between the two countries. Saudi Arabia has also already provided humanitarian and relief assistance to Iraq amounting to approximately $88 million. We are also talking to our Iraqi brethren on relieving their debt to the Kingdom.

But we still believe the solutions must come from within Iraq. And the Iraqi people and the Iraqi leadership are the ones that should determine their government and destiny. We are merely helping them get there.

For all of these issues, there is a tendency to compartmentalize and keep them separate. As we have seen, this is not an approach that will work. What is needed is a holistic and comprehensive strategy that starts directly with the root of the problem. And that problem is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Besides being a conflict between two peoples, the situation with Palestine and Israel has become an impediment to international stability. Without forging a solution, we will continue to be unable to secure lasting peace throughout the Middle East. And this turmoil, as we have all witnessed, will be echoed across the world.

Terrorists use the conflict to justify their evil acts around the world. Extremists use the conflict to recruit people to their cause. If you could see what people in the Middle East see on television every night, your opinion would change dramatically. For too long, the Palestinian people have endured great injustices and hardships. Many thousands live in hopeless poverty and thousands more have been uprooted from their homes. All have been deprived of minimum human and national rights.

Since peace is manifestly in the interest of the region and the world at large, it is that much more incumbent on leading powers, including Saudi Arabia and the United States, to be consistent — and insistent — in moving Palestine and Israel towards the known outlines of a durable settlement.

For this to be accomplished, though, we need implementation. For 50 years, we’ve had ideas and proposals, resolutions and initiatives. But never has there been an honest and just implementation, or enforcement, of these agreements.

Right now – even after the events of this summer – we have the Road Map – as outlined by President Bush – and the Abdullah Peace Plan. We need to finally bring these parties to the negotiating table. A lasting and just peace plan can only result from diplomatic negotiations. Israelis and Palestinians can begin to build confidence and trust in a process that takes into account the needs of both sides. Only when there is trust in the process, can there be trust in the implementation of the solution.

When this issue is removed from the table – or at the very least, allowed to move towards resolution – then others who use it to justify violence or misadventure will be quieted.

Ladies and Gentlemen: More international cooperation is needed to ensure that peace and stability can triumph in the world. Saudi Arabia has worked, and will continue to work, with its international partners to ensure this.

Thank you.

[Prepared remarks as posted at SaudiEmbassy.net]

Related Material:

Saudi ambassador: Israel key to end of Mideast turmoil

Turki: U.S. cannot unilaterally decide to pull out from Iraq

Also on SUSRIS/ArabiaLink:

A Vision for the Future of Saudi-US Relations – Prince Turki al Faisal – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 4, 2006

Prince Turki Al Faisal – Arab-US Policymakers Conference – Oct. 30, 2006 – Luncheon Keynote Address: Vision for the Future – Transcript/Audio [ArabiaLink.com]

Prince Turki Al Faisal – Arab-US Policymakers Conference – Oct. 30, 2006 – Luncheon Keynote Address: Vision for the Future – Q&A – Transcript/Audio [ArabiaLink.com]

Region in Crisis: A Call for American Leadership and a Lasting Peace – Prince Turki al Faisal – SUSRIS IOI – Aug 3, 2006

Perspectives on US-Saudi Relations from Foggy Bottom: A Conversation with Assistant Secretary of State C. David Welch – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 30, 2006

Perspectives on Conflicts, Cooperation and Crises: A Conversation with Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to the United States – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 14, 2006

Outreach and Engagement: A Conversation with Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to the United States – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 9, 2006

Secretary of State Rice and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal – Remarks to the press in Riyadh – SUSRIS IOI – Feb. 23, 2006

Saudi-US Strategic Dialogue – Secretary Rice, Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal – Meeting the Press – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 13, 2005

Secretary Rice Roundtable with Saudi Media – SUSRIS IOI – Jun. 21, 2005

Secretary Rice, Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal Meet the Press – SUSRIS IOI – Jun. 21, 2005

Crawford Summit Perspective: A Conversation with Thomas Lippman – SUSRIS Interview – May 9, 2005

Press Briefing on the President’s Meeting With the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (Rice/Hadley) – SUSRIS IOI – Apr. 25, 2005

Editor’s Note
SUSRIS is pleased to bring you a conversation with Professor Gregory Gause on this week’s developments in the Middle East. He spoke with us today by phone from his office at the University of Vermont.

The conversation is available in streaming audio on the SUSRIS Web site (link below) with the highlights provided here. We welcome your feedback on the usefulness of streaming audio as a way to provide you the latest information and insight on Saudi-US relations. Just send your comments to < info@SUSRIS.org >

Highlights
On Nov. 25 Vice President Cheney visit to Saudi Arabia:

“It’s clear that the administration ahead of the meeting with Maliki was trying to sound out its regional allies.. ..reflection of the administration’s desire to keep the Saudis in the loop and seek their help in Iraq..”

On Prince Turki’s statement about US not “leaving [Iraq] uninvited”:

“..a reflection of Saudi thinking these days.. ..Saudi cabinet had a meeting a couple of days ago and put out a statement that was quite direct for them.. saying to the US ‘you can’t leave now’ because if you leave now.. the historic balances within the region will be disrupted.. a clear signal that they meant the Shia will get more powerful than they should be..”

On Nawaf Obaid’s Nov. 29 Washington Post op-ed concerning Saudi intervention in Iraq:

“..the idea the Saudis as a government, as a matter of policy, back Sunni organizations, Sunni militias, in Iraq is, I think, a perfectly credible threat.. ..this is part of the full-court Saudi press in the run up to the Baker-Hamilton report in which they want to say that, “Hey, you broke this place, you can’t leave it without considering the interests of your allies in the region..”

On the threat to drive oil prices down as an economic wedge against Iranian interests:

“..it’s a risky thing. Because they can effect the market enormously but they can’t completely control it. They have an economic model now that’s based on a certain price for a barrel of oil.. ..just because the Iranians would hurt more doesn’t mean there’s not a risk to the Saudis.. ..They want to signal the US about how furious they are about this.”

On rising Iranian power:

“..I think the Saudis are acutely sensitive to balance of power concerns in the Middle East and they see Iran as a growing power. Add to that the ideological problems that they have with the Islamic Revolutionary regime and you have the sense in Riyadh that they have to block this power from becoming dominant in the region.. They see it on the march in Iraq. They see it on the march in Lebanon. And they are worried about it. On the other hand the Saudis don’t want a direct confrontation with Iran..”

On US-Saudi relations:

“..they stake their foreign policy very much on a strong relationship with the United States.. ..facing a potential regional power like Iran they need an outside ally. But they are very nervous that we will not take into our account, of our interests in Iraq, their interests. They see this continuously in Arab-Israeli questions where they don’t think the United States takes into account the interests of friendly Arab states.. ..they fear that’s going to happen in Iraq.. ..if they think we’re pursuing a policy that harms their interests they’ll take their own steps in Iraq..”

Related Items – Dr. Gregory Gause:

Region in Crisis: US-Saudi Relations – A Conversation with F. Gregory Gause, III – SUSRIS Interview – July 28, 2006

Developments in the Relationship: A Conversation with Gregory Gause – SUSRIS Interview – March 31, 2005

How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists By F. Gregory Gause III – SUSRIS IOI – Sep. 22, 2004

How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists – Panel Discussion – Part 1 – SUSRIS IOI

How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists – Panel Discussion – Part 2 – SUSRIS IOI

Executive Summary — The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of U.S. Relations with the Gulf States by F. Gregory Gause, III

F. Gregory Gause, III is an associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont, and director of the University’s Middle East Studies Program. He was previously on the faculty of Columbia University (1987-1995) and was a Fellow for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (1993-1994).

Editor’s Note

Today’s Washington Post carried an op-ed by Mr. Nawaf Obaid that displayed remarkable insight and candor on the likely course change in Saudi Arabian policy toward Iraq if the United States abandons the mission of stabilizing the country. We reprint it here for your consideration along with links to Mr. Obaid’s previous contributions to SUSRIS on-line holdings.

***

Stepping Into Iraq – Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves
Nawaf Obaid

In February 2003, a month before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, warned President Bush that he would be “solving one problem and creating five more” if he removed Saddam Hussein by force. Had Bush heeded his advice, Iraq would not now be on the brink of full-blown civil war and disintegration.

One hopes he won’t make the same mistake again by ignoring the counsel of Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal, who said in a speech last month that “since America came into Iraq uninvited, it should not leave Iraq uninvited.” If it does, one of the first consequences will be massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shiite militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis.

Over the past year, a chorus of voices has called for Saudi Arabia to protect the Sunni community in Iraq and thwart Iranian influence there. Senior Iraqi tribal and religious figures, along with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and other Arab and Muslim countries, have petitioned the Saudi leadership to provide Iraqi Sunnis with weapons and financial support. Moreover, domestic pressure to intervene is intense. Major Saudi tribal confederations, which have extremely close historical and communal ties with their counterparts in Iraq, are demanding action. They are supported by a new generation of Saudi royals in strategic government positions who are eager to see the kingdom play a more muscular role in the region.

Because King Abdullah has been working to minimize sectarian tensions in Iraq and reconcile Sunni and Shiite communities, because he gave President Bush his word that he wouldn’t meddle in Iraq (and because it would be impossible to ensure that Saudi-funded militias wouldn’t attack U.S. troops), these requests have all been refused. They will, however, be heeded if American troops begin a phased withdrawal from Iraq. As the economic powerhouse of the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world’s Sunni community (which comprises 85 percent of all Muslims), Saudi Arabia has both the means and the religious responsibility to intervene.

Just a few months ago it was unthinkable that President Bush would prematurely withdraw a significant number of American troops from Iraq. But it seems possible today, and therefore the Saudi leadership is preparing to substantially revise its Iraq policy. Options now include providing Sunni military leaders (primarily ex-Baathist members of the former Iraqi officer corps, who make up the backbone of the insurgency) with the same types of assistance — funding, arms and logistical support — that Iran has been giving to Shiite armed groups for years.

Another possibility includes the establishment of new Sunni brigades to combat the Iranian-backed militias. Finally, Abdullah may decide to strangle Iranian funding of the militias through oil policy. If Saudi Arabia boosted production and cut the price of oil in half, the kingdom could still finance its current spending. But it would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even with today’s high prices. The result would be to limit Tehran’s ability to continue funneling hundreds of millions each year to Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere.

Both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite death squads are to blame for the current bloodshed in Iraq. But while both sides share responsibility, Iraqi Shiites don’t run the risk of being exterminated in a civil war, which the Sunnis clearly do. Since approximately 65 percent of Iraq’s population is Shiite, the Sunni Arabs, who make up a mere 15 to 20 percent, would have a hard time surviving any full-blown ethnic cleansing campaign.

What’s clear is that the Iraqi government won’t be able to protect the Sunnis from Iranian-backed militias if American troops leave. Its army and police cannot be relied on to do so, as tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen have infiltrated their ranks. Worse, Iraq’s prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, cannot do anything about this, because he depends on the backing of two major leaders of Shiite forces.

There is reason to believe that the Bush administration, despite domestic pressure, will heed Saudi Arabia’s advice. Vice President Cheney’s visit to Riyadh last week to discuss the situation (there were no other stops on his marathon journey) underlines the preeminence of Saudi Arabia in the region and its importance to U.S. strategy in Iraq. But if a phased troop withdrawal does begin, the violence will escalate dramatically.

In this case, remaining on the sidelines would be unacceptable to Saudi Arabia. To turn a blind eye to the massacre of Iraqi Sunnis would be to abandon the principles upon which the kingdom was founded. It would undermine Saudi Arabia’s credibility in the Sunni world and would be a capitulation to Iran’s militarist actions in the region.

To be sure, Saudi engagement in Iraq carries great risks — it could spark a regional war. So be it: The consequences of inaction are far worse.

Reprinted with permission of the author.

***

Nawaf Obaid

Nawaf Obaid is current the Managing Director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, a government consultancy based in Riyadh.

He is author of “The Oil Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Arabia” (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). he is also an Adjunct Fellow in the Office of the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC where he co-authored, with Anthony Cordesman, “National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges.”

He has a BSFS from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, an MA in Public Policy from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, and completed doctoral courses at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program.

***

On SUSRIS:

• Is Riyadh Ready to Recalibrate the Relationship – Nawaf Obaid – May 15, 2011
• Energy Infrastructure Threat Assessments Hyped – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Apr 18, 2011
• “Conspicuously quiet” in Saudi Arabia – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS –April 10, 2011
• Saudi Arabia “not ripe for revolution” – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – March 10, 2011
• Assessing Saudi Power – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Nov 14, 2007
• Riyadh and Washington Maneuver Over Iraq Fears – SUSRIS – Dec 13, 2006
• Leading Saudi Arabian Diplomats – SUSRIS – Dec 12, 2006
• Saudi Ambassador Abruptly Resigns, Leaves Washington – SUSRIS Special Report- Dec 12, 2006
• Official Source Refutes Report of Nawaf Obaid in “Washington Post” – SUSRIS – Dec 2, 2006
• Stepping Into Iraq – Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves – SUSRIS – Nov 29, 2006
• Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Role: New Strategic Initiatives – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Nov 6, 2006 (PDF)
• Remnants of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Current Assessment – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Nov 3, 2006 (PDF)
• Disintegrating Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Oct 30, 2006 (PDF)
• Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SUSRIS – Oct 16, 2006
• The Saudis and Containing Iran in Lebanon – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Aug 30, 2006
• Dampened Trust – SUSRIS Exclusive Interivew – Nawaf Obaid – Aug 22, 2006
• Region in Crisis: Saudi Arabia’s Critical Role in Lebanon – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Aug 8, 2008
• Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Energy Initiative: Safeguarding Against Supply Disruptions – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jul 29, 2006 (PDF)
• Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Leadership Role in the Region – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jul 24, 2006 (PDF)
• Fractured Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jun 23, 2006 (PDF)
• Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Mar 15, 2006 (PDF)
• Saudi National Security Assessment Project – SUSRIS Special Section 2006
• National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses and Challenges – Cordesman / Obaid – SUSRIS – Oct 25, 2005

***

US Embassy Expedites Visas for Saudi Students
Maha Akeel, Arab News

JEDDAH, 20 November 2006 — Saudi students approved for US scholarships by the Ministry of Higher Education can expect to receive notices by the end of this month, said a US Embassy official in Riyadh.

In a presentation given yesterday at the Dar Al-Hekma College for girls urging students to apply for US universities early, Vice Consul Carrie Giardino said that officials at the embassy had been told by the ministry that names of students approved for 10,000 US scholarships announced months ago would be disclosed at the end of November. The ministry plans to announce the names in groups every two weeks.

The problem arose when the ministry announced scholarships, which caused the embassy to block appointment times for students in order to process their visas as quickly as possible thus reducing the number of interviews for other types of visas from the usual 200 a day to 80 a day. This created a backlog of interviews for other visas and many people complained that it took months just to schedule an interview.

“Now we have opened 2,000 new appointment times in December and January for the public, but priority of no-wait-time is given to students. As soon as the ministry makes available the scholarships, the times would be reserved again for students,” Giardino told Arab News.

Another problem caused by the ministry’s delay in issuing the scholarships is that even the students who applied for a visa have their documents pending until they receive a confirmation of their scholarship.

“We cannot issue the visa until the student gets the scholarship. We are asking them to at least get us a letter from the ministry confirming that they have a scholarship,” said Giardino.

The US Consulate in Jeddah gave a presentation yesterday at the Dar Al-Hekma College on the occasion of International Education Week.

Najat Al-Saied, educational adviser at the consulate, talked about choosing a university for graduate studies, admission requirements and other information.

She recommended students start applying 12 to 18 months before their intended study time and to research the universities based on their area of interest and requirements.

In general the minimum academic year grade accepted is B and the average international student pays between $16,000 and $46,000 a year depending on the university. More than 500,000 international students apply for graduate studies in the US every year — most of them from India, China and South Korea — 80 percent of whom are issued visas. The most competitive colleges to be accepted in are medical and dental where less than 3 percent are accepted.

All US visa applications worldwide, as of Nov. 1, 2006, must be completed online. “Prepare all the required documents before going to Riyadh for the interview otherwise there would be a delay,” said Giardino to the students explaining to them the process of getting a student visa.

The validity period on the I-20 form given by the school is the maximum that a student can stay in the US, although due to the reciprocity agreement between the Kingdom and the US, the visa is issued for only two years even if the study period is longer than that, so the student would have to renew it.

“If you have all the required documents we can issue the visa in a week, but sometimes there is additional processing in Washington so it might take two months especially for male students. There is a lot of security concerns, so you need to apply early,” said Giardino.

For female students worried about needing a mahram to accompany them, the ministry issues an exemption card attached to the passport allowing her to travel by herself if her family permits her, according to Giardino. However, the embassy does not issue a “mahram visa,” a person wanting to accompany the female student must apply for a visa separately and go through the process.

Once a student identifies the school they wish to attend, there are five steps that make up the visa application:

1. Make an appointment for a visa interview by going to http://ksa.us-visaservices.com , pay $12 to receive a PIN number that allows you to log onto the appointment system.

2. Pay the application fee at a Samba branch and receive a yellow receipt which you should bring with you to the embassy. Or go online to http://www.samba.com and print a copy of the receipt.

3. Complete the application by going to http://evisaforms.state.gov and bring the printout.

4. Pay your SEVIS fee by going to http://www.fmjfee.com to pay $100 and bring a copy of the receipt. All primary student applicants for F-1, M-1 or J-1 visas must pay the SEVIS fee but the fee does not have to be paid for the derivatives or dependents of those applicants.

5. The documents needed are: application form, full face photos showing hairline and chin, I-20 from the school you will attend, SEVIS fee receipt, application fee receipt, high school/college transcripts, financial statements (three months or scholarship verification), and passport valid for six months.

Reprinted with permission of Arab News

Related Material
The Value of A Visa? Priceless – A Conversation with Mohammed H. Al-Qunaibet – SUSRIS Interview – Jul 7, 2006

Saudi Arabian Super-Achiever to Deliver UCLA Student Commencement Address – SUSRIS IOI – Jun 15, 2006

An Open Letter from a Saudi Businessman: Amr Khashoggi – SUSRIS IOI – Jan. 12, 2006

Perspectives on US-Saudi Relations from Foggy Bottom: A Conversation with Assistant Secretary of State C. David Welch – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 30, 2006

More Saudi Students in U.S. – SUSRIS IOI – Dec 18, 2005

Easing Visa Restrictions? Ambassador Oberwetter Provides an Update on the Relationship – SUSRIS IOI – May 4, 2005

The Impact of U.S. Visa Policies: Implications for America’s Economy – An Initial Inquiry – By National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce – SUSRIS IOI – Sep. 12, 2004

Editor’s Note
As Anthony Cordesman notes in the lead to his tripartite briefing on global energy security, “long-term assessments are inherently too speculative to be reliable.” We are fortunate, however, that he continues to serve as a prolific contributor to the need for cutting edge analyses on a host of issues important to SUSRIS readers. Such is the case today with a series of briefings he prepared for a conference at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

We should also note his recent contribution to the Arab-US Policymakers Conference in Washington at which he discussed US policies in the Gulf with co-panelists Prince Turki al-Faisal and Assistant Secretary of State Gordon Gray, and moderator Anne Joyce. The audio files from that and other panels are available on SUSRIS’ companion web site ArabiaLink.com [link below] and transcripts are forthcoming.

Saudi Energy Security: A Global Perspective
Anthony H. Cordesman

Washington, DC, November 10, 2006- The attached briefing analyzes Saudi energy security from a broad national, regional, and global energy security perspective. It is one of a series of three briefings on global energy security to be issued by the Burke Chair at CSIS and was prepared for a conference held by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on November 5th-6th, 2006. This and the two briefings to follow next week will deal with overall global energy security issues, and with the global security risks affecting oil exports by region and country.

This briefing draws on work by the Energy Information Agency of the US Department of Energy, the International Energy Agency, the CIA, various Saudi Government sources, and by Nawaf Obaid. In brief, it makes the following arguments:

– The global energy debate focuses far too much on Saudi Arabia to the exclusion of other energy suppliers, and oil to the exclusion of other sources of energy. Such risk assessments often ignore the fact that Iran and Iraq, with more than 20% of the world’s proven conventional oil supplies, have presented real supply problems since the fall of the Shah in 1979, and Iraq’s defeat in the Iran-Iraq War.

–There is little reason to believe Saudi Arabia will run out of oil, will not meet its production goals, or has serious investment and oilfield management problems.

– Global dependence on increased Saudi exports is often grossly exaggerated because of the use of demand models based on low-price oil rather than more realistic high-priced cases.

–The Saudi political and social systems have significant problems, but real efforts are being made to address many aspects of these problems, and there is little evidence of any current internal threat.

–Energy terrorism is a serious global problem, but unlikely to present serious problems in Saudi Arabia. Small interruptions and panics are a possibility, but not a probability.

–Saudi Arabia faces serious mid- and long-term problems with economic diversification, demographics, and youth unemployment. At the same time, it is investing massively in trying to deal with these problems, and is using its new burst of oil wealth relatively wisely.

This assessment does not mean Saudi energy supply is risk free. It does mean many of the risks have been exaggerated, and that Saudi Arabia is likely to be a relatively stable energy supplier in the near- and mid-term. As is the case with many other potential risks in global energy supply, long-term assessments are inherently too speculative to be reliable.

To find the full briefing Click Here

Rethinking Global Energy Security: Geostrategic & Economic Risks
Anthony H. Cordesman

Washington, DC, November 13, 2006- The attached briefing is the second in a series of three briefings taking a new approach to global energy security. The first focused on Saudi Arabia. The third will focus on oil export security by region and country.

This briefing suggests that the problems of energy security go far beyond oil exports. It notes that the expansion of coal will be as critical in meeting overall energy supply as oil, and that current projections of increased coal use may present as much cumulative risk as increases in oil supply and oil exports.

The fact that this will be driven by domestic energy investment and environmental decisions, and by not export capability, further illustrates the fact that the current focus on energy exports can be deeply misleading. Domestic decisions about new energy supply, efficiency, and conservation are at least equally critical and present major areas of risk. They are critical to the development of key nations like China and India, as well as to the real world future demand for oil and gas exports.

Gas is also identified as a key area of global risk. Particularly dependence on gas produced or shipped by Russia. Serious questions exist about Russia’s ability to increase production at the forecast level, its pipeline projects, and its stability.

This does not mean that oil does not present a major area of risk, particularly since many gas exports must also move by sea. The various types of risk are evaluated, including security risks. At the same time, the briefing cautions that many estimates of oil demand are based on low to medium prices with little real analysis of the elasticity of demand. High oil prices sharply reduce demand, the need for increased exports, and the rate of depletion of reserves.

The analysis also concludes that efforts to create true global energy stability and security face problems too complex and too driven by other factors to solve. At the same time, it suggests that high prices have the general impact of making the world less dependent on energy growth and the secure flow of exports, and that smaller energy “crises” and interruptions serve a useful purpose in making the global economy more adaptable in dealing with inevitable problems in the smooth growth and flow of energy supply.

To find the full briefing Click Here

Global Oil Security: Risks by Region and Supplier
Anthony H. Cordesman

Washington, DC, November 15, 2006- The attached briefing is the third in a series of three briefings taking a new approach to global energy security. The first focused on Saudi Arabia. The second focused on overall global risks for all forms of energy.

This briefing summarizes the risks to sustaining and increasing global oil exports by region and country. It examines the type of risk, their potential impact on global supply, and the problems in achieving a significant degree of stability.

One key message is that much depends on oil prices and that high oil prices sharply reduce global demand, the need for increases in supply, and risk of a major depletion of oil reserves. It suggests that over time, high oil prices may actually aid the global economy, not hurt it.

It also suggests that many estimates of the growth of Asian demand may be seriously exaggerated. The same is true of estimates of the need for increased oil exports from the Gulf.

At the same time, serious energy risks are identified in every exporting region. These include continuing problems in Iran and Iraq, with more than 20% of the world’s conventional proven oil reserves, as well as West Africa and Latin America. These problems are compounded by new asymmetric military threats and the threat of terrorism.

To find the full briefing Click Here

The Office of the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
The Burke Chair in Strategy is held by Anthony H. Cordesman
Phone: +1 (202) 775-7325
Fax: +1 (202) 457-8746

Web: http://www.csis.org/burke

About CSIS
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in these publications should be understood to be solely those of the authors.

Education Key to Development: Gates
Siraj Wahab, Arab News

RIYADH, 9 November 2006 — Microsoft founder Bill Gates concluded 14 separate development agreements with Saudi universities, businesses and ministries yesterday during a whirlwind visit to Riyadh.

Speaking at the First Global Competitiveness Forum, Gates urged the Kingdom and its people to make a solid commitment to educational excellence and encouraged partnerships to develop energy-sector software to leverage the country’s expertise in oil and gas production. He said the people of Saudi Arabia already had a partner in Microsoft.

“The agreements we signed today will help public- and private-sector organizations in Saudi Arabia to empower people to reach their full potential,” Gates told business leaders, academicians and government officials gathered at the forum. “As a leading IT company, at Microsoft we are committed to using our resources to help the citizens of Saudi Arabia and people around the world benefit from technology and thrive in the knowledge economy.”

The forum was organized by the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) and Microsoft Arabia at the direction of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah. Its focus was to bring information-technology-sector leaders together in an effort to advance the Kingdom’s goal of transforming the nation into one of the world’s 10 most attractive investment destinations by the year 2010 ["10x10 program"].

In his opening speech to the forum — read out by Riyadh Gov. Prince Salman — King Abdullah emphasized Saudi Arabia’s resolve to improve the country’s investment climate within the framework of a comprehensive economic reform program.

“We have launched a comprehensive program to solve the problems facing investors in cooperation with all relevant government departments,” the king said.

Abdullah said the Kingdom was pleased to host the first global competitiveness forum as an affirmation of providing a suitable atmosphere to increase investments.

“We are happy to see the participation of world personalities including intellectuals and business leaders to exchange views and make practical proposals with Saudi officials and businessmen,” the king said.

Abdullah said the forum was organized in support of SAGIA’s 10×10 national program. “This of course demands a lot of efforts in order to improve performance, increase productivity and enhance the Kingdom’s competitiveness,” the king said.

In his keynote address, Gates said the road to a prosperous future was the information superhighway, which would enable international business and education partnerships that would otherwise be impossible. “The digital approach is also making it a worldwide marketplace,” Gates said. “That is a good thing. It means that when you partner with other companies, they don’t need to be companies in the same location. We are seeing, for example, companies in China with great manufacturing expertise; we have companies in the United States that have various types of medical or software expertise. Many of these great products will involve companies from different countries working together. For a company like Microsoft, it means partnering throughout the world to form new companies. For example, companies in Saudi Arabia can take a lead in the energy area and come up with software solutions for that as well as other strategic areas. It is very important for us to reach out to them to share the information and to make sure that they have the latest software to do the work. So the advancement will come from many countries.”

Most important to enable the Kingdom to compete in the global marketplace was a massive commitment to improve education, he said. “The governments have a central role to play. The most important priority of all should be investing in education and to have several world-class universities. These are the things where only the government can show leadership,” Gates said.

Speaking of his own country, the Microsoft chairman said that the keystone of the US economy was the country’s educational system. “The United States often ranks very high on the competitive tables, which you can say is very surprising because we are the most expensive economy in the world, our legal costs, defense costs and medical costs are highest in the world. The reason we do well is because our universities are among the best in the world,” Gates said. “Most people say 15 of the Top 20 universities are in the United States. We are also very lucky in that smart people from around the world often want to come to the United States, so we get not only the best domestic skills but a lot of top people from around the world.”

Gates said that for Saudi Arabia to succeed, a number of factors would have to be considered. “What does Saudi Arabia have to do to move up? I think they have to take a lesson from a number of places,” Gates said. “You’ve got to look at the US universities. You’ve got to look at their incentive systems where people who create intellectual property in the United States know that they can start a company, that their innovation will get that kind of protection.”

He lamented the difficulties people of many nationalities were experiencing when trying to visit and work in the United States. “I am actually quite critical of the US government for not making it easier for people to come in,” Gates said. “Immigration policies make it kind of slow and unattractive to come to the United States, so that is a big hindrance.”

Looking into the future, Gates said: “For interaction today, we primarily use the keyboard. In the future we will be using all sorts of means for interacting with the computer. We will be using speech, we will be using ink. And then, we are talking about eliminating textbooks or books altogether because we will have a very light thin screen, a tablet-like computer that you can carry with you and which would be connected to the Internet.”

An interesting revolution is under way, he said. “Ten years ago when we thought about photographs, we thought about taking a camera, developing a film.. ..And when we thought about organizing and sharing our photo collection, that required working on paper that was very inefficient. Well, today, if you take a photo you can put it on the Internet and have it published in a very rich automatic way and in seconds. You can review your catalog in a very rich way. Isn’t that amazing?”

Gates recalled a story to underline the speed with which changes are taking place in the digital music world.

“I had my children with me recently and we were walking in a shopping area and there was a record store and my son asked me: ‘What is a record?’ Well, he has never seen a record. If I take him to a museum, he will see one. He knows what a TV is, but 10 years from now even TV will be something people will look back on and say: ‘Well, how inconvenient that was.’ You can’t carry it with you wherever you want and you can’t organize it the way you would like.”

Among the 14 agreements signed yesterday were pacts with King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), Saudi Post, Supreme Commission for Tourism, Saudi Telecom Company, General Organization for Technical and Vocational Training (GOTEVOT), the King Faisal Foundation and the Intelligence Department.

Organizers said the forum’s IT focus reflected the sector’s importance to economic development.

“Information and communications technology was chosen as the theme of the forum because of its vibrant impact on the economic productivity and competitiveness,” said SAGIA Governor Amr Dabbagh.

“It has a wide market that has big potential for developing a knowledge-based economy in Saudi Arabia.”

Reprinted with permission of Arab News

On SUSRIS

An Insight Into Education Reform in Saudi Arabia – Jamal Khashoggi – SUSRIS IOI – Aug 15, 2006

Saudis Look East for Higher Studies – SUSRIS IOI – Mar 13, 2006

More Saudi Students in U.S. – SUSRIS IOI – Dec 18, 2005

Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA)

Related Material:

Gates gives thumbs up to Saudi development plans – ME Times – Nov 9, 2006

Gates signs 14 accords with Saudi institutions – Trade Arabia – Nov 9, 2006

Bill Gates’ Visit to Kingdom Raises High Expectations – Arab News – Nov 8, 2006

Editor’s Note
As many readers know, SUSRIS is a private-sector, non-partisan information resource sponsored by the Washington-based National Council on US-Arab Relations. Not having any affiliation with any government, it sometimes takes us by surprise to be approached in email or phone calls from visa applicants and others seeking this or that government service, from this or that government. I’m sure we, in turn, surprise people when they learn that our editorial offices are located in Tennessee’s Highland Rim.

We occasionally joke that we have Tennessean Al Gore, the self-styled “creator of the Internet,” to thank for enabling us to work from such a great location. The downside of relying on the Internet and the telephone so much is in missing some of the pop-up opportunities to stay connected to people that is presented in places like Washington, our former base of operations. We were recently thrilled to learn that Mr. Rami Khouri, columnist and executive editor of Beirut’s Daily Star — the leading English language newspaper in the Middle East — was visiting our neighborhood recently — as a guest lecturer at Maryville College, on the doorstep of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.

Mr. Khouri arrived in Maryville to speak at the college’s “When East Meets West: The U.S. and the Middle East” lecture series fresh from his panel appearance on the CNN special report, “In God’s Name: A Global Summit with President Clinton.” Mr. Khouri’s presentation at Maryville, titled, “What Has Broken Down? The Perils and Promise of Communications Between the Arab World, the Middle East, and the West,” kept a large audience engrossed for almost two hours, demonstrating both his endurance and his passion for dialogue. We were fortunate that Mr. Khouri was able to spend time, afterward, to elaborate on some of the points made in his presentation and to focus in on US-Saudi relations as seen from the perspective of someone who reports on regional developments.

{Mr. Khouri’s Maryville College presentation will be provided in full on SUSRIS’ companion web site ArabiaLink.com.]

SUSRIS: Mr. Khouri, thank you for sharing your perspectives on the Middle East with us today. How would you describe the state of the Saudi-US relationship?

Rami Khouri: It strikes me that the Saudi-American relationship has passed through its most difficult moments and there is a serious attempt on both sides to try to get back to normal. 9-11 was a difficult time obviously because there were Saudis among the terrorists. The Bush Administration responded with talk of draining the swamp — you have these Middle Eastern countries from which terrorism emerged and attacked the United States. Therefore these societies need to radically reform.

That initial broad-brush simplistic approach has shown its weaknesses and limits. I think there is now a much more realistic understanding of the facts. The terrorists are attacking Arab countries as much as they are foreign countries, and Saudi Arabia has been a victim numerous times. There is an appreciation in the United States that the Saudis are seriously fighting the terrorism threat, while six, eight years ago the Americans probably felt they weren’t doing enough. That was obvious. There has been a clear change in the Saudi approach to fighting terrorism.

Also the Saudis have always been quite realistic and sensible in their oil policies. In terms of price stability and supply stability the relationship has always been a functional one between the United States and Saudi Arabia. There have been no problems there.

One of the most interesting aspects of the relationship in recent years has been the Saudis being barometers of wider Arab sentiments. For instance, the Saudis are constantly telling the Americans and the world about the need to solve the Palestine problem. This is a key element of fighting radicalism in the region.

There was also a recent interesting development during the Lebanon war when the Saudis released a statement chastising the United States.

..Hence the kingdom calls on the international community as a whole – represented by the United Nations – and on the USA in particular with an appeal and a warning: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia urges everyone to move in line with the dictates of their conscience and the moral values of international humanity, and warns everyone that, should the option of peace fail as a result of the Israeli arrogance, only the option of war will remain. And then only God Almighty knows what wars and conflicts the region will witness, the evil of which will spare no-one, even those whose military power is now pushing them to play with fire.. – Statement of the Royal Court – July 25, 2006.

The Royal Court was publicly chastising the United States, not just chastising but warning the United States. They were very frank, blunt words from friends of the United States saying, look there are problems in this region which are partly caused by Israeli policies and American support for those policies which are creating tremendous anger and tension and pressures in the region — the Arab world has tried the peace option, and if it doesn’t work there is always a war option.

The Saudis weren’t saying they are going to go to war. What they were saying is that masses of people will not be silent forever in the face of injustice. If America is seen to be complicit in Israeli aggression or occupation or barbaric warfare, especially against civilians, then the anger will be directed against America as well. That was very startling to me. It was very striking because the Saudis above all else are discreet. They don’t identify countries by name like that. They don’t talk of a war option. This was really unprecedented Saudi public political language — unprecedented in my lifetime.

The United States should understand it as being a very significant sign or barometer of the nature of concern in the Arab countries — concern about the trend of radicalism, extremism, public political anger and the role of the United States and Israel in that process. So that strikes me as something quite new and important and the more that the Saudis speak out like this, honestly, the better it is for everybody.

SUSRIS: The Royal Court statement you are referring to followed a public denunciation by Saudi Arabia of Hezbollah and its backers for “creating a gravely dangerous” situation. In light of the earlier message blaming Hezbollah and its sponsors what was behind the second message, the Royal Court statement? Was it a reflection of the discontent of the so-called “Arab Street”?

Khouri: You know, I think the two statements are not contradictory, because the second statement wasn’t saying Hezbollah was right. The first statement said that Hezbollah was reckless or whatever the word they used, I can’t remember

SUSRIS: “Miscalculated adventures,” I believe.

Khouri: Yes, something like that. Other people in the Arab world said the same thing, including many people in Lebanon. So it was just surprising that they said it in public — not that they said it, but that they said it in public. But it was an honest statement that reflected their views and many other people held those views.

The second statement, which was critical of the United States and referred to the United States by name, was obviously a reaction to events on the ground. It didn’t negate the first statement. It said that while Hezbollah was practicing adventurism or whatever, the Israelis are now doing something much worse, the Americans are supporting them and there are consequences to this kind of policy.

It reflected the seriousness of the situation in terms of popular Arab sentiment. It also reflected Saudi concerns that the Arab regimes themselves are uncomfortable with this kind of mass political anger. It’s unlikely that the widespread anger of the man on the street in the Arab world is going to threaten any Arab regime. I don’t expect there to be any threats to Arab regimes. What it does do, however, is to increase the support for some of the Islamist groups around the region. It’s possible — in some cases that individuals already angry with what’s going on and humiliated — it’s possible a few of them will go off and join terror groups like bin Laden’s. So it could possibly lead to greater terrorism and that terrorism is directed against Arab regimes and leaderships as well as Israel and the United States. So I think the Royal Court statement accurately reflected those concerns.

SUSRIS: I’d like to come back to the regional relationships because there are a lot of pieces here to discuss but first let’s finish talking about the elements of the Saudi-US relationship. The connections at the government and business levels seem to be much better off than the people to people relationship. How do you assess the connections and perceptions of the publics on both sides? Where are we now? Where are we going? Is it getting worse? Is it getting better?

Khouri: My sense is that the people to people relationship is actually deteriorating a little bit, not massively, but it’s still defined by a combination of ignorance, some resentment and some anger, on both sides. It’s not helped by the kind of high-level American statements, especially by President Bush, constantly talking about Islam and fascism and terrorism, and Islam and fascism and terrorism in the same breath, speech after speech after speech. That tends to reinforce the image in the United States public, which is ignorant of Islam and Arabs because they don’t interact with those societies. It tends to expand this perception in the United States that Islam as something problematic, broadly speaking. Islam is not associated with baseball and Crackerjacks and fun times. Islam is associated with threats, with threat levels and societies that have a lot of anger against the United States and occasionally send terrorists to the United States.

The people to people relationship in both directions remains I think mired in the quagmire, the mud of post 9-11. Even though governments are doing okay, and business people will always find a way to do business, the people to people perceptions are not good.

It works the other way too. Many people in Saudi Arabia and the Arab world are concerned about American attitudes towards them. They are worried about security and visa issues. They are worried about what will happen if they invest their personal money in the United States. Will it get confiscated one day? These are real concerns that they have.

This situation is a consequence of acts of violence by terrorists, but also acts of violence by governments, like the situation in Iraq that I think many Saudis have problems with. So it’s a function of acts of individuals, terrorists, governments, whatever acts of violence. It is also a function of the rhetoric that you hear and this is where the American side, I think, is more at fault. The Saudis tend to be quite measured in their public statements. That’s why the Saudi statement during the Lebanon crisis was so dramatic. It is in the nature of Saudi diplomacy is to be discreet. Arabs in general tend to be low key. They don’t like to wash their dirty laundry in public, but the Saudis are even more discreet. So I think it’s a situation that’s going to stay like it is for a while.

The good news, though, is that when people meet on an individual or group level, whether it’s for sports or tourism or business or education or whatever they need, they meet and everything is fine. These tensions dissipate like a fog lifting when the sun comes out. It doesn’t worry me in the long run because we know how these tensions emerged and we know that they are quite thin and superficial. So I’m not too worried about it.

SUSRIS: Let’s get back to the regional relationships. What do you think is the view from Riyadh of increasing Iranian influence around the neighborhood?

Khouri: I don’t know the Saudi government thinking that well. The only thing I can comment on is what I see happening in the region. There you see evidence of Saudi concern about Iran, about what’s going on in Iraq, about Hezbollah in Lebanon.

There are Saudi concerns over the signs the political order in the Middle East is changing. There are signs, as well, of possible forces that could lead to more tension and violence and instability. The Saudis are clearly concerned about Iranian influence. It is sometimes used, implemented or activated through other Shiites, like Hezbollah, and sometimes through political alliances with others such as the Syrians or even Hamas, which is a Sunni movement.

So I think it is not so much a Shia problem as it is an Iranian radical problem. The fear is not that the Shiites are getting stronger and Iran is empowering the Shiites in the Middle East. You have Saudi Shiites and you have Shiites from other Arab countries but I think the Arab identity is probably stronger than the Shiite identity.

I always thought nationalism was stronger than religious identity in most cases. You saw this with the Iraqi Shia in Iraq during the war with Iran. National identity is very strong. What you have is an Iranian government that is radical and exporting this radicalism. They are trying to mobilize allies and partners around the region to form a loose resistance and rejection front including Hamas, Hezbollah, Muslim Brothers, Syria, some progressives, some nationalists, whatever. The purpose is Iran’s fight against American hegemony and against Israeli occupation as they see it. That’s what worries the Saudis a little bit. This is my perception and you see it in situations where the Saudis try to step in and play a mediating role when they can. For example, as with Syria and Lebanon, at one point they were trying to play a role

SUSRIS: They certainly played a significant role in the recent Lebanon crisis, providing $1.5 billion to stabilize the economy and for emergency relief. Is this the type of role we can expect to see them play?

Khouri: Well, they get drawn into these situations sometimes. They are a major Arab power — a financial power, a religious power. Their ideology is low key but they do have an ideological orientation. It is quite pro-Western and pro-free market. But they also have very principled stands on issues so I think they’re constantly trying to balance all of these factors.

They are not very happy with the mainstream Islamist movements, in my opinion, but they can probably live with them better than they can live with the terrorist movements.

The Saudis are challenged by the circumstances of the region around them and their own terror and radicalism problems at home. They are challenged to be more decisive and more active diplomatically, probably more than they would like to be. Their tendency is to be low key and quiet, but you can’t have such a big power in the region being docile. And of course you know there is the Iranian issue with nuclear weapons and the threats against Iran that result.

SUSRIS: That’s where I was going next, the nuclear question. The Saudis are in a difficult situation. Riyadh doesn’t want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon but also doesn’t want the United States to resort to a military confrontation. How can those positions be reconciled?

Khouri: Yes, it is a concern for the Saudis, and their concerns are twofold. They are concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon and throwing its weight around the region. Iran is not going to actually use such a weapon. I think the Saudis are just concerned about a more assertive Iran.

They are concerned about the implications of an American-Israeli attack against Iran to stop the nuclear developments. That would be bad because they might get dragged into it. They might be a target of Iranian revenge. They are concerned about the environmental issues — nuclear fallout. Obviously, everybody in the Gulf shares that concern. The Saudis are concerned about a radical change in the balance of power in the region. If the West accommodates Iran with some kind of arrangement that asserts Iran’s supremacy in the Gulf the Saudis obviously wouldn’t like that. If there is a deal between Iran and the West, which is possible, I think that would allow Iran to have continued strong influence in the region.

The way to offset that is to solve the Arab-Israeli problem. When you solve the Arab-Israeli problem you take away a huge element that Iran exploits to penetrate the region and develop close working relations beyond their borders. If you solve the Arab-Israeli question you wouldn’t have Hamas and Iran; and Syria and Iran. It would change the dynamics in the region, and therefore change Iran’s relationship with the region.

Saudi concerns about Iran fall into several categories but a lot of the issues are not in the Saudi’s hands to do anything about. It’s the Iranian-American relationship that’s key.

SUSRIS: Saudi Arabia has great strategic interests in Iraq and again Iran is a major player there. Saudi Arabia has tried to play a role. Last year they facilitated an emergency summit in Cairo bringing all the Iraqi parties together that resulted in more Sunni participation in the December vote. But compared to the high stakes in Iraq for Saudi Arabia there is only so much they can do. Where do you see the possibilities or the limitations for Saudi Arabia vis a vis Iraq?

Khouri: My impression is that from the region only the Iranians now can play a significant role externally. The Iranians and the Americans are the two key parties right now who can have a role in Iraq. Saudi Arabia? I just don’t know.

SUSRIS: Stand back and be nervous?

Khouri: Yeah I think they’re obviously nervous but I don’t know if they are just standing back, but I honestly just don’t know. But being nervous, clearly most people in the region are worried about Iraq, because the implications are serious.

In both directions, if Iraq succeeds like the Americans want it to succeed — which is not likely, there’s perhaps a two percent chance that Iraq becomes stable and democratic and prosperous without the American forces there. Who knows, it might happen. I doubt it, but maybe a few years down the road it could happen.

SUSRIS: Two percent isn’t very good odds.

Khouri: Yes, the chances are really slim, very unlikely. I just leave that two percent there because you never know, you can’t read the future. You might have a miraculous transformation. The Iraqi politicians could get together. They could agree to a constitution. Americans could leave. The Iraqis could stop the terrorism. It’s possible. It’s in fact in Iran’s interest to help bring that about, because if there is a stable Iraq is going to be very friendly with Iran.

In any case, if Iraq succeeds and becomes a stable democracy many people in the Arab countries may not like that because they might find it intensifies the pressure on them to become more democratic. I am not just talking about the Saudis. Many Arab countries are not happy with that prospect. On the other hand, if it gets worse, if a civil war breaks out, that’s bad as well as any possible consequences and we already have some of the negative consequences — the expansion of terrorism training, experience and networks. So yes, the Saudis are concerned about it.

SUSRIS: What do you think Americans should know about Saudi Arabia?

Khouri: I think the American public should be aware of the slow but steady attempts at reform in Saudi Arabia. There is recognition among Saudis that they must evolve their system. They don’t want radical change. They don’t want change forced on them from outside. But they do understand — the leadership, clearly, and the mainstream of society too — the need for an evolution.

Whatever you want to call it — reform, more liberal, more democratic, more participatory, more modern, whatever word you want to use — there has to be an evolution in the system that allows people to participate more in decision-making. That is the big Saudi challenge, and the government and the mainstream in society, they get it. They understand that and they are trying to bring about change in a very slow, steady, systematic manner. It’s probably slower than many people want, but the fact is that it is happening.

SUSRIS: Is it too fast for some?

Khouri: Yes, but I think the pace is realistic for most Saudis. Yes, some people might complain. But the important fact is that it is starting to happen. You are getting women doing things that they couldn’t do before. There has been voting in municipalities. There’s a process that is moving faster than it was before. And I think that’s important to understand.

These societies only move at their own pace. You can’t force a process of reform from outside or a pace that is determined by outside. Saudi Arabia is very conservative, very traditional. It had been politically very static. It’s now evolving, moving, which is a significant historical phenomena in the context of the Arab world.

The important thing is to keep it going, to keep the process going. Speed it up when you can but make sure it doesn’t stall, because many reform processes in Arab countries have been launched but after lots of promises and big hopes then they were completely ignored or frozen. So maybe the Saudi approach to slower change but at a steady pace, maybe that is a more appropriate way. We will have to see.

SUSRIS: King Abdullah has been on the throne for a little over a year, and we wish him a long life, but will the Saudi commitment to reform outlast him?

Khouri: My hunch is that reform in Saudi Arabia is not completely personality driven. It is partly personality driven. Generational change is a factor. You have a whole generation who are 35 years old and younger who have been educated and exposed to the world. The demography of Saudi Arabia is very different than it was in 1970 during the first oil boom. So this is a whole different demographic ballgame.

There is the fact that you do have reformers in the system, in the bureaucracy, in the royal family. There is greater private sector interaction with everyone talking about these issues so I think it is not something that will be stopped or reversed whenever there is a succession. That’s my hunch.

SUSRIS: Thank you Mr. Khouri for taking time to talk with us here in Tennessee and have a safe trip home.

[Mr. Rami Khouri was interviewed on the campus of Maryville College, Maryville, Tennessee, USA on September 20, 2006]

Introduction of Rami Khouri by Karyn Adams, Director of Communications, Maryville, College

As executive editor of the largest English-language newspaper published throughout the Middle East, Khouri conducts research and writes extensively on the range of roles Middle Eastern culture, politics and religion play worldwide.

He is a senior associate at the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflict at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University and a fellow of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs in Jerusalem.

Previously the editor-in-chief of The Jordan Times and writer for international publications, such as The Financial Times, The Boston Globe, and The Washington Post, Khouri was also the general manager of Al Kutba Publishers in Amman for 18 years and continues to be a consultant for the Jordanian tourism ministry on biblical archaeological sites.

He is the author of A View from the Arab World, an internationally syndicated weekly political column at www.agenceglobal.com.

Well-respected among his peers, academics and the media, Khouri has severed as a Nieman Journalism Fellow at Harvard University and was appointed a member of the Brookings Institution Task Force on U.S. relations with the Islamic World.

More about Rami Khouri

Rami George Khouri is a Palestinian-Jordanian and US citizen whose family resides in Beirut, Amman, and Nazareth.

He is editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star newspaper, published throughout the Middle East with the International Herald Tribune. He is an internationally syndicated political columnist and author.

Recent Articles by Rami Khouri

On SUSRIS
Region in Crisis – Qana: Into Uncharted Diplomatic Terrain – Rami G. Khouri – SUSRIS IOI – Jul 31, 2006

Time to Bring Home Arab Human Development – Rami G. Khouri- SUSRIS IOI – Jan 21, 2005

Saudi-US Relations Perspectives: Crisis in the Middle East – SUSRIS Special Section

Crisis in the Region: Who Is Responsible? – SUSRIS IOI – Jul 18, 2006

Region in Crisis: Consultation – President Bush and Saudi Officials in White House Meeting – SUSRIS Special Report – Jul 23, 2006

Region in Crisis: US-Saudi Relations – A Conversation with F. Gregory Gause, III – SUSRIS Interview – Jul 28, 2006

Editor’s Note
Just over a year ago the world watched as Crown Prince Abdullah ascended to the Saudi throne on the passing of King Fahd. The change of rulers was carried out as outlined in the Saudi Arabian Basic Law of Government and was followed by the pledging of allegiance by Saudis to the new King. About a month later SUSRIS talked with Doctor Ghassan al Sulaiman, Chairman of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry, about issues of transition and reform in the Kingdom. [link below] He said, “The perceptions outside Saudi Arabia on situations inside Saudi Arabia are always very different from those of people living there. So the concern was not there. Most Saudis expected a smooth transition. They knew that the rumors about some conflict in the Royal Family were exaggerated and way out of place. So it was not a surprise for people in Saudi Arabia.”

Last month Saudi Arabia introduced the Bay’ah Council, the Allegiance Law which “aims at streamlining succession, facilitating smooth transfer of power and removing the uncertainty caused by the inability of a king or crown prince to run the affairs of the state as a result of poor health” according to Arab News. The new law received the backing of the Consultative Council, the Shoura, last week, which noted it would “strengthen political stability, ensure national unity and provide a big boost to comprehensive development” as well as protecting the Kingdom’s international reputation.

With the new law in place Prince Turki al Faisal, Ambassador to the United States, chose to discuss the significance of the Allegiance Law when he addressed the Arab-US Policymakers Conference, sponsored by the National Council on US-Arab Relations in Washington last week. We are pleased to bring you Prince Turki’s remarks about the Bay’ah Council since this development may have received little notice outside the Kingdom, particularly among US observers of the Kingdom. Perhaps the little attention paid to the new law was due to the high volume of news in and about the region in recent weeks.

You will also find his answers to questions from AUSPC participants noteworthy. In the Q&A he addressed topics such as the war on terror inside the Kingdom, the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, King Abdullah’s 2002 peace plan, the situation in Iraq, Saudi accession to the WTO, the Saudi economy and jobs and women’s issues.

We should note that Prince Turki’s remarks about political reform trumped a speech he had planned to give regarding the future of the relationship between America and the Kingdom. SUSRIS obtained a copy of that speech and has provided it separately. [link below]

Streaming Audio

Saudi Arabian Constitutional Evolution
Prince Turki Al-Faisal
Keynote address
15th Annual Arab-US Policymakers Conference
Washington, DC
October 30, 2006

Prince Turki al-Faisal Keynote
(See below for Q&A audio)
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Audio Source: Ryan&Associates

I was going to speak initially at this conference on a vision for the future of Saudi-U.S. relations, but I changed that because of an event that took place last week in Saudi Arabia, which was the formation of the Bay’ah Council, which is an important constitutional revolution in the governing of Saudi Arabia. So for those who want to see what my opinions are on U.S.-Saudi relations, this paper is being distributed and given out to the press, but also I would like you to know what we Saudis feel about constitutional change and what it means to us as individuals and as a nation.

As you know, last week King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, announced the establishment of the Bay’ah Council, which is to formalize the succession process. To call it the Allegiance Council, as I’ve seen now in currency, is a misnomer because allegiance is one-sided and connotes total obedience. The Bay’ah is actually a compact, and it is a contract between the ruler and the ruled whereby the ruler obliges himself to protect, promote, and enhance the lives and property of the ruled; and the ruled, in return, oblige themselves to protect, promote, and obey the ruler on everything but that which counters the teachings of God.

The announcement is significant both because it is an important amendment to the Basic Law of Governance and because it is illustrative of the principles which have guided Saudi Arabia’s constitutional evolution ever since King Abdulaziz brought together what was to become the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

The Quran, as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, calls upon us to – (speaks in Arabic) – “take all our decisions through consultation.”

The first act of Shurah, consultation in Islam, took place at the deathbed of the second Khalifah to the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, 1,400 years ago. Omar the Khalifah called upon six of the Prophet’s Companions to choose who his successor will be. Since then, this became the way in which Arab societies have chosen their leaders, in one form or another; most times paying lip service to the Shurah, and many times the process was even whimsical and even without Shurah.

But none of us can claim to have come close to the perfect form of government. But the Bay’ah Council is a straightforward evolution of what the Khalifah Omar did. It is clear and transparent, and it includes procedures in case of the incapacitation of the ruler and his successor. It also allows for the ruler’s choice of successor to be rejected by the Council and for the Council’s choice to be chosen, even if the ruler does not agree. Casting the ballot is an essential component of the election process. This, ladies and gentlemen, is truly a remarkable reform of what has been the traditional way of deciding the succession.

In Saudi Arabia, the most important tradition has always been to follow the Quranic call of reaching decisions through consultation, while also maintaining a direct and universal link between our leaders and our people. For hundreds of years, the people of the Arabian Peninsula have had the opportunity to express their hopes and grievances to their leaders during the Majlis held by each one of these leaders. While it has become a more complex task in modem times, we have come up with new ways to respect this tradition, be it through the Majlis or local governors or the new municipal councils.

Saudi Arabia’s constitutional evolution began when King Abdulaziz united the country, entered Makkah, where there was established a Consultative Council, or Council of Representatives in 1924. The name, shape and role of this Council evolved over time but its primary function was to act as a focus for advice and consultation to the King in reaching his decisions. Although King Abdulaziz was busy establishing a state and uniting its people, he assigned a great deal of importance to the setting up of this Council and thereby learned a great deal about the people of the Hijaz and the other parts of the Kingdom and their aspirations.

The Council evolved somewhat more slowly over the following decades, as the Arab world as a whole suffered from the convulsions caused by the creation of new states and boundaries under colonialism and dispersion. The interwar period was not a bright period in the history of the Middle East, yet Saudi Arabia pursued its establishment of the institutions of a modem state.

King Abdulaziz was known for his Shu’ba as-Siyassia, or the political department, composed of learned men from all around the Arab world, which met on a daily basis to review Saudi and international events. The King benefited greatly in his decisions from the varying and often opposing opinions that were expressed freely in this gathering.

But arriving at current times, the late King Fahd reorganized the way in which the Kingdom was governed and established a new set of regulations through the Basic Law of 1992. These changes further underline the importance of consultation in Islam. At the center of the Basic Law stood arrangements for regional government and a re-founded the Consultative Council, a milestone in the constitutional evolution of Saudi Arabia. More recently, the establishment of municipal councils, half of whose members are directly elected, has again reaffirmed the importance of consultation and participation in Saudi Arabia’s constitutional evolution.

Consultation allows for the expression of many different views, not in the form of a duel but to discuss issues robustly and transparently for the benefit of the country. It provides a forum for new ideas and serves the King by suggesting what steps are more important for the country.

I recall the history of this evolution in order to show that Saudi Arabia has followed a clear path in its constitutional evolution, establishing a state with modem institutions that is in tune both with the basic instructions of Islam and with the traditions of our people. Saudi Arabia has been progressing towards its own form of representative institutions. We have not reached the end of the road or the end of the path, but we have embarked on it with steadfastness and determination.

More importantly, Saudi Arabia’s constitutional evolution is homegrown and consistent with the traditions of its people and the tenets of Islam. Our institutions and system of government were not created in a vacuum, nor were they imposed from the outside. They have come about by experience, by consultation and by a feeling for the participatory form of government which is in the interest of the Saudi people.

Essentially, ladies and gentlemen, we have chosen this progressive evolution because we believe it fits the needs and aspirations of our people. We are not in a hurry to experiment with foreign interpretations of democracy or methods of government. Saudi Arabia’s own form of representative government will be fed, vitalized and grown through our assessment of what will best serve Saudi Arabia and its people.

We will make mistakes along the way, and we can be sure of that, but they will be our mistakes, not someone else’s. And we will invest all our energy in assessing our evolution and making the necessary adjustments when we see that we went wrong somewhere. Therein lies the power of consultation and of having a constant awareness of people’s needs and aspirations. It allows for constant and healthy assessments of the cumulative effects of changes and decisions, and steady improvements in the interest of our people.

Many of you will be interested in knowing how the constitutional evolution, which I have spoken about, affects women’s rights in the Kingdom. The role of women in Saudi Arabian society is still very different from that which many of you are familiar with, but women have been an integral part of the evolution of Saudi Arabia, particularly in its social aspect.

If you remember, five years ago Saudi Arabia launched a National Dialogue in which women were asked to participate and to define their aspirations and ideas on change and reform in the Kingdom. Their recommendations form an increasing part of Saudi Arabia’s constitutional evolution and we are ensuring that women’s participation becomes more visible and more substantive, as evidenced in the election of women to the board of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and to the board of the Engineers Association.

I hope that I have succeeded in giving you a clearer idea of where Saudi Arabia stands in its constitutional evolution and in constantly adapting its institutions according to the principles which have established their strength and effectiveness. The changes that we will see over the coming years will be exciting for the prospects of Saudi Arabia and its people, and they will continue to respect our traditions and aspirations. Saudi Arabia has moved well along the road of defining itself as a state that is both modem and in tune with its traditions, continually pushing forward in its constitutional and participatory evolution.

Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

Streaming Audio

DR. JOHN DUKE ANTHONY (President and CEO, NCUSAR): His Royal Highness has agreed to take several questions. I will repeat them for the benefit of the media here. One of them, Mr. Ambassador, is to what factors can one attribute the string of successes that Saudi Arabia has registered in its domestic campaign against violent extremists in the past year?

Prince Turki – Questions & Answers
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Audio Source: Ryan&Associates

PRINCE TURKI: The principal reason that these successes have taken place is because the people of Saudi Arabia have participated in eliminating these extremist individuals and their ideology. There has been an interchange between the citizens and the security forces that is healthy and very beneficial for both. During the last three years since the terrorist attacks in 2003, more terrorist activity has been prevented because of citizens informing on potential such acts to the security forces than any other reason. And it is this engagement with the people that has really meant the success of the program that we have engaged in.

The other thing also is the leadership that King Abdullah and Prince Sultan and the government has taken in highlighting the wrongness of the ideology that is espoused by these extremists and these terrorists. And along with the religious leadership in the Kingdom, particularly Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Asheikh, who is the mufti of Saudi Arabia and other religious leaders in condemning and casting as sinful the terrorist acts and activities. This has elicited from the citizenry the kind of cooperation and opposition to the philosophy as well as the acts of the terrorists.

One aspect that is not much talked about in our dealing with terrorism in Saudi Arabia is what happens when such extremists or terrorists are captured and brought to justice in Saudi Arabia. Those who have not committed crimes in terms of killing and capital crimes are immediately engaged in a process that is based on reconnecting them with their families because Al-Qaeda and groups like Al-Qaeda act as cults, and the first thing they do when they recruit someone is they cut him off from his family, and then from his society and turn them into a brotherhood, if you like, or a sisterhood that believes in a philosophy and a cult leadership.

So the first act that the government does when it captures somebody and puts them in jail is to reconnect them with their families, and after a period of realignment with their parents or with their siblings or with other members of the family. They are then put through a psychiatric program to evaluate their psychological and psychiatric condition for a few months, after which, having gone through that rehabilitation process, they are brought into connection with the religious scholars who challenge their ideology on a religious basis and show them that their views and interpretations of Islam are not only wrong but that there are alternatives to them which they may not have known about and which are there for them to take up.

And so far, out of a number of 700 of these prisoners who have been captured over the last three years who’ve had connections one way or another with the extremist groups in the Kingdom, 400 of them have deemed rehabilitated and have been released from prison in the care of their families, but also the government keeps an eye on them to make sure that they don’t slide back to their wrong ways. And over the past year, those who have lived through that program have prospered and continued to engage with their families and with the rest of the society without anybody falling back to their bad ways.

DR. ANTHONY: The second question is more in the realm of international relations. Your Royal Highness, would you share your feelings when courageous and bold and far-reaching plans for a comprehensive peace were ignored by the world’s more powerful countries and responded to with little more than “good idea”?

PRINCE TURKI: I’m sure the reference there is to the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, which has been plaguing us for the last half century at least, if not more.

All of you ladies and gentlemen know that there have been varying and a myriad of propositions and proposals and initiatives and peace offerings over the last 50 years. In my working life, I’ve lived through the Rogers Plan, the Kissinger talks, the Carter Camp David peace proposals, several of Mr. Reagan’s plans, Bush Sr.’s Madrid conference and subsequent talks on that, and then Clinton’s Oslo agreements and now Bush – the present Bush’s Roadmap. And all of these plans and formulations and permutations have literally dissected every aspect of the problem between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

And there is nothing new to add to that equation other than the fact that all of these plans need to be implemented. The United States, in its Roadmap, has given a way to achieve peace and the establishment of a two-state solution. Couple that with the Abdullah Peace Plan of 2002 and you will get an end view to that process, which is two states, based on the ’67 borders, with Israel withdrawing from all Arab territories, including Jerusalem, in return for total Arab countries’ recognition of Israel and normalization of relations. And the only thing lacking in all of these things is that nobody has put their foot forward, and we have to be clear in our views on this issue.

The United States is the only country that can do the right thing for everybody in the Middle East, not only because of the size and strength of the United States, but because the United States is engaged and enmeshed in our political situation and has been for the last 50 years or so, whether it likes it or not. And I don’t think it’s a matter of liking or not that should decide this year, but where are the basic interests of the United States? The basic interests are for peace to reign in our part of the world so that we can turn to more fruitful endeavors and more contributive engagements with each other.

And even those among the United States, friends of Israel, we want you to remain friends with Israel. We have no objection to that, nor do we have any inhibitions about that. But that friendship should be used to push Israel to engage in the peace process and to allow the Palestinians the same kind of rights which are inalienable to all people in the world, and those are the rights for homeland and the state and the nationality which has been denied the Palestinians for the last 50 years.

It is that simple, and I think those who try to complicate it and try to say that perhaps this is not the right time to do something about that because the Olmert government is weak or because Mahmoud Abbas doesn’t have full control over the Palestinian Authority or the government, or because of this and that. These excuses will continue with us, and we have heard them for the last 50 years.

Implementation should be done now. The United States devised the Roadmap; it needs to implement it. And we in the Kingdom will do whatever we can to support whatever the United States does in that process. A friend of mine, the Palestinian ambassador in your country, is sitting right here. And he has a wonderful thing that he said a few weeks ago when he as asked about the nonaligned movement in the world today. He said – and I’m paraphrasing what he said – that today there is no need for a nonaligned movement because there is only one power. It’s a unipolar world. What we need today is for that power to be nonaligned. And that is such a true statement – (applause) – and that is coming from a Palestinian, one who has suffered the expulsion from his home and went through all of the difficulties that have come about. But the U.S.’s responsibility is primary in this, and King Abdullah, many times, has engaged with President Bush to push forward the need for an immediate implementation of the Roadmap.

DR. ANTHONY: Mr. Ambassador, we have one other international question. It’s a little bit to the east of Palestinian. It has to do with Iraq, and it’s got two parts to it: Are you offering President Bush and the United States a better approach to Iraq? If the answer is yes – Ambassador, unless it’s privileged information, might you share with us what the broad outlines of that suggestion might be? And if you’re not, why not? (Laughter.) And related to that is, from the vantage point of Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbors, how might Iraq realistically manage to maintain its character as a unitary state? How, if Iraq divides de facto and/or de jure into three separate, autonomous provinces, might one or more of these new Iraqs play a positive role, if any positive role, within the immediate Gulf region vis-à-vis its – or vis-à-vis its non-Gulf neighbors for that matter, and/or the broader Arab and Islamic world for that matter too?

PRINCE TURKI: That’s some question. (Laughter.) Iraq is an issue of primary concern to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and I’ve continued to say since I’ve come here that since America came into Iraq uninvited, it should not leave Iraq uninvited. And by that I mean that the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government should engage with the United States in how and where and the wherewithal of the kind of relationship they will have with each other when American forces withdraw from Iraq.

We have never held back on any ideas as far – not just Iraq but any issue of concern to us in the area with our American counterparts. On the issue of Iraq, before, during and after the military invasion took place, we shared our views with your officials clearly and above board and publicly because we don’t think there is anything to hide here. It is a vital interest to you as well as to us that Iraq remains a unified country.

Those who call for a partition of Iraq are calling for a three-fold increase in the problems rather than a unified Iraq provides for all of us. And although I heard earlier from my good friend and colleague in terms of a study on Iraq that he made –Mr. Nawaf Obaid – on the inevitability, in his view, of the partition of Iraq, or the civil war – some of you will say erupting and others will say that it is already there in Iraq.

My view on that issue is that it is practically impossible for Iraq to be divided on sectarian lines, or even on ethnic lines. There is just too much intermingling of Iraqis with each other in every part of Iraq. We see now, within the Shi’a community in Iraq, those who promote regional autonomy and those who opposed regional autonomy. Why? Because those who oppose regional autonomy live in a mostly majority non-Shi’a sections of Iraq.

If you take Baghdad, which is in the center of Iraq and which presumably, if there is a partition in Iraq, will be along the Sunni part of Iraq, how will you divide Baghdad? Baghdad has a majority Shi’a population. It has more Kurds living in it than in all of the cities in Kurdistan. And if you take in the south, in the Basra area, there are more than 35 percent Shi’a Arabs living in the south and another 5 or 10 percent Kurds and other nationalities living in the south. How are you going to remove them from that Shi’a sector or Iraq? If you go to the north in Kurdistan, all the cities in Kurdistan, whether it is Arbil or Sulaimaniya or any of the other cities, have Arab and both Shi’a and Sunni and Turkoman and other subdivisions of Iraq living in them.

To envision that you can divide Iraq into three parts is to envision ethnic cleansing on a massive scale, sectarian killing on a massive scale, and the uprooting of families and even the divorce rate in Iraq will shoot up 300 percent because a husband who is a Sunni will divorce his Shi’a wife, and a Shi’a wife will – Shi’a husband will divorce his Sunni wise, and a Kurdish mother will disown her half-Arab children, et cetera. It is just, in my view, impossible to do that.

What we see today is an expression of the – first of all, the lack of authority of the government, which encourages people to turn to their basic sectarian and ethnic divides for self-protection. Hence, the rise in militias and so on that, some of them, for political reasons, others for material gain or even for simply criminal activity, undertake the killings and the dislodgings that have been practiced in the last two years in Iraq.

But this is not going to continue like that. Our hopes and our engagement with the Maliki government is to encourage them to extend their authority over all of Iraq and provide the daily requirements of stability and security that any society deserves anywhere in the world today. And by doing that, you can go a long way in meeting the challenges of the insurgency that takes place in Iraq.

DR. ANTHONY: Mr. Ambassador, this will be the last question. It’s a domestic one and it has several parts. I’ll try to weave them together.

PRINCE TURKI: You mean to Saudi Arabia or –

DR. ANTHONY: Domestic to Saudi Arabia. We have an election time – (Arabic phrase).

This one has to do with the World Trade Organization. And everyone, I think, is quite conversant with the benefits, after 12 years, that Saudi Arabia was admitted in the past year. What are some of the challenges, or perhaps the downside of it that pose issues for policies and interests? And related to that, what is the Saudi government doing to generate jobs and hopes for a productive and bright future for its young people? And related to that, when will Saudi Arabian women enter the Foreign Service and be full members of the Shurah Council, and what was the reason for excluding women from voting in the municipal elections, and will they be allowed to vote in the future?

PRINCE TURKI: I thought this was going to be one question. (Laughter.) You always do this to me. (Laughter.)

Anyway, let me start with the issue of women and why they were excluded from the last elections. I remember at the time I was ambassador in the U.K. and we hosted several Saudi women who came for various functions in the U.K., and the issue came up so I called the man in charge of the election process in Saudi Arabia and asked him whether women were going to be voting in the elections or not. And he told me this time, no, they’re not. And I said, why? And he said, well, because the bureaucracy hasn’t worked as efficiently as we wanted them to in preparing all of the necessary accoutrements, if you like, of elections for women, whether it was identification cards or voting booths or transportation or any of the other things. And I remember I told him on the phone, all of these sound like lame excuses; I hope you will not use them in the next elections. And he said, no, in the next elections we’re hoping to have women voting on an equal basis for the municipal elections and then for other administrative and representative bodies in the Kingdom. So I’m waiting to see what is going to happen in the next election, as all of you are.

And what were the other issues?

DR. ANTHONY: The downside, if any –

PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL: On WTO.

DR. ANTHONY: – of WTO in terms of creating a better, productive future for the country’s youth.

PRINCE TURKI: As ambassador to your country, I have not heard of a downside, yet there are many Saudi business people here. One of them is sitting at our table here. He would be a better spokesman on that issue, and I would not dare to put words in their mouths or to imply any of their thinking.

What I know is that, like all bureaucracies, our bureaucracy, when it does function, it functions very slowly, and on the issue of WTO, remarkably this bureaucracy has functioned extremely quickly and very efficiently because over a period of 10 years we moved from non-compliance with any of the WTO rules to full compliance in the sense that we were accepted as members in the WTO.

Implementation, it will take time, and as we gather more experience and more exchanges with our partners, whether it is the United States or other countries in the world, we will go through a process of learning and doing better than we do now. But I know that your trade representative is in constant contact with our ministry – with our ministry of trade on all of the issues that are still outstanding in their relationship with our two countries vis-à-vis the WTO.

But I have not seen that it has had a negative impact on our economy. Our economy, as you heard earlier, is growing robustly, and not only because of the oil income but because the people have confidence in the economic system in Saudi Arabia. Most of the public IPOs, whether for private enterprise or for government corporations, have been subscribed over many times when they have been issued in the Kingdom, which shows that the Saudi citizen wants to put his money in his country and the future of his country, which is good, and it is an indicator of where our people are going vis-à-vis trade and other issues.

So I have not seen a negative downside to the WTO yet. There will be those, I’m sure, who have that view, but if they do, they can always reach whatever official or whatever newspaper to express their views about those issues.

DR. ANTHONY: Some of the other questions we’ll save for this afternoon because they’re more appropriately addressed substantively to the energy panel and/or some reminiscing and forward gazing about the former American ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who will speak.

But His Royal Highness would have the final word.

PRINCE TURKI: I just remembered there was also a question about job creation, and I don’t want people to think that I’m running away from that because job creation is a primary goal of all of the government’s activities for the past 25 years since the first five-year plan was established in the Kingdom. And over the last at least three years, the establishment of these mega projects like the King Abdullah Economic City – and this week two more such projects are going to be announced: one in Jizan and one in Najran. And in the last three months, other cities of that mega scale have been announced in Hail and I think in the Eastern Province.

So as you can see, all of these investments that the Kingdom is putting – and all of these investments, by the way, are going to be driven by private enterprise, not by government financing. All of these projects are going to be geared towards job creation and employment for Saudis, men and women. And already, I’ve been told by Minister Abdullah Zainal that in the next few days or weeks statistics will be coming out on issues like number of unemployed. And I know I’m putting him on a spot here, but if there is any question in the future about why we didn’t put out those statistics, please refer to him and not to me. (Laughter.) Thank you.

(Applause.)

DR. ANTHONY: Mr. Ambassador, we thank you for the incisiveness of your comments and the candor and spirit of friendship in which you expressed them.

PRINCE TURKI: Thank you.

DR. ANTHONY: Thank you.

(Applause.)

Source: SaudiEmbassy.net

On SUSRIS

The Allegiance Institution Law (unofficial translation)
A Vision for the Future of Saudi-US Relations – Prince Turki al Faisal – SUSRIS IOI – Nov 4, 2006
Transition and Reform: A Conversation with Ghassan al Sulaiman – SUSRIS Interview – Sep 30, 2005
The Saudi Succession and Economic Stability – Anthony H. Cordesman – Aug 5, 2005
US-Saudi Bond Grew Under Fahd – Wyche Fowler Jr. – SUSRIS IOI – Aug 4, 2005
The Impact on Saudi Regional Stability – Anthony H. Cordesman – SUSRIS IOI – Aug 2, 2005
King Fahd Died This Morning – SUSRIS Special Report – Aug 1, 2005
Related Material:

Shoura Backs Allegiance Law – Arab News – Oct 30, 2006
The Saudi Constitution: Planting the Seeds of a New Paradigm – Asharq Alawsat – Oct 28, 2006
Editorial: Step in Political Evolution – Arab News – Oct 22, 2006
Saudi Arabia sets up panel to formalize succession – Reuters – Oct 20, 2006

Editor’s Note
It was too good a speech not to be given. But when Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s top diplomat in the United States, took the podium in the Atrium Hall of the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington for the keynote address to the Arab-US Policymakers Conference he gave a different one.

A week earlier Saudi Arabia announced the formation of the Bay’ah Council which will formalize the succession process. This reform was considered important enough by Prince Turki that he wanted to talk about it before the AUSPC conferees and the live C-Span television audience. [SUSRIS will distribute a copy of the "Bay'ah Council speech" on Monday.] So he had a spare speech. Fortunately copies of his remarks on the future of Saudi-US relations were available. We are, therefore, pleased to be able to share with you Prince Turki’s vision of where the relationship has been, where it is now and where it is going.

A Vision for the Future of Saudi-U.S. Relations
Prince Turki Al-Faisal

Dr. Anthony, thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. I am very glad to be participating in this event. The National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations performs an important service, working to bring together nations and people.

Through events such as this, fellowships, publications, internships and more, the Council serves the critical role of improving American knowledge of the Arab world. Increasing and improving people-to-people exchanges and educational programs is exactly the type of approach Saudi Arabia is currently engaged on its own.

Today, I was asked to present a vision of the future of Saudi-U.S. relations. If the request were asked of me five years ago – or even three years ago – I would have had a very different answer. The events of 9-11 placed a heavy burden on our countries’ relationship. But one we’ve shouldered admirably.

Today, as a result of serious work on both sides, there are a lot of positive things to say. After King Abdullah met with President Bush, last year, on an official level, relations between our two countries are stronger than they have ever been. What is clear is that the terrorists miscalculated in their attempts to drive our nations apart. They only stirred a resolve that has resulted in greater cooperation and coordination between us. And this extends far beyond the war on terror.

Indeed, our enduring relations are bound by much more than oil. We have a number of important pillars that support our relationship. Without preference for their order, there are six of them: the war on terrorism, oil, trade, Middle East stability, military cooperation and the longstanding interpersonal relationships shared between the people of our nations – which have, in fact, endured longer than any official relationship. These pillars form our foundation. They define our interaction and provide us with concrete reasons why our nations continue to work together successfully.

But where do we go from here? How do we continue to improve our relationship? There are still many issues left unresolved. There are still many sticking points.

To address the challenges before us, and the challenges ahead, the first thing we have done is to put in place stronger links between our two governments and a framework to better manage the many complex issues we have on our common agenda.

The best example of how this is taking shape is the Saudi-U.S. Strategic Dialogue. This new mechanism is intended to institutionalize relations between our countries. It is meant to overcome inevitable differences and to align our resources and capabilities to a greater extent.

The Strategic Dialogue is progressing through regular meetings between the Saudi Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State – as well as among working groups from both governments – to work constructively and comprehensively on a continuous basis on a range of issues of importance to both countries.

The first meeting occurred during then Crown Prince, now King Abdullah’s visit with President Bush last year in Crawford, Texas. Since then, Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal and Secretary of State Rice have met twice for the Strategic Dialogue.

The gatherings are open to candid discussion in a collegial atmosphere. There are also meetings of six working groups, which include Energy; Economic & Financial Affairs; Consular Affairs; Partnership, Education, Exchange & Human Resources – that is all one committee – Military Affairs; and Counterterrorism.

Allow me to explain briefly how the Strategic Dialogue has been working.

In the beginning of May, President Bush invited me to a “meet and greet” at the White House. During a thorough review of issues, I made the point to Mr. Bush that solving the Palestinian problem will allow us to go on a to solve the other problems in the area.

Three weeks later, the meeting of the Strategic Dialogue took place. Prince Saud delivered to the President a letter for King Abdullah, offering to work with the President in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The President then instructed Secretary Rice to follow up with Prince Saud with the details. Alas, the capture of the two Israeli soldiers led to the Israeli invasion and destruction of Lebanon.

King Abdullah then sent Prince Saud back in July to stress to Mr. Bush the need for an immediate cease-fire and again to press for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Prince Bandar bin Sultan and Adel Al-Jubeir accompanied Prince Saud. In August, they came back to Washington to follow up on these issues.

The present activity we see in the Middle East is a direct result of these joint efforts, and the next meeting of the Strategic Dialogue will tale place in Riyadh in December. This framework is an important mechanism that we hope will endure. It has opened unparalleled levels of communication, and is turning out to be a key way our nations are overcoming obstacles to solve real problems.

But we are also taking other steps to improve our relationship – beyond the very highest levels. Another initiative involves improving relations by increasing people-to-people interaction. The Kingdom is encouraging more delegations of officials and business leaders and citizens to come to the United States to share their views and to learn in kind.

We have also expanded a scholarship program to send our students to college abroad. Many of our students will be coming to the United States. More than 10,000 are already studying here.

They will not only be receiving a world-class education; they will be forming the next generation of friendships and bonds between Saudis and Americans. They will be the true ambassadors.

I would say one priority we currently have is to develop better relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Congress. My embassy colleagues and I have been meeting with members of Congress continuously for the past year. We have been working to answer them their concerns and questions about the Kingdom and to express to them our concerns and our questions about how we view our relationship with the United States.

There are a lot of issues on this level, as your Representatives in both houses of Congress are some of out toughest critics. But as the saying goes: “It takes two to tango.” And here is where more action needs to be taken on your end.

For a country of such critical importance to Middle East and global affairs, we encourage more American representatives to come to the Kingdom. We want them to see our country. We want them to meet our businessmen. We want them to hear from our citizens – our men, our women, and our children. I am confident that if they come to the Kingdom, their outlook will change for the positive.

In a related way, this brings me to my last observation on how we can improve our relationship in the future. I think the type of discourse that exists between the United States and Saudi Arabia needs to change.

We don’t mind being criticized. There is a well-known saying in Arabic: “Your true friend is one who tells you the truth, not the one who simply agrees with you.” But it is the way in which Americans criticize us – whether it is politicians or public figures or thought leaders – that causes us concern. We often hear political rhetoric and bombast and not constructive commentary.

Americans want to see and hear about reform and change in Saudi society and political culture. That is on the agenda, ladies and gentlemen. But we’re not going to change just because you tell us to do so. We are changing and reforming our society because it is the right thing to do for our people and our country. And we will do so in our own way, in accordance with our traditions and culture.

Making dictums leads nowhere. Constructive comments, on the other hand, are more helpful. Why not productively engage us instead of engaging in rhetoric that seems designed to drive us apart?

And quite frankly, right now, we find the analysis of Saudi Arabia lacking. It does not have a clear and real understanding of what is going on in the Kingdom and appears to be emotionally driven. It needs to be less revealing of political agenda and more of good sense and plain dealing. That would be helpful to both sides.

It is important to remember that your opinions, your thoughts and your analyses are not just considered by Americans; they’re considered by Saudis, too. And if you want to improve the state of our relations, it would behoove us to improve every level of our communications.

Our interest are too intertwined. If you look at the problems we are facing today – the war on terrorism, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, energy security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – none of these problems can be faced alone. We must work together to find solutions to these challenges.

Recently, due to the increasingly critical level of importance the Middle East situation is taking on, we’ve tried to be clearer and clearer about what needs to be done.

It is no secret that U.S. standing in the Middle East is at an all time low. It is not a matter of military strength or a shift in rhetoric, but rather, a matter of basic understanding of the needs of the people who are affected by U.S. political decisions. If the U.S. is going to help itself – its policy needs to change in the Middle East.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This may sound very direct. It is meant to be. We should be direct with one another – especially when it comes to matters of such great importance. We are direct because we can be.

Saudi Arabia and the United States share a long and special relationship, one that is some 70 years old. We have always been forthright with one another. We have been open and honest. And so we will continue to be.

Our relationship today has matured. It was tested by the tragic events of 9-11 and emerged stronger than before. Officials in both countries have recognized the need to put in place institutional frameworks to further solidify our relationship. This effort, I’m pleased to report, is proceeding very well. And I am confident that the future or our relationship will be, God willing, a bright one. Bur first we need to act.

Ashkurukum shukran jazeelan – thank you all very much – and barak Allah feekum – and God bless you all.

Also on SUSRIS

Region in Crisis: A Call for American Leadership and a Lasting Peace – Prince Turki al Faisal – SUSRIS IOI – Aug. 3, 2006
Saudi-US Relations Perspectives: Crisis in the Middle East – SUSRIS Special Section

Editor’s Note
“If a man does not know to what port he is steering, no wind is favorable.” In his concluding remarks of the 15th Annual Arab-US Policymakers Conference in Washington this week, Ambassador Chas Freeman, drew upon Seneca the Younger who offered that observation about two thousand years ago. Freeman applied the Roman philosopher’s dictum to the case of United States foreign policy in the Middle East in the context of an analogy to military “consequence management.” He described it as setting aside questions of why and how widespread devastation occurred and focus, instead, on “actions to mitigate it and prevent it from worsening.” Freeman says, “It is time to apply consequence management to the mounting wreckage of our policies in the Middle East.” We recommend that you read Ambassador Freeman’s remarks and share this item with your colleagues and friends.

The Arab-US Policymakers Conference (AUSPC) engaged distinguished diplomats, scholars, business people, military leaders, analysts and others for two-days of discussions focused on the Saudi-US relationship (Day 1) and the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Day 2). We were pleased to attend the AUSPC and have the opportunity to document the proceedings. In the coming weeks we will share the highlights of the conference with you in the pages of SUSRIS and we will work to bring a complete set of conference transcripts and audio to you on ArabiaLink.com, a companion information resource. Today, however, we want to share Ambassador Freeman’s remarks with you and thank the Middle East Policy Council for permission to reprint the transcript from its Web site.

Here now is Chas Freeman on the GCC, Iraq, Iran, Israel and US Middle East policy.

Streaming Audio

The GCC and the Management of Policy Consequences
Remarks to the 15th Annual US-Arab Policymakers Conference
Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr., USFS (Ret.)
October 31, 2006
Washington, DC

Chas W. Freeman, Jr.
[Flash plug-in required. Check below for more info.]

Audio Source: Ryan&Associates
It is an honor once again to make the concluding remarks at the annual US-Arab Policymakers Conference. I do so, of course, as an individual and as an American concerned with the implications of events in the Gulf region, not on behalf of any organization or group with which I am affiliated. Speaking only for oneself enables one to call it like it is. I shall.

The Gulf Cooperation Council began in a time of crisis 25 years ago. Since then the GCC has passed through many stressful strategic environments. It was, after all, formed to cope with the challenges that caused Americans first to declare the Gulf a region of vital interest to the United States – the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. The GCC was also, of course, created to provide a means of dealing with the sudden rise in US interest and military activity in the Gulf in the wake of these events, the oil boom, and the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel.

The GCC functioned as a coherent alliance during the US-led war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation that followed the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Its members separately provided essential staging areas and support bases for the US invasion and occupation of Iraq a dozen years later. Some have since deepened their reliance on the United States, while others have hedged their previous dependency.

Now the GCC member states may be facing their greatest challenge: the changes brought about by the progressive collapse of American policies in the region, including US efforts to transform Iraq, to block Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, and to achieve security for Israel by persuading it to respect the right of Palestinians to democratic self-determination in a secure homeland.

The US military have developed the useful concept of “consequence management.” The idea is to set aside for later study the questions of why and how widespread devastation followed the use of weapons of mass destruction or a large-scale natural disaster, and instead to acknowledge the damage while focusing on actions to mitigate it and prevent it from worsening. It is time to apply consequence management to the mounting wreckage of our policies in the Middle East.

Only true believers in the neo-conservative dream can now fail to recognize that it has wrought a deepening nightmare in Iraq. The shattered Iraqi state has been succeeded (outside Kurdish areas) by near-universal resistance to the foreign occupation that supplanted it. The aggravation of secular and ethnic divisions by ill-conceived constitutional bargaining and elections has created a new political culture in Iraq in which theocratic feudalism, militia-building, and terrorist violence are the principal modes of self-expression.

The attempt to cure the resulting anarchy by building a strong army and police force for the Iraqi central government misses the point. The Baghdad government is itself a key participant in all of the pathologies of contemporary Iraq. In practice, it is more a vengeful tyranny of the majority in a temporary marriage of convenience with Kurdish separatists than a government of all the people. It is hard to disprove the thesis that it seeks a monopoly on the use of force only to consolidate either a Shiite version of Saddam’s dictatorship or an Iraqi version of the Iranian theocracy. The sad fact is that, to many Iraqis, these outcomes now seem to offer the most realistic hope for renewed domestic tranquility in their country.

All but a small minority of Iraqi Arabs now reject the legitimacy of any continuing US military presence on Iraqi soil. On the one hand, the occupation has become the indispensable prop of the current order in Iraq, such as it is; on the other, the prolongation of the occupation is the main reason Iraqis wage an insurgent war against that order. The occupation thus supplies its own opposition; its continuation feeds the violence that makes its eventual curtailment inevitable.

The unpopularity of the occupation continues to provide a rewarding opening for outside agitators. Al Qa`ida now openly acknowledges a major stake in the US staying in Iraq for as long as possible. Our military presence is not just a potent motivator of anti-Americanism and a source of volunteers for terrorism, it has put us in the position of providing instructors to “Jihad U,” the graduate school we have inadvertently created in Iraq for terrorists with global reach – an advanced curriculum, where failure is punished by death at our hands, but course completion is rewarded by a chance to take part in future terrorist operations in Europe, Asia, and North America. The costs of the occupation must be measured in much more than the hundreds of billions of dollars we continue to spend on it.

No one can predict how US forces will withdraw from Iraq, but no one now doubts that their departure is only a matter of time. While some wish to soldier on, few see any prospect that the United States will leave behind an Iraq at peace with itself, a united Iraq capable of playing a constructive role in regional affairs, or a strong Iraq willing and able to balance Iran as it once did. The United States invaded Iraq against the counsel of our allies and friends, drunk with our own self-importance, convinced by our own delusions, apparently invincible in our ignorance, and utterly unprepared for the quasi-colonial mission we assumed. Contemporary Iraq is a monument to American martial prowess and civil ineptitude.

It now seems likely our withdrawal will be undertaken for domestic American political reasons, again without much attention to Iraqi and regional realities. But withdrawal risks escalating the conflict inside Iraq, infecting other parts of the region with Iraq’s sectarian strife, and providing an early graduation ceremony for terrorists bent on applying elsewhere what they have learned in Iraq. Unless diplomacy has first crafted a regional context that limits the damage, a politically-dictated withdrawal will crown our incompetence with disgrace and devaluation as a security partner. What kind of country is it that invades another, trashes it, sets it on fire, and then walks away to let inhabitants and neighbors alike die in the flames or perish of smoke inhalation? Who will wish to associate themselves with such a country, still less entrust their security to cooperation with it?

We did not consult the GCC countries or others in the region about the strategy or tactics of our invasion of Iraq. We would do well to seek their advice, counsel, and support – and they would do well to insist on our consulting them – as we make our next moves, whether these are within Iraq or away from it. Techniques of asymmetric warfare pioneered in Iraq now find their way within weeks to Afghanistan and elsewhere. The targeting of GCC rulers and oil and gas facilities by terrorists with connections to the mayhem in Iraq underscores our common interest in countering spillover from the jihadi intervention in that country. Similarly, the well-founded concern that areas in the Gulf with mixed Sunna and Sh`ia populations might suffer contagion from the religious struggles in Iraq emphasizes the imperative of containing them.

These are closely connected and clearly anticipatable problems that affect many countries in the region. They must not be left to be addressed ad hoc and at the last minute.

Then, there are the problems presented by Iranian ambitions, not just for nuclear weaponry but for preponderant influence in the Gulf. These go well beyond the issues of whether bombing Iran would not provoke it to attempt regime change in the countries from whose bases the attack had been launched, or simply confirm it and others in their judgment that the only effective protection against preemptive attack by the United States is the possession of a nuclear deterrent.

Assuming, as we must, in light of the results similar US policies toward north Korea have produced, that Iran will eventually acquire a nuclear deterrent, how do the GCC countries plan to deal with Iran as a nuclear power? Will each respond separately or will the response be collective? Will there be piecemeal appeasement or defiant reaffirmations of sovereign independence? If a nuclear umbrella or deterrent to the nuclear threat from Iran is deemed necessary, will this be collectively managed or will each country seek its own protection? In either context, what role, if any, do the Gulf Arabs desire for the United States or other nuclear powers? Is the role they envisage for us one that Americans can or will undertake?

Then, too, having destroyed Iraq’s utility in balancing Iran, we and the GCC have yet to concert a strategy for a new and sustainable balance of power. Such a balance cannot be sustained if, as was the case in Saudi Arabia, the American military presence becomes not an asset to national security but its principal liability, thanks to the provocation it offers to political extremists. How do we propose to manage the contradiction between our desire to assure the stability of the Gulf and the fact that our presence in it is inherently destabilizing? If we are to avoid a strategic debacle, we cannot leave Iraq without agreeing on answers to these questions with our Gulf Arab partners.

Iran is emerging as yet another proof that diplomacy-free foreign policy does not work. Neither do lack of planning or the refusal to talk to interested allies and adversaries. It’s not hard to anticipate the questions that will arise from the probable future course of events in Iran itself and in Iranian relationships with Iraq and other countries in the region. These too must not be left to tactical responses, improvised on the spot in the absence of strategy, sprung with no warning upon those whose cooperation or forbearance is essential to enable them to succeed.

Finally, let me allude briefly to the issue of Israel, a country that has yet to be accepted as part of the Middle East and whose inability to find peace with the Palestinians and other Arabs is the driving factor in the region’s radicalization and anti-Americanism.

The talented European settlers who formed the state of Israel endowed it with substantial intellectual and technological superiority over any other society in the Middle East. The dynamism of Israel’s immigrant culture and the generous help of the Jewish Diaspora rapidly gave Israel a standard of living equivalent to that of European countries. For fifty years Israel has enjoyed military superiority in its region. Demonstrably, Israel excels at war; sadly, it has shown no talent for peace.

For almost forty years, Israel has had land beyond its previously established borders to trade for peace. It has been unable to make this exchange except when a deal was crafted for it by the United States, imposed on it by American pressure, and sustained at American taxpayer expense. For the past half decade Israel has enjoyed carte blanche from the United States to experiment with any policy it favored to stabilize its relations with the Palestinians and its other Arab neighbors, including most recently its efforts to bomb Lebanon into peaceful coexistence with it and to smother Palestinian democracy in its cradle.

The suspension of the independent exercise of American judgment about what best serves our interests as well as those of Israelis and Arabs has caused the Arabs to lose confidence in the United States as a peace partner. To their credit, they have therefore stepped forward with their own plan for a comprehensive peace. By sad contrast, the American decision to let Israel call the shots in the Middle East has revealed how frightened Israelis now are of their Arab neighbors and how reluctant this fear has made them to risk respectful coexistence with the other peoples of their region. The results of the experiment are in: left to its own devices, the Israeli establishment will make decisions that harm Israelis, threaten all associated with them, and enrage those who are not.

Tragically, despite all the advantages and opportunities Israel has had over the fifty-nine years of its existence, it has failed to achieve concord and reconciliation with anyone in its region, still less to gain their admiration or affection. Instead, with each decade, Israel’s behavior has deviated farther from the humane ideals of its founders and the high ethical standards of the religion that most of its inhabitants profess. Israel and the Palestinians, in particular, are caught up in an endless cycle of reprisal and retaliation that guarantees the perpetuation of conflict in which levels of mutual atrocities continue to escalate. As a result, each generation of Israelis and Palestinians has accumulated new reasons to loathe the behavior of the other, and each generation of Arabs has detested Israel with more passion than its predecessor. This is not how peace is made. Here, too, a break with the past and a change in course are clearly in order.

The framework proposed by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah at Beirut in 2002 offers Israel an opportunity to accomplish both. It has the support of all Arab governments. It would exchange Arab acceptance of Israel and a secure place for the Jewish state in the region for Israeli recognition of Palestinians as human beings with equal weight in the eyes of God, entitled to the same rights of democratic self-determination and domestic tranquility within secure borders that Israelis wish to enjoy. The proposal proceeds from self-interest. It recognizes how much the Arabs would gain from normal relations with Israel if the necessary conditions for mutual respect and reconciliation could be created.

Despite the fact that such a peace is so obviously also in Israel’s vital and moral interests, history and the Israeli response to date both strongly suggest that without some tough love from Americans, including especially Israel’s American coreligionists, Israel will not risk the uncertainties of peace. Instead, it will persist in the belief, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that it can gain safety through the officially sanctioned assassination of potential opponents, the terrorization of Arab civilians, and the cluster bombing of neighbors rather than negotiation with them. These policies have not worked; they will not work. But unless they are changed, the Arab peace plan will exceed its shelf life, and Arabs will revert to their previous views that Israel is an ethnomaniacal society with which it is impossible for others to coexist and that peace can be achieved only by Israel’s eventual annihilation, much as the Crusader kingdoms that once occupied Palestine were eventually destroyed.

Americans need to be clear about the consequences of continuing our current counterproductive approaches to security in the Middle East. We have paid heavily and often in treasure in the past for our unflinching support and unstinting subsidies of Israel’s approach to managing its relations with the Arabs. Five years ago we began to pay with the blood of our citizens here at home. We are now paying with the lives of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on battlefields in several regions of the realm of Islam, with more said by our government’s neoconservative mentors to be in prospect. Our policies in Afghanistan and Iraq are adding to the threats to our security and well-being, not reducing them. They have added and are adding to our difficulties and those of allies and partners, including Israel. They are not advancing the resolution of these problems or making anyone more secure. They degrade our moral standing and diminish our value as an ally. They delight our enemies and dismay our friends.

In the interest of all, it is therefore time for a change of course. But, as Seneca remarked almost 2,000 years ago, “If a man does not know to what port he is steering, no wind is favorable.” It is past time that we agreed on our destination and devised a strategy for reaching it. As events belatedly force us to come up with a workable approach to consequence management and lay a course to take us beyond it, Americans will need the advice of our partners in the GCC and others in the region.

If we pay no attention to the opinions and interests of these partners, we should not be surprised to discover that we have forfeited their friendship and cooperation. Without both, we cannot hope to manage and overcome the consequences of the series of policy disasters we have contrived or to devise new and effective policies. And we here, like our friends in the region and elsewhere, will all pay again for this failure, and pay heavily. We must not allow that to come to pass.

Source: Middle East Policy Council

Related Reporting:

Building Understanding: The Role of the MEPC – A Conversation with Chas W. Freeman, Jr. – SUSRIS Interview – Sep. 20, 2006

Strengthening the Relationship: Whose Job? – A Conversation with Chas W. Freeman, Jr. – SUSRIS Interview – Aug. 14, 2006

The Arabs Take a Chinese Wife: Sino-Arab Relations in the Decade to Come – Chas W. Freeman, Jr.- SUSRIS IOI – Jun 1, 2006

How Can the U.S. Re-Open for Business to the Arab World? – MEPC Capitol Hill Forum – Part 1 – Ambassador Chas Freeman – SUSRIS IOI – Apr 14, 2006

Defining Interests and a Changing Relationship – Ambassador Chas Freeman Interview – Part I – Oct 29, 2004

About Amb. Freeman

Ambassador Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. succeeded Senator George McGovern as President of the Middle East Policy Council on December 1, 1997. Ambassador Freeman was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1993-94, earning the highest public service awards of the Department of Defense for his roles in designing a NATO-centered post-Cold War European security system and in reestablishing defense and military relations with China. He served as U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm).

Ambassador Freeman Bio

Watchdogs, meet a gadfly by Dan Froomkin

ARAB U.S. POLICYMAKERS CONFERENCE SOLD OUT

Due to the overwhelming interest in the focus of this year’s Policymakers’ Conference, the first day “Taking Stock of the Saudi Arabian U.S. Relationship: Examining the Implications for Interests and Policies” and the second day focusing on the Gulf Cooperation Council, the National Council on U.S. Arab Relations regrets to inform you that both days of the Conference are sold out.

Monday Reception Note: Participants are reminded that attendance at the reception at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia is strictly by invitation only.

We thank you for your interest in the efforts to contribute to the national dialogue on U.S.-Arab relations.

The Conference Organizers
FOR DETAILS VISIT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL WEBSITE AT WWW.NCUSAR.ORG

US Ready to Help Saudi Arabia Defend Oil Facilities
By Meredith Buel, VOA
Washington
27 October 2006

The United States says it is ready to help Saudi Arabia defend its oil facilities against terrorist threats, following a statement by the British navy asking merchant shippers to be on alert for suspicious vessels or activity in the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. Navy is supporting the recommendation as we hear in this report from Meredith Buel in Washington.

Britain’s Royal Navy says coalition forces in the Gulf have been deployed to counter a possible threat to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Officials say this has resulted in stepped-up security at Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura terminal, the world’s largest offshore oil facility.

On the fifth anniversary of the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the United States, a videotaped message from al-Qaida’s deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was broadcast.

In the video the terrorist leader warned the Persian Gulf region and Israel would be the group’s next targets. He also accused Western powers of stealing what he called Muslim oil.

State Department spokesman Sean McCormack says the United States is ready to help Saudi Arabia fight threats from terrorist groups.

“There have been calls by al-Qaida to attack Saudi oil facilities in the recent past,” he said. “These are not new. You go back in the record you can see these threats previously. We will do everything that we can, if there is a request for assistance, both in general terms or specific terms to assist the Saudi government.”

McCormack declined to discuss specific threats to Saudi facilities or whether the United States has received any requests to defend them.

A spokesman for U.S. Navy forces in the Persian Gulf, Commander Kevin Aandahl, told VOA U.S. forces endorse the British recommendation for increased caution in the region.

“We support the recommendation that commercial mariners be especially vigilant while they’re transiting the Gulf,” he said. “Coalition forces, we’re taking prudent precautionary measures and focusing on our bread-and-butter [main] operation, which is maritime security operations in the Gulf, on these possible threats.”

Commander Aandahl, at the Navy’s regional headquarters in Bahrain, says for security reasons he can not discuss any specific threats or intelligence information.

But he says U.S. ships have not taken any special precautions or launched any extraordinary missions.

The commander says threats against oil facilities in the Gulf are nothing new, but need to be taken seriously because terrorists have tried to attack such infrastructure in the past.

“I can’t talk to any specific threat,” he said. “But I can say that we just take any and all threats seriously.”

Authorities say oil export operations in the Gulf region are currently proceeding normally.

Reprinted with permission of VOA

Related Reporting:

Coalition Navies on Watch for Oil Attack – Washington Post

Oil steady near $60, Saudi oil threat supports – Reuters

Saudi oil terminal on alert after terror threat – Times On Line [UK]

US warns of potential threat to Saudi oil facilities – The News International [PK]

Oil prices creep higher on terror fears – Chron.com [Houston]

Also on SUSRIS:

Saudi Oil Facilities: Al-Qaeda’s Next Target? – John C.K. Daly – SUSRIS IOI – Feb 24, 2006

The Impact of the Abqaiq Attack on Saudi Energy Security – Khalid R. al-Rodhan – SUSRIS IOI – Feb 28, 2006

Terrorist Attack at Abqaiq Oil Facility Thwarted – SUSRIS NID – Feb. 25, 2006

Terrorists Attack Oil Facility – Abqaiq – Feb. 24, 2006 – SUSRIS Special Report

PROGRAM

DAY 1: Monday, October 30, 2006
“TAKING STOCK OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN-U.S. RELATIONSHIP: EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERESTS & POLICIES”

DAY 2: Tuesday, October 31, 2006
“THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL: A FORUM ON THE FUTURE OF THE GCC”

FOR DETAILS AND REGISTRATION: VISIT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL WEBSITE AT WWW.NCUSAR.ORG

All speakers but one, as indicated, are confirmed
Titles of speakers’ remarks as cited are subject to change

MONDAY OCTOBER 30, 2006 – DAY 1

8:15-9:00 a.m. Refreshments and Registration

9:00-9:15

“Welcome and Introductions” — Dr. John Duke Anthony, President and CEO, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations; Member, Council on Foreign Relations; Adjunct Associate Professor on Saudi Arabia and Gulf Politics, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; author, numerous books, articles, and essays on the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the six GCC countries.

Welcome from the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center.

9:15-10:30 TAKING STOCK OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN U.S. RELATIONSHIP

Moderator: Ms. Afnan Al-Shuaiby, Advisor to the President of the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council, Washington, D.C.; formerly a business consultant to major U.S. companies and commercial associations, including Walt Disney World Company and the Business Council.

Keynote Speaker: “Saudi Arabia and America: Where Are We Headed?” — H.E. Abdalla A. Alireza, Minister of State, Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers; former Co-Chairman, National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce.

Panelists:

“Saudi Arabian-U.S. Relations: A Balance Sheet on the Issues of Greatest Importance to Both” — The Hon. Robert Jordan, Partner, Baker and Botts; President, Dallas Committee on Foreign Relations; Member, Board of Directors, the John G. Tower Center for Political Studies; in addition to having served as personal attorney to President George W. Bush, he was U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 2001-2003.

“The Dynamics of Educational Reform in the Kingdom: A Balance Sheet” — H.E. Dr. Khalil Al-Khalil, Member, Majlis ash-Shura [National Consultative Council], Riyadh and Professor, Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University, Riyadh.

“Women’s Rights and Development in the Kingdom: An Analytical Assessment” — Dr. Eleanor Abdella Doumato, Visiting Fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island; former president of the Association for Middle East Women’s Studies; co-editor of, inter alia, Getting God’s Ear: Women, Islam, and Healing in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, plus author of essays on women in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf in numerous edited volumes and monographs as well as scholarly journals and encyclopedias.

10:30-11:00 Refreshments Break and Networking

11:00-12:30 REGIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Moderator: H.E. Dr. Majed Al-Qasabi, Director General, Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud Foundation, Riyadh, and former president, Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Keynote Speaker: “Strategic Scenarios for the Energy Future” — Dr. Daniel Yergin, Chairman, Cambridge Energy Research Associates; author of The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, for which he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize, and more recently, Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy; former Chair, U.S. Department of Energy’s Task Force on Strategic Energy Research and Development; Board Member, U.S. Energy Association; Member, the National Petroleum Council; the sole foreign member of the Russian Academy of Oil and Gas; Trustee, The Brookings Institution; Board Member, the New American Foundation; Advisory Board Member, the International Institute for Economics.

Panelists:

“Impact of Events in Iraq and Iran: Implications for Saudi Arabian Interests and Policies” — Mr. Nawaf Obaid, Managing Director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; co-author, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges.

“Assessing the Kingdom’s Efforts in Counter-Terrorism and Political Reform” — Dr. Rachel Bronson, Director of Programs, Institute for Global Affairs, Chicago; former Director of Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Council’s Senior Associate for Near East Programs; author of Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia; and testifier before The Congressional Anti-Terrorist Finance Task Force; Congress’ Joint Economic Committee; and the 9-11 Commission.

“Oil Prices and the Financial and Investment Outlook for Saudi Arabia” — Dr. Nahed M. Taher, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Gulf One Investment Bank, Bahrain, — the first Saudi Arabian woman to head a bank in the Gulf region; and former Chief Economist, Saudi National Commercial Bank, where she was the first Saudi Arabian woman to hold such a position.

12:30-2:00 LUNCHEON KEYNOTE ADDRESS: VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Moderator: Dr. John Duke Anthony, President and CEO of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations.

Keynote Speaker: “A Vision for the Future of U.S. Saudi Relations” — HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America; Chairman, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh; Co-Chair, C100 Group, Council of 100 Leaders (West-Islamic World Dialogue) which has been affiliated with the World Economic Forum since 2003; Founding Member, Board of Directors, King Faisal Foundation; former Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United Kingdom and Ireland; and former Director General, General Intelligence Directorate, the kingdom’s main foreign intelligence service, 1977-2001.

2:00-3:30 THE ENERGY OUTLOOK: INDEPENDENCE OR INTERDEPENDENCE?

Moderator: The Hon. James Schlesinger, Chairman of the Board of the MITRE Corporation and Senior Advisor at Lehman Brothers; Consultant to the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security; Member, the Defense Policy Board, the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board, and Vice-Chairman of the Homeland Security Advisory Council; former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and former Secretary of Defense as well as the nation’s first Secretary of Energy.

Invited Guest of Honor: The Hon. Samuel W. Bodman, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy.

Keynote Speaker: Mr. Khalid Al-Falih, Senior Vice President, Industrial Relations, and Board Member, Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco), the world’s largest producer of crude oil and which manages a quarter of the world’s total oil reserves; Chairman of the Board, South Rub’ Al-Khali Company, an upstream gas joint venture among Shell, Total, and Saudi Aramco; Chairman, Dammam City Municipal Council; former President of Petron Corporation, a refining and marketing venture between Saudi Aramco and the Philippine National Oil Company; former Vice-President for Gas Ventures, Development, and Coordination.

Panelists:

Among the senior energy executives represented in the following session are those whose companies are, among other things, major purchasers of Saudi Arabian crude oil, joint venture partners in refining projects in Saudi Arabia and the United States, substantial investors in both countries while pursuing expanded commercial relations and sharing technology to ensure continued reliable long-term energy supplies.

Mr. Stephen D. Pryor, President, ExxonMobil Refining and Supply Company and a Vice President of the Corporation

Mr. Peter J. Robertson, Vice Chairman of the Board, Chevron Corporation; former Comptroller for Chevron Oil Europe, Comptroller of Chevron USA, and Vice President of Finance, Chevron USA; former President, Warren Petroleum Company, Chevron’s former natural gas liquids subsidiary; former President, Chevron Overseas Petroleum Inc., with responsibility for directing Chevron’s oil exploration and production activities worldwide; Director, U.S.-Russian Business Council; the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council; the American Petroleum Institute; and Vice-Chairman, U.S. Energy Association.

Mr. John D. Hofmeister, President, Shell Oil Company; Head, U.S. Country Leadership Team, which includes the leaders of all Shell businesses operating in the United States; Board Member, the American Petroleum Institute, United States Energy Association, National Association of Manufacturers, National Urban League, and the Foreign Policy Association.

Mr. James J. Mulva, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, ConocoPhillips, and Chairman, the American Petroleum Institute; former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Phillips Petroleum Company; Member, the Business Council and the Board of Visitors of M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston.

Mr. Gary R. Heminger, President, Marathon Petroleum Company LLC, and Executive Vice President, Marathon Oil Corporation; Chairman, American Petroleum Institute Downstream Committee; Chairman of the Board, Tiffin University; former Chairman, Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, and Member, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

3:45-5:00 WHAT WENT WRONG, WHAT WENT RIGHT, AND THE WAY FORWARD — MISTAKES MADE, LESSONS LEARNED

Moderator: The Hon. Walter L. Cutler, twice former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, having represented President Ronald Reagan, 1984-86 and 1987-1988; Ambassador to Tunisia and Zaire and Ambassador-Designate to Khomeini’s Iran before diplomatic relations were severed; President Emeritus, Meridian International, Washington, D.C.; former Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Panelists:

“Economic and Related Reforms in the Kingdom’s Strategic Development Plans” – H.E. Dr. Mohammed Al-Qunaibet, Vice Chairman, Economic and Energy Affairs Committee, Majlis ash-Shura [National Consultative Council], Riyadh.

“Perspectives of a Former Ambassador and United States Senator: Saudi Arabia-U.S. Relations, Reforms, Elections, and the Challenges Ahead.” — The Hon. Wyche Fowler, Chairman of the Board, Middle East Institute; former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, having represented President Bill Clinton, 1996-2000, and former Deputy Minority Leader, United States Senate and Congressman, 1977-1993.

“Enhancing the Mutuality of Benefit: The Bilateral Commercial Dimension” — H.E. Usamah Al-Kurdi, Member, Majlis Ash-Shura [National Consultative Council], Riyadh; immediate past Secretary General, Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry 1997-2001; former Vice President, Saudi Consulting House, a fore-runner of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA).

5:00-6:00 Refreshments in the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Hosted by the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council, Ms. Susanne Lendman, Vice President.

6:30-8:00 p.m. RECEPTION HOSTED BY HRH PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL, SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, AT THE ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.

OCTOBER 31, 2006 – DAY 2

8:15-9:00 a.m. Refreshments and Registration

9:00-9:15 Welcome and Introductions: Dr. John Duke Anthony, President and CEO, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations.

9:15-10:30 THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC): 25 YEARS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES

Moderators: H.E. Shaikh Terky bin Rashid Al-Khalifah, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrain; and Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, (USN, Ret.) Chairman, Board of Directors, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations; President, Board of Trustees of Physicians for Peace; Director, American-Bahraini Friendship Society; former Commander, U.S. Middle East Force; and Director Emeritus, National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce.

Panelists:

“Impact and Implications for GCC Interests and Policies of the Situation in Iraq” — Dr. Michael Collins Dunn, Editor of The Estimate and Editor of The Middle East Journal; noted specialist on Middle Eastern defense and security issues; and former professor, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

“Impact and Implications for GCC Interests and Policies of the Situation in Iran” — Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Senior Analyst of Gulf Affairs, Congressional Research Service, with special emphasis on Iran, Iraq, the GCC countries, Afghanistan, and violent groups operating in the Middle East and South Asia; author, U.S.-Iran Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations; co-author, “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard;” and author of papers on the ballistic missile capabilities of Iran for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (“The Rumsfeld Commission”); formerly, Majority Staff Member, International Relations Committee, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, and consultant to CBS News on Al Qaeda and related Islamic extremist organizations.

“Reflections on the Way Forward Regarding U.S. Policies Toward the GCC Countries, Iran and Iraq — Dr. Joseph Moynihan, Regional Vice President for the Middle East and Africa, Northrop Grumman; Founding Deputy Director for Research, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research; former AWACS Group Commander; and Visiting Professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

10:30-11:00 Refreshments Break and Networking

11:00-12:30 WHAT FUTURE FOR THE GCC REGION?

Moderator: Ms. Anne Joyce, Editor, Middle East Policy and Vice-President and Board Member, Middle East Policy Council, where, inter alia, she was editor and in charge of production for The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World; The Gulf, Cooperation, and the Council: An American Perspective; A Century in Thirty Years: Shaykh Zayed and the United Arab Emirates; and The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen.

Keynote Speaker: “Pursuing Greater Cooperation Among the GCC Countries: Opportunities and Challenges” — HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America; Chairman, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh; Co-Chair, C100 Group, Council of 100 Leaders (West-Islamic World Dialogue) which has been affiliated with the World Economic Forum since 2003; Founding Member, Board of Directors, King Faisal Foundation; former Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United Kingdom and Ireland; and former Director General, General Intelligence Directorate, the kingdom’s main foreign intelligence service, 1977-2001.

Panelists:

“Reflections on the Way Forward Regarding U.S. Policies Toward Iran and Iraq” — Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies; National Security Analyst, ABC News; Director, CSIS Middle East New Assessment Project, The Gulf in Transition Study, and principal investigator, CSIS Homeland Defense Project; former National Security Assistant to Senator John McCain of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Director of Intelligence Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Civilian Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; and author of more than 40 books, among them, The Iraq War; National Security in Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century; The Lessons of Afghanistan; Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare; and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

“A Geopolitical and Bilateral Cooperation Perspective of the GCC Region and the United States” — The Hon. Gordon Gray, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, U.S. Department of State, with responsibilities for, inter alia, the promotion of U.S. interests in the Arabian Peninsula and Iran; former Director of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

12:30-2:00 LUNCHEON KEYNOTE ADDRESS: A VISION OF THE FUTURE OF THE GCC

Moderator: Dr. Hussein Al-Athel, Secretary General, Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Keynote Speaker: “The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Way Forward” — HE Nasser bin Hamad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the State of Qatar to the United States of America and Non-Resident Ambassador of the State of Qatar to the United States of Mexico. Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United Kingdom, and Non-Resident Ambassador to Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, 2000-2005; Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Non-Resident Ambassador to Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Cuba and Nicaragua, 1996-1998; Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Italy, and Non-Resident Ambassador to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Malta, 1994-1996; and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea, 1992-1993.

Panelists:

“A Geo-Strategic and Defense Cooperation Perspective of the United States and Southwest Asia” — Lt. Gen. David Barno (USA, Ret.), Director, Center for Near East and South Asian Studies, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense; former Commanding General, Task Force Warrior, to train Iraqi armed forces in conjunction with Operation Iraqi Freedom; Commanded more than 20,000 U.S. and Coalition Forces in the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, with responsibilities to the US Central Command for regional efforts in Afghanistan, most of Pakistan, and the southern parts of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

“American-GCC Relations: An Assessment of Reforms, Elections, Challenges and the Prospects for Regional Peace and Stability” — The Hon. W. Chas Freeman, Jr., President, the Middle East Policy Council; Chairman of the Board, Projects International; Co-Chair of the United States-China Policy Foundation; Vice-Chair, Atlantic Council of the United States; former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990-91.

CONFERENCE ADJOURNMENT: Dr. John Duke Anthony

FOR DETAILS AND REGISTRATION: VISIT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL WEBSITE AT WWW.NCUSAR.ORG

When US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited the region two weeks ago as part of a new diplomatic initiative, she received a cold response. Arab leaders agreed to meet her and listen to her statements and arguments because it is part of the diplomatic protocol.

But Arab leaders also know that US policy is not made in the State Department. Rather, the real power resides in the White House in the form of the Vice President’s Office and the National Security Council.

Moderate Arab allies have basically abandoned the United States — not militarily or economically, but politically. What remains is a facade of a relationship. Egypt, for example, is not about to jeopardize billions of annual aid by completely ignoring the United States. Rather, it pays lip service to the US by receiving its dignitaries and occasionally calling on the US to revive the peace process.

The same is true with the Arab Gulf countries, which realize that they require American military power for protection in a dangerous neighborhood. For the moment, they rather have the US in their back pocket despite all its problematic policies than have Iran breathe down their neck.

Given the realities of America’s quagmire in Iraq, all the suggestions that, during the second term, the Bush administration became more realistic in its assessment of Middle East situation and more sincere in reaching out for the assistance and input of the allies is simply nonsense. The bottom line is that the US has not changed its policies on the Arab-Israeli conflict over the past three decades. This means the US will never exert sufficient pressure on Israel to reach an agreement on the Arab-Israeli conflict despite the fact that the outlines of an eventual accord are known to everyone and have been around for some time. It is land for peace.

But what Israel really wants is both peace and all the land it currently occupies without any tradeoff. This will never lead to any kind of security.

The Arab world has certainly made its mistakes in the past, but the characterization of right and wrong as being an absolute definition in international relations no longer applies. The US, however, still lives with its Cold War mentality in which there exists a winner and loser, and its policy officials succumb to precisely that logic.

In the Gulf, having tried it before and failed, the US continues to implement a balance of power approach to regional relations by playing one country against another. This is also the case with within the Gulf Cooperation Council. But in this way, the region will never be able to attain any desired level of security. As in the past, one crisis will simply follow the next.

To their credit, the governments of the Arab Gulf countries have understood for some time both the changes talking place in the international system — in which military power is no longer the ultimate determinant of right and wrong — and the shortsightedness of US Middle East policy.

Even prior to 9/11, then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah became so unhappy with the US position on the Arab-Israeli conflict that he instructed the Saudi ambassador to the US to deliver the following message: “Starting from today, you’re from Uruguay, as they say. You (Americans) go your way, I (Saudi Arabia) go my way. From now on, we will protect our national interests, regardless of where America’s interests lie in the region.” Similarly but more diplomatically, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal told the Gulf Dialogue meeting in Bahrain in December 2004 that guarantees for Gulf security cannot be provided unilaterally “even by the only superpower in the world” but that the region required guarantees “provided by the collective will of the international community.”

In a way, both messages were signals to the US that its policies were heading in the wrong direction. But instead of taking note of these signals, the US has continued on the same path, in turn deepening the region’s doubts about actual US intentions.

As a result, the Arab Gulf has begun to build ties with a variety of nations including the European Union, Turkey, and particularly Asia.

By linking the economic interests of these countries and regions to the security of the Gulf, the Arab Gulf is able to build stronger partnership, in addition to establishing a role for itself in the international arena. Underscoring this policy is the understanding that relations are no longer defined by military power alone and that only extensive economic, political and social relationships will help the region escape its inherent cycle of instability.

What is more, the diplomatic efforts of the Arab Gulf countries are being reciprocated by the other side with European and Asian officials increasingly coming to the region and realizing the moderate potential these countries hold for the region as a whole. There is a temptation to provide US foreign policy with the benefit of doubt, but under the Bush administration it has proven to be a facade with very little substance behind it. After listening and placing their hopes in American promises about a better future, the Arab Gulf countries have begun to look after their own interests and they are intent to follow this path despite US objections. This could be the real strategic shift occurring in the region.

– Dr. Christian Koch is the director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai.

Reprinted with permission of Arab News

bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable

The Arab League initiative

• The Arabs can do better – Yossi Alpher
The Israeli public cannot help but wonder how sincere Abdullah and Musa are about their plan.

• Stripping Israel of excuses – Daoud Kuttab
This is exactly the kind of plan that everyone can agree to. It is what negotiators call a win-win situation.

• The US is the key – an interview with Nawaf Obaid
The initiative is the only viable basis the Arab world is willing to negotiate on.

• An American view – Tom Pickering
Buried in the initiative, but not too deeply, is the notion that the US needs to take a more active role in Middle East peace.

The Arabs can do better
Yossi Alpher

The Arab League peace plan of March 28, 2002, recently revived by the League and other Arab leaders, is a missed opportunity. Moderate Arab leaders, beginning with Saudi King Abdullah who initiated the plan, seem to have done almost everything possible to ensure that it finds an unfavorable reception in Israel. With a little effort and creativity they could achieve better results.

To be sure, the plan as ratified in Beirut more than four years ago is problematic from Israel’s standpoint. It insists on the 1967 borders without even alluding to the possibility of border alterations as reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 242, territorial swaps as agreed in principle by Yasser Arafat, or Israel’s demand that the peace border with Syria reflect mainly the 1949 lines, not those of 1967.

In calling for a “just solution” of the refugee problem, the plan displays understanding for Arab problems such as the nebulously worded “forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries” [read: Lebanon must be enabled to get rid of its Palestinian refugees], yet shows no regard for Israel’s position. Indeed, while the resolution carefully avoids demanding the “right of return”, the assembled Arab states in Beirut in March 2002 made sure that the next four resolutions they passed reaffirmed precisely that right, which is anathema to Israel.

Yet the plan also constitutes a dramatic and important step forward for the Arab approach. It offers Israel “normal relations”, a peace agreement and even “security for all the states of the region”. Certainly this is the first time the entire Arab world has even obliquely offered Israel security within a regional framework.

Israel’s problems with the initiative began the day after it was proclaimed, with the Passover feast suicide bombing in Netanya that killed 30 celebrants. That act of Palestinian terror, which had tremendous and tragic symbolic importance for Israelis and Jews everywhere, quite understandably distracted Israelis’ attention from the initiative. Yet the same Arab League that had just offered Israel peace said and did nothing about it.

Finally, the concluding paragraph in the League’s initiative calls for its leadership to “pursue the necessary contacts to gain support.. ..at all levels”. Indeed, over the years the initiative has been presented by its sponsors to nearly every major power and international institution–except to the country it addresses: Israel. When the initiative was first published back in the spring of 2002, PM Sharon was asked for his reaction. “Let [then Crown Prince] Abdullah come to Jerusalem to present it,” Sharon said dismissively.

And cynically: Sharon was highly skeptical about the prospects of real peace with Israel’s Arab neighbors. Yet what could be more natural? Were Abdullah to follow in the footsteps of Anwar Sadat and King Hussein and come to Jerusalem to present his initiative, the effect on Israeli public opinion would be electrifying. Even Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa, who as Egyptian foreign minister has visited Jerusalem many times, has not taken the trouble to present the plan to the Israeli leadership and public and solicit a response. The impression created over the years is that King Abdullah and the Arab League, rather than suggesting an agenda for discussion with Israel, are either going through the motions without really caring or seek to impose their plan on Israel without debate.

Small wonder, then, that Israeli PM Ehud Olmert and FM Tzipi Livni have avoided commenting publicly on the latest Arab attempt to “revive” the initiative, even as they have heaped praise on Saudi Arabia’s leadership in recent months. Washington, too, has been largely silent, though several years ago it did compel Israel to accept mention of the initiative in the preamble to the roadmap as one of the “foundations” of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

Recently, the Arab League initiated a discussion of the initiative at the UN Security Council. The American and Israeli boycott of that session was understandable given the League’s seeming insistence that Washington impose the plan on Jerusalem without discussion, coupled with the actions and attitudes of the current Syrian and Palestinian leaders with whom the plan wants Israel to make peace. But Jerusalem does have to find opportunities to explain to the sponsors of the initiative how poorly they have marketed it to the public it is ostensibly directed toward.

That public–Israelis–cannot help but wonder just how serious Abdullah and Musa are about their plan.- Published 19/10/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

–Yossi Alpher is the Israeli coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications.

Stripping Israel of excuses
Daoud Kuttab

The Arab League’s peace initiative came some time after the eruption of the Aqsa intifada and followed a plan conceived of by then Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. The plan was actually leaked to the NY Times’ Tom Friedman in advance over a private dinner with the crown prince and was then adopted as an Arab peace plan at the Arab League Summit in Beirut in March 2002.

In one simple stroke the plan offers all parties what they need while falling entirely in line with international law and legitimacy. It asks for the return of all lands occupied by Israel in 1967, i.e., the Gaza Strip, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, to serve as a future independent Palestinian state, and the Golan Heights to Syria. It also alludes to a “just and fair” resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem, though it is not clear whether the right of return refers to the state to be created or historic Palestine.

In return the plans offers Israel two things it has always sought: recognition by and normalization with all the countries of the Arab world. Recognition includes all Arab states except Egypt and Jordan who have already signed peace treaties with Israel. Normalization includes these two countries, whose people and institutions have so far done little to genuinely accept Israel as a neighbor in the Middle East.

Ask any expert on the Middle East. Survey the majorities of the peoples in the region or ask leaders for their private opinions. They will all say that this is exactly the kind of plan that everyone can agree to. It is what negotiators call a win-win situation.

Only one problem. Israel won’t accept it. Thus it was left on the shelf with a host of other plans, and would have been forgotten had Marwan Barghouti and his fellow Palestinian prisoners not resurrected it from the dustbin of history. The plan is now back at the center of attention because, like Israel, the Hamas-led government refused to accept it despite the fact that all Arab countries, including Syria where some of the Hamas leadership resides, have endorsed it.

Unfortunately, while an extremely practical plan, it has no teeth, no enforcement mechanism and no possibility of realization without the backing of Israel’s powerful allies. Not only has Israel rejected the plan, but the US and major European countries have done nothing to translate it into a binding Security Council resolution or use its political muscle to try and push it through.

The fact that for now Hamas rejects the plan may be a blessing in disguise. The Israeli side has been historically adept at accepting plans and initiatives it could predict would be rejected by the Arab side. This time, Israel seems not to have predicted that Hamas would win the Palestinian elections. Internal pressure on Hamas is now predicated on the movement accepting this plan.

While it is shameful that the international community is unwilling to properly support something that is in line with international law and clearly in the interests of everybody, Palestinian and Arab leaders must also shoulder some blame for having regularly failed to sell whatever merchandise they possess. This plan provides Arab countries with an easy sell if ever there was one, but only if they unite and for once work genuinely for the Palestinian cause.

Ironically, by rejecting the plan, Israel has turned down a clearly articulated idea that has the seal of the approval of every Arab country with which Israel has always coveted normal relations. The message that a continued Israeli rejection of the initiative sends is that Israel is really not interested in any plan that might lead to the return of land to their rightful owners. Israeli officials have explained away their position by pointing to the actions of Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants. But if Hamas is under extreme pressure to accept this plan, should Israel not be under extreme pressure to do the same?

The Arab Peace Initiative has in effect stripped Israel of all the excuses it has given for not returning Arab lands. Israel stands to obtain peace and normalcy in return for doing so. When will Arab countries have the power and the guile to show the world who is the real obstacle to peace in the region?- Published 19/10/2006 © bitterlemons.org

– Daoud Kuttab is a journalist and director of the Institute of Modern Media at Al Quds University in Ramallah.

The US is the key
an interview with Nawaf Obaid

BI: The Arab League has recently pushed hard to promote its 2002 peace initiative with Israel. Why now?

Obaid: Because there was a feeling among the Saudi leadership that, after what happened in Lebanon and what’s going on in Iraq, the regional situation is spinning completely out of control. And as Palestine has always been one of the major rallying points for all the Arab peoples, the idea was that the only way to move forward was to try again with this initiative to obtain some kind of permanent ceasefire so the details of what a Palestinian state will look like can be worked on.

The timing can be debated. But what is happening is this. Saudi Arabia has everything ready. It has the finances ready, the economic packages ready, it has everything ready to disburse to the Palestinian government to start building a cohesive entity.

The problem is, this cannot be done as long as there is no political will on the ground, especially from Israel, to say that ‘this is Palestine, this is the territory, this is what the Palestinian state will look like’.

The Saudis believe that if this continues, the situation will spiral more and more out of control, Hamas and others will become more extreme and violence and potential war will be inevitable.

BI: Have the Saudis made it clear, either directly or indirectly, to Israel that there is a package ready to start working with?

Obaid: On the issue of talks, there appears to be some domestic confusion in Israel. There is no factual evidence of any such meeting taking place.

On the issue of making it clear to Israel, we know the Americans have been very clear about what the Saudis are doing, as have the Egyptians. The Egyptians and Jordanians have been major interlocutors with the Israelis. They know, and they have been very clear on this, that all the finances and economic programs are ready to sustain the first several years of what would be a Palestinian state.

The problem is, this cannot move forward without having a clear and precise understanding that enough is enough.

Parallel to King Abdullah launching the initiative in Beirut in 2002, he made huge financial commitments to the Palestinians. He announced a $1 billion fund of which Saudi Arabia would donate a quarter. Then there was another fund to which Saudi Arabia donated over $300 million. In the latest royal decree for Lebanon aid, another $250 million was allocated to a Palestinian reconstruction program.

The first two sums are sitting in an account administered by the Islamic Development Bank. The last chunk is still in the central bank waiting for a bilateral agreement. All that money is sitting there waiting for the appropriate political climate.

BI: In 2002, the initiative caused a stir in the Arab world because it promised full normalization of Arab relations with Israel. Yet, the Israeli response was dismissive. Was that a surprise to the Saudi leadership?

Obaid: The Israelis said “if they are serious, let’s sit down and talk face to face.” The Saudi leadership’s position is that “we don’t mind recognizing you, but first of all Palestine has to be defined as a country. First there has to be a viable Palestinian state and then we don’t have a problem in leading the Arab world to fully recognizing Israel.”

That’s where the sticking point lies.

BI: In New York, the Israelis put a lot of pressure on the US and the UN not to debate the initiative in a binding UN forum. Is that frustrating for Saudi Arabia?

Obaid: Absolutely. The Saudis have been very frustrated by a lot of issues recently, the Lebanese issue, the Iraqi issue and, first and foremost, the Palestinian issue.

But there is a policy in the US toward Israel that in the long term is not viable, politically, on the ground, even economically. It’s just not viable.

What the Saudis are doing is, in a very nice way, saying, “listen, this needs to stop. Let’s work out a way in which we can start seriously going toward a Palestinian state,” with the promise that the Arab world will then come around to recognize Israel as a country in the Middle East.

BI: So Saudi efforts are focused on the US?

Obaid: Absolutely. The US is the key. That’s why the efficacy of talking directly to the Israelis is wishful thinking. The key here is the US. What’s adding even more to the frustration is that the money is there. We see Palestinians suffering and dying, but the money is there, waiting to be disbursed.

BI: What is the future of the initiative?

Obaid: The initiative is the only viable basis the Arab world is willing to negotiate on. It will be there for the time when–if and when–the Americans are ready to do enough to pressure the Israelis to start working within this framework.- Published 19/10/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

– Nawaf Obaid is managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, a consultancy based in Riyadh.

An American view
Tom Pickering

For years the words “Saudi initiative” have come close to being an oxymoron. Saudi foreign and security policy initiatives are as rare as snowstorms in Riyadh in July. Only three real ones have emerged in the last few decades: the acquisition in the 1980s of Chinese ballistic missiles; the awakening and energizing of Saudi security forces in the face of the current al- Qaeda/Saudi Hizballah attacks; and Crown Prince Abdullah’s 2002 peace initiative.

Official American attitudes toward the latter have been interesting. Welcomed “carefully” by President Bush and Secretary Powell, in part undoubtedly because then Prime Minister Sharon found it more than wanting, the proposal is generally seen in a positive light–a useful expression of a forward Arab view on, in effect, a deal over land for peace. This is best expressed in terms of the offer for Arab recognition of the state of Israel and a willingness to establish diplomatic relations with it–in the words of Foreign Minister Saud al -Faisal, just like any Arab state has with any other foreign state–in return for Israel’s yielding up the occupied land.

For many Americans, the proposal has not been and is not now, post- Lebanon, the magic silver bullet that will effect an instant breakthrough to peace. However for those Americans, official and unofficial, who follow these issues it is now an important part of the armamentarium that can buttress and support a successful process.

Columnist, pundit and commentator Tom Friedman, who played a special role in coaxing the proposal to life in his meeting with Abdullah in 2002, certainly saw its value and understood its significance–a clear Arab statement from the highest authority (although he was still only crown prince then, Abdullah spoke with authority for Saudi Arabia) that Israel and Israelis could expect the Arabs to be faithful to what has always been for them an elusive bargain over land for peace.

Elusive in two ways. Territory has to be given up as a finite act in time; peace must endure forever. Giving away something tangible must happen in return for the grant of something that is intangible–almost a state of mind. How could an Arab leader provide a corrective to these deficiencies in the Arab position as seen from Israel and by Israelis- -and indeed by many in the United States? Whether or not you quibble over some elements of the final statement by the Arab League at Beirut, this important step by Crown Prince Abdullah addressed that issue in the only way he could–in a clear statement by a key Arab leader from a significant, and indeed theologically the most conservative, Arab country.

In the United States, the concerns expressed by some over ambiguities and deficiencies in the wording of the Arab League version of the initiative have caused few problems. Whether the initiative means peace, or some other unstated future status as some have argued, doesn’t seem to have caught much attention here. Indeed, a careful reading of Abdullah’s statements at least makes it hard to argue that peace is not the objective. Similarly, concerns over ambiguities regarding the right of return of refugees–whether to Israel, a new state of Palestine, or elsewhere–again do not seem to have caught American attention. Here those points are too deep in the weeds for many, and for others, are still to be resolved through further negotiation. As a whole, the initiative is seen as a contribution to building a structure underpinning the peace process, a cornerstone that perhaps can be built upon.

The recent UN Security Council debate, shunned by the US and Israel, over an Arab League initiative to give new legs to the plan indicates the Bush administration is not ready to push it hard with Tel Aviv. Similarly, Arab League requests for the US to provide its own precisions on a two-state solution are unlikely to provoke a positive US response in keeping with Washington’s current more watch-and-wait attitude.

Buried in the initiative, but not too deeply, is the notion that the US needs to take a more active role in Middle East peace. Whether Secretary Rice’s recent visits to the region, post-Lebanon, represent a reawakening of American diplomacy in the region is being debated. What is not being argued on this side of the Atlantic is that the Abdullah initiative is a good one to build upon.- Published 19/10/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

– Tom Pickering is a former US ambassador to Jordan, Israel, and the United Nations and former under secretary of state for political affairs.

Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons- international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.

[Reprinted with permission of Bitterlemons-international.org]

Related Material on SUSRIS:

Arab Peace Initiative – 2002 – King Abdullah’s Peace Plan

The Impact of Lebanon on US-Saudi Relations – A Conversation with Robert Jordan – SUSRIS Interview – Aug 16, 2006

Region in Crisis: Saudi Arabia’s critical role in Lebanon – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS IOI – Aug 8, 2006

Region in Crisis: A Call for American – Leadership and a Lasting Peace – Prince Turki al Faisal – SUSRIS IOI – Aug 3, 2006

Region in Crisis: Fine Lines and Consequences – A Conversation with Thomas W. Lippman – SUSRIS Interview – Aug 2, 2006

Perspectives on Conflicts, Cooperation and Crises: A Conversation with Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to the United States – SUSRIS Interview – Mar 14, 2006

Issues of the Day: Prince Turki al Faisal – SUSRIS IOI – Feb 6, 2006

Arab League Summit Convenes – SUSRIS NID – Mar 22, 2005

Iraqis Hope to Reconcile at Makkah Meet
Maha Akeel, Arab News

JEDDAH, 19 October 2006 — Preparations are under way for the meeting tomorrow between senior Iraqi Sunni and Shiite religious scholars at the Al-Safa Palace overlooking the Grand Mosque in Makkah.

The meeting is set to take place after Taraweeh prayers and is aimed at adopting a formal reconciliation document that calls for ending sectarian violence in Iraq.

The “Makkah Al-Mukarramah Document” will be proclaimed during the last days of the blessed month of Ramadan with the participation of senior Muslim scholars and authorities from Iraq. A press conference will be held after the signing of the document.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which initiated this reconciliation effort, is flying Iraqi delegation members and a media team from Amman to Jeddah today.

Iraqi Shiite and Sunni religious leaders have been in Makkah for most of the week trying to find a way to halt sectarian violence that is threatening to escalate into an all-out civil war. Key leaders of Iraq’s Shiite majority community have given their blessings to the meeting hosted by Saudi Arabia but analysts voiced skepticism about its chances of influencing the sectarian death squads at work in Iraq.

Gathering under the auspices of the 57-member OIC, the summiteers will work from a 10-point text that draws on verses of the Qur’an and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) highlighting that “spilling Muslim blood is forbidden.”

The text also calls for safeguarding the two communities’ holy places, defending the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq and the release of “all innocent detainees.”

An OIC spokesman said the summit was “not a conference or a forum or a venue for negotiations.” Rather, “it is a meeting of the Marjaya (Shiite religious authorities) and Sunni ulema to anoint the document, which will be distributed to Iraqis and publicized in the media. “This initiative aims to quell religious conflict and does not profess to reconcile the protagonists,” he added.

The delegates are expected to include the heads of Iraq’s two religious endowment organizations and a number of leading religious leaders from both sides.

Sources would not name the Iraqi religious scholars who would be attending but assured that they are senior and influential members of both religious sects.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki said he hoped the talks would boost his Shiite-led government’s national reconciliation efforts.

“We pin hopes on every step made by people who care for the interest of Iraq and condemn the terror acts in Iraq,” he said.

Shiite spiritual leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani said: “We support this conference and wish it success.”

Shiite leader Moqtada Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia US commanders accuse of carrying out much of the killing from the Shiite side, said: “I support all conferences that go in line with the interests of Iraq, though I would have preferred it to be held in Iraq.”

But Iraqi academic Dhargham Abdullah Al-Dabbagh predicted the summit would fall flat.

“Of course, the Saudis’ intentions are good, but the meeting is bound to fail. It will have no impact on the ground,” said Dabbagh, a diplomat under the regime of Saddam Hussein who nonetheless spent 16 years in jail.

Whether the meeting will be successful in ending the bloodshed is up to the Iraqis, “but at least we at the OIC tried and the meeting is an initiative that was not attempted before by anyone else,” said the source.

The document calls on every Iraqi to cease infighting and to abide by Islamic principles regarding inter-Muslim violence.

“This is a message that should reach every Iraqi citizen,” said OIC Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu.

The OIC says that the call for reconciliation would be given the broadest possible circulation, to be endorsed and confirmed publicly by all religious bodies, and broadcast and print media.

Preparatory meetings to formulate the reconciliation document were held at the headquarters of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in Jeddah earlier this month. The Iraqi delegation that participated in the preparatory meeting represented Sunni and Shiite religious scholars. It comprised Sheikh Jalaludeen Al-Saghir, Sheikh Salah Abdul Razaq, Sheikh Abdul Satar Abdul Jabbar Abbas and Sheikh Mahmoud Al-Samidai.

– With input from agencies

Reprinted with permission of Arab News

***

Related Material on SUSRIS

Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – Final Report from the SNSAP Iraq Project – SUSRIS IOI – Oct 16, 2006

Gulf Security and US-Saudi Relations: The Cases of Iran and Iraq – A Conversation with Khalid al-Rodhan – SUSRIS Interview – Jun 20, 2006

United States Urges Arab Nations To Support Iraq – Assistant Secretary of State Welch looks to Arab Summit – SUSRIS IOI – Mar 26, 2006

Prince Turki al-Faisal Talks With Charlie Rose – Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the US Takes His Message to Americans – Part 2 – Iraq, Iran, War on Terror – SUSRIS IOI – Feb 18, 2006

Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry – Joseph McMillan – United States Institute of Peace – Part 1 – Summary/Intro – SUSRIS IOI – Jan 31, 2006

Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry – Joseph McMillan – United States Institute of Peace – Part 2 – The Primacy of Stability – SUSRIS IOI – Jan 31, 2006

Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry – Joseph McMillan – United States Institute of Peace – Part 5 – Reform in Iraq, Reform in Saudi Arabia – SUSRIS IOI – Jan 31, 2006

Saudi Arabia Proposes Sending Islamic Forces to Iraq – SUSRIS IOI – Jul 29, 2004

Related Press Reporting

Iraq Sunni, Shiite clerics to urge unity

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2006/10/19/Iraq-Sunni-Shiite-clerics-to-urge-unity/UPI-86851161254606/

Iraq clerics to convene meeting in Makkah in bid to halt bloodshed – The Peninsula

OIC and Saudi Arabia determined to stem tide of separatism in Iraq – ArabMonitor.info

OIC intervention may not help Iraq, but it can’t hurt to try – DailyStar.com
Saudi-Iraq Separation Barrier – Aljazeera.com

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Editorial/Oct/17/OIC-intervention-may-not-help-Iraq-but-it-cant-hurt-to-try.ashx#axzz1f2xviX00

Editor’s Note

The Saudi National Security Assessment Project recently shared a briefing [PowerPoint PDF - click here] of its findings from a six-month Iraq assessment study with SUSRIS readers. Today we are pleased to be able to share the final report from SNSAP’s Iraq Project which touches on regional security issues of vital importance to both the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The complete document is posted on the SUSRIS Web site [click here] and the introduction to the report is provided below. We would like to thank Mr. Nawaf Obaid, Director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, for allowing us to share this document with you. You can visit the SUSRIS special section of SNSAP reports for more information.

***

Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security

Introduction

Iraq is at a crossroads and faces a myriad of challenges, including economic, social and most importantly, security issues. The 2003 US invasion opened a bloody Pandora’s Box of deep-rooted sectarian tensions as well as rival communal interests. It also ignited a tinderbox of violence brought on by an insurgency that is proving difficult to contain and even harder to eradicate — to date, the country has seen no respite from violence, which has targeted US and Iraqi forces and terrorized civilians with almost daily bombings, drive-by shootings, kidnappings and assassinations. A civil war may well be inevitable. Such a development would have the gravest implications for the entire region, especially Saudi Arabia, which shares its longest international border with Iraq.

The importance of a stable and cohesive Iraq to Saudi Arabia cannot be overstated. King Abdullah, as the most powerful leader in the Arab Muslim world, has a vested interest in preserving the integrity of Iraq and safeguarding the rights of Sunnis in a country dominated by Shi’ites.

Although the recent elections represent a milestone in the country’s move towards democracy, they have done little to foster a sense of unity among Kurds, Sunnis and Shi’ites, the three principal communities in Iraq. On the contrary, they have largely served to emphasize communal differences. As Chart 1 shows the election results fell primarily along ethnic lines (see Appendix I for complete election results. The new government appears to be unable or unwilling to resolve these disparities, but this situation must be addressed if the political process is to move forward with any legitimacy. Whether the new government can meet the test is still uncertain.

The Kurds, who have long enjoyed the privileges of living in a semi-autonomous state, are unlikely to be willing partners in a government that, when fully functional, might offer them considerably less. Since the US invasion, the Kurds have demonstrated a tendency to use their dominance in the provinces that comprise the Kurdish area in a manner that gives them a distinct advantage over other ethnic groups in the region. The soft ethnic cleansing now underway in Kirkuk is a prime example of this.

Pervasive interference from Iran further complicates the situation. Iran’s influence over the post-Saddam government in Iraq has been significant, and the most predominant Shi’ite parties in Iraq politics have long enjoyed the sponsorship of Tehran. Iranian levers of influence include a broad network of informants, military and logistical support of armed groups, and social welfare campaigns. Most importantly, Tehran has sought to influence Iraq’s political process by giving support to new various parties, in particular to the SCIRI.

For their part, the Sunnis, who occupied positions of power under Ba’athist rule, may find it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile their now subordinate status in the new Iraq. Basic issues of governance, such as the nature of the central government and the role of Islam, will be points of contention for many years to come. Finally, although they constitute only a fraction of the insurgency, foreign fighters will continue to remain a seriously destabilizing force in the country.

While the situation in Iraq may be too far gone to salvage, there are several policies that may assist the Kingdom in mitigating the grave situation that has been created in the country. These include: The development of a comprehensive national strategy which takes into account the possibility of a civil war; improving communications between the Kingdom and the United States regarding the extent and strength of the insurgency; and neutralizing Iranian interference. When the security situation allows, the Saudi leadership should also work to strengthen its diplomatic ties with Iraq and cultivate relationships with its religious and political leaders. These proposals are more fully discussed at the conclusion of this report.

***

To review the complete report visit:
“Fractured Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security,” Saudi National Security Assessment Project – Final Report”

***

Nawaf Obaid

Nawaf Obaid is current the Managing Director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, a government consultancy based in Riyadh.

He is author of “The Oil Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Arabia” (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). he is also an Adjunct Fellow in the Office of the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC where he co-authored, with Anthony Cordesman, “National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges.”

He has a BSFS from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, an MA in Public Policy from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, and completed doctoral courses at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program.

***

On SUSRIS:

• Is Riyadh Ready to Recalibrate the Relationship – Nawaf Obaid – May 15, 2011
• Energy Infrastructure Threat Assessments Hyped – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Apr 18, 2011
• “Conspicuously quiet” in Saudi Arabia – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS –April 10, 2011
• Saudi Arabia “not ripe for revolution” – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – March 10, 2011
• Assessing Saudi Power – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Nov 14, 2007
• Riyadh and Washington Maneuver Over Iraq Fears – SUSRIS – Dec 13, 2006
• Leading Saudi Arabian Diplomats – SUSRIS – Dec 12, 2006
• Saudi Ambassador Abruptly Resigns, Leaves Washington – SUSRIS Special Report- Dec 12, 2006
• Official Source Refutes Report of Nawaf Obaid in “Washington Post” – SUSRIS – Dec 2, 2006
• Stepping Into Iraq – Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves – SUSRIS – Nov 29, 2006
• Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Role: New Strategic Initiatives – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Nov 6, 2006
• Remnants of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Current Assessment – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Nov 3, 2006
• Disintegrating Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Oct 30, 2006
• Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SUSRIS – Oct 16, 2006
• The Saudis and Containing Iran in Lebanon – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Aug 30, 2006
• Dampened Trust – SUSRIS Exclusive Interivew – Nawaf Obaid – Aug 22, 2006
• Region in Crisis: Saudi Arabia’s Critical Role in Lebanon – Nawaf Obaid – SUSRIS – Aug 8, 2008
• Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Energy Initiative: Safeguarding Against Supply Disruptions – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jul 29, 2006 (PDF)
• Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Leadership Role in the Region – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jul 24, 2006 (PDF)
• Fractured Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Jun 23, 2006 (PDF)
• Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security – SNSAP – Nawaf Obaid – Mar 15, 2006 (PDF)
• Saudi National Security Assessment Project – SUSRIS Special Section 2006
• National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses and Challenges – Cordesman / Obaid – SUSRIS – Oct 25, 2005

***

Editor’s Note
Today for your consideration we present the summary from Samba’s report on the Saudi Economy at Mid-Year 2006. This insightful report can be reviewed in full at www.Samba.com (follow links to the Economy Watch section).

Summary

The economic boom in Saudi Arabia continued to gather strength, with 2006 likely to see record oil revenues, and record trade and budget surpluses in an overall context of 20 percent growth and low inflation. Now in its fourth year, we still believe this boom is only beginning, with signs that strong oil prices and revenues will last many years, a government fiscal position that can support growth in spending for years, and megaprojects just getting underway that will carry high growth through 2010 and beyond.

Oil remains the anchor of the Saudi economy, and the Kingdom will earn a Samba-forecast $203 billion in oil export earnings this year; an all-time record and up 25 percent from the record last year of $162 billion. Even while allowing the government to provide strong fiscal stimulus to the economy, the oil revenues are not being spent as fast as they are being earned. Of the roughly $17 billion per month in oil export earnings, about $7 billion per month is accumulating as foreign assets at the central bank.

Underlying the strength in the oil market is continued exceptional global economic growth and demand for crude oil as well as oil disruption concerns in oil-producing regions of the world. Oil prices hit all-time highs during the first half of the year and ended the half at $74 per barrel (West Texas Intermediate, WTI). Our forecast, upwardly revised, is that WTI will average $68 for the year, and the average price for Saudi crude oil will be $62.50 per barrel, well above the $38 per barrel needed to meet the Saudi government budget’s revenue projection. Saudi oil production is likely to average 9.4 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2006, the same as in 2005.

The local stock market, which experienced a sharp rise then decline, attracted the most attention in the first half of the year. From the top in late February to the bottom in early May, the market moved down 54 percent. From year-end 2005 to the end of June 2006, the market was down 21 percent. The downturn does, have economic implications — a likely slowdown in retail sales, business investment, and banking sector earnings growth. These are more than offset, however, by the strength of the oil market, and we have revised upward our forecasts for GDP growth for 2006. The aspect of the stock market that continued to generate wealth is the Initial Public Offerings (IPO’s). At the end of June 2006, every IPO since 2003 remained profitable, some extremely profitable, from the offering price.

Besides oil and the stock market, the other major theme of the first half of 2006 was megaprojects. Large infrastructure investment is surging. Our assessment of major project activity shows some 37 major projects that are underway or have a high likelihood of implementation over the next several years with a total value of $283 billion. Hydrocarbons — crude oil production, refining and petrochemicals production — dominate, especially where private sector investment is concerned, but projects are in a wide array of industries and geographically dispersed around the Kingdom.

Our macroeconomic forecast is for nominal GDP growth of 20 percent this year, and real GDP growth of 5.8 percent. The difference is that nominal growth captures the rising price of oil, so we find this to be a better measure of what is atually occurring. The non-oil private sector will grow 8.9 percent in real terms, the highest growth in 25 years, inflation will be under 2 percent.

The strong oil export earnings will be the main factor behind a likely current account surplus of $114 billion, the eighth surplus in a row. The trade profile of the Kingdom is healthy.

Government finances are also strong and growing stronger. Even with likely spending growth of 20 percent over 2005 levels, the government will still run a record surplus in 2006 of a Samba-forecast SR 250 billion ($67 billion). Government debt, all domestically held and riyal-denominated, will decline to about SR 380 billion ($101 billion), or 27 percent of GDP. Foreign assets at the central bank will grow to about SR 840 billion ($224 billion), enough to provide budgetary support for years to come and defend the currency’s peg to the dollar. In that regard, there was speculation recently of a revaluation upward of the riyal’s exchange rate against the dollar. The central bank made clear this is not going to happen anytime soon.

These strong conditions — high oil revenues, stimulative fiscal policy, robust non-oil growth, low inflation, and surging investment in major projects — are likely to continue well beyond 2006. The challeges to emerge will be those associated with managing high growth — keeping inflation under control, ensuring that investment in fixed assets and government spending remain efficient, and keeping surging imports from overtaking exports. Having such challenges, however, is the envy of many economies around the world.

Produced by the office of the Chief Economist, Samba.

Related Material

Samba Economy Watch Archive

The Middle East Boom: How Big and How Long Will It Last? – Samba Presentation – Brad Bourland – Chief Economist – Apr. 25, 2006

Saudi Arabia and the WTO – Samba Office of the Chief Economist – SUSRIS IOI – Mar. 18, 2006

Saudi Arabia’s Accession to the WTO: Is a “Revolution” Brewing? – Middle East Policy Council Capitol Hill Conference Series on US Middle East Policy – Introduction by Ambassador Chas Freeman – SUSRIS IOI – Jan 22, 2006

The Saudi and Gulf Stock Markets: Irrational Exuberance or Markets Efficiency? – Khalid R. Al-Rodhan – SUSRIS IOI – Dec. 21, 2005

Saudi Arabia’s 2006 Budget, 2005 Economic Performance – SUSRIS IOI – Dec. 16, 2005

Saudi Arabia Economic Update – An Economy Watch Report From Samba – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 3, 2005

Saudi Economic Performance: A Conversation with SAMBA Chief Economist Brad Bourland – SUSRIS Interview – Feb. 27, 2005

WTO Accession: One Step Closer – SUSRIS IOI – Oct. 12, 2005

World Trade Organization Accession: Saudi Arabia Gets “Green Light” – SUSRIS NID – Oct. 28, 2005

SUSRIS Topic Section – Saudi Arabia’s Accession to the WTO

The Implications of WTO Membership: A View from the Kingdom – SUSRIS IOI – Oct. 30, 2005

World Trade Organization Accession – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 10, 2005

Reprinted with permission from washingtonpost.com and The Washington Post.

Rice Meets With Saudi King on Trip to Rally Arab Allies
In Wake of Lebanon War, Secretary of State Looks to Stabilize Middle East, Counter Momentum of Militant Movements

By Robin Wright
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, October 3, 2006; A06

JIDDAH, Saudi Arabia, Oct. 2 — Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held midnight talks with Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah on Monday on the first leg of a five-day swing through the Middle East to rally Arab allies against the growing momentum of militant movements in the region.

The Bush administration is trying to line up support among an informal new bloc — including the six Persian Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan — to help stabilize the region after the 33-day war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel.

America’s top diplomat described that conflict as a clarifying moment in defining the political forces in the world’s most volatile region. Many analysts believe the sixth Middle East war at least temporarily boosted the standing of Hezbollah as well as its patron Iran and allies such as the radical Palestinian group Hamas.

Rice is hoping to explore ways of reviving the moribund peace process between Israel and the Palestinians as well as bolster support for the fragile governments in Iraq and Lebanon. U.S. officials privately concede that their expectations for any major movement are low.

To emphasize the growing gap between moderates and militants, Rice may hold talks on Iran on Friday with the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany. The subject will be what actions to take against Tehran for failing to comply with a U.N. resolution to stop uranium enrichment for an energy program that could be used to develop nuclear weapons.

Rice held a conference call with her counterparts over the weekend to discuss Iran, which missed a formal Aug. 31 deadline. A second, informal deadline passes this week.

“I think it’s fair to say that we have not yet heard anything that suggests that the Iranians are going to suspend,” Rice told reporters traveling with her, pointing out that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has repeatedly rejected suspending enrichment.

The Bush administration is pressing for punitive sanctions against Iran if it does not agree to suspend enrichment and come to the negotiating table.

Rice said European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana is likely to “check his sources one more time to see if there is anything more there.” Solana has been heading up talks with Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani.

“We did have a discussion of the importance of remaining firm on Resolution 1696, which means that if the Iranians don’t suspend, then we will go to the Security Council for sanctions,” Rice said.

The U.S. effort to generate new momentum in the Middle East comes at an all-time low in the region for the Bush presidency, with Iraq’s insurgency intensifying, the Palestinians enmeshed in a political and economic quagmire, Hezbollah still armed in Lebanon, Iran’s new president increasingly defiant, and three Israeli soldiers captured by Palestinian and Lebanese fighters over the summer yet to be released.

An attempt last month between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas to form a national unity government collapsed, particularly over the issue of recognizing Israel. New clashes in Gaza among Palestinians on Sunday killed six and injured more than 100.

In Jiddah, Rice said she is also hoping to win Saudi political and financial help in Iraq. Guardian of Islam’s holy places and ruled by a staunchly Sunni government, the kingdom has particular leverage with Iraq’s Sunni tribes.

“Saudi Arabia has a lot of standing with a number of the forces in Iraq” and was “very helpful in trying to get Sunnis involved in the election,” Rice told reporters traveling with her. “So I think it would be very helpful if they were supportive of, and working toward,” helping Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s national reconciliation plan.

Rice’s trip is a follow-up to President Bush’s pledge at the United Nations last month to galvanize moderate voices in the region. Rice is also scheduled to visit Egypt for a meeting with eight foreign ministers and then Israel and the West Bank to discuss peace efforts.

Copyright 2006, Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive and The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.

http://www.washingtonpost.com

Related Material
Secretary of State Rice Travels to Mid East for Engagement in the Peace Process – SUSRIS Special Section

Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal Meet the Press – SUSRIS Special Report – Oct. 3, 2006

Travels With Secretary Rice – Middle East, October 1-5, 2006

Rice kicks off regional tour with Saudi talks – AFP – Oct. 3, 2006

Rice Meets With Saudi King on Trip to Rally Arab Allies – Washington Post – Oct. 3, 2006

GCC underlines importance of FMs’ Cairo meeting – KUNA – Oct. 3, 2006

Rice, on trip to Saudi Arabia, appeals for end to conflict among Palestinians – Canadian Press – Oct 3, 2006

Rice in Saudi, Iran issue on top of agenda – Gulf Times – Oct. 3, 2006

Rice seeks Saudi support for Abbas – Haaretz – Oct. 2, 2006

Rice seeks Saudi help to stabilise Iraq – The Peninsula – Oct. 3, 2006

President Bush Addresses the United Nations General Assembly – Sep 19, 2006

Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace – Sep 20, 2006

Middle East Crisis – July/August 2006 – Israel/Lebanon/Gaza – SUSRIS Special Section

US-Saudi Arabia Strategic Dialogue – Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal – Press Conference – SUSRIS IOI – May 21, 2006

Secretary Condoleeza Rice and Prince Saud Al-Faisal Remarks to the Press – SUSRIS IOI – May 21, 2006

Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Saud Al-Faisal interview with US print media – SUSRIS IOI – May 21, 2006

US-Saudi Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement – SUSRIS IOI – May 21, 2006

Other Related Material

Perspectives on US-Saudi Relations from Foggy Bottom: A Conversation with Assistant Secretary of State C. David Welch – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 30, 2006

Perspectives on Conflicts, Cooperation and Crises: A Conversation with Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to the United States – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 14, 2006

Outreach and Engagement: A Conversation with Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to the United States – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 9, 2006

Secretary of State Rice and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal – Remarks to the press in Riyadh – SUSRIS IOI – Feb. 23, 2006

Saudi-US Strategic Dialogue – Secretary Rice, Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal – Meeting the Press – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 13, 2005

Secretary Rice Roundtable with Saudi Media – SUSRIS IOI – Jun. 21, 2005

Secretary Rice, Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal Meet the Press – SUSRIS IOI – Jun. 21, 2005

Crawford Summit Perspective: A Conversation with Thomas Lippman – SUSRIS Interview – May 9, 2005

Press Briefing on the President’s Meeting With the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (Rice/Hadley) – SUSRIS IOI – Apr. 25, 2005

Reporting on Other Saudi Bilateral Relationships

Saudi Arabia – United Kingdom

Two Kingdoms’ Dialogue: Round Two of Saudi-UK Forum – SUSRIS NID – Apr. 22, 2006

Two Countries: Facing the Challenges Ahead: UK – Saudi Conference – SUSRIS IOI – Mar. 19, 2005

Saudi Arabia – People’s Republic of China

Saudi-Sino Relations: President Hu in Riyadh – SUSRIS NID – Apr. 24, 2006

China Visit Wrap-Up – SUSRIS NID – Jan. 27, 2006

King Abdullah Prepares for China Visit – SUSRIS NID – Jan. 21, 2006

Saudi Arabia – Germany

Germany, Kingdom Set Out New Broad Vision of Bilateral Relationship – Arab News – Oct. 3, 2006

Editor’s Note
The Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al Faisal spoke today at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington to a standing-room only crowd, describing the current state of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Prince Turki’s remarks, broadcast live over C-Span, were provided in a press release from the Saudi Embassy and are provided below. A transcript of the Q&A session will be provided separately.

Remarks delivered by Prince Turki Al-Faisal
At the Center for Strategic and International Studies
On October 4, 2006
Washington, DC

Hello ladies and gentlemen. Thank you, Dr. Hamre, for the kind introduction. And thank you for inviting me to speak here today. This is the first time I will have spoken at CSIS. I am both, pleased and privileged to have the opportunity to be here.

Recently, I was reminded of a story about Mark Twain, who attended an event in which one of the speakers was raising money. Twain, deeming the cause to be a worthy one, decided to donate $100. As the speaker droned on, however, Twain decided to cut his contribution in half. With no end in sight, Twain cut his offer again, to $10.

At last, the speaker finished and the collection basket was passed around. Twain reached in the basket, removed a dollar and passed it along.

I hope I don’t have the same impact on you, and I am not looking for a collection, therefore I will be sure to keep my remarks brief to allow time for good questions.

Today, I was asked to discuss the road ahead for Saudi-U.S. relations. I would say that if this question were posed to me five years ago, or even three years ago, I would have a very different answer. But I say to you that today – as a result of serious work on both sides – there are a lot of positive things to say.

Right now, on an official level, relations between our countries are stronger than they have ever been. Indeed, the terrorists miscalculated in their attempts to drive our nations apart. They only stirred a resolve that has resulted in greater cooperation and coordination between us. This has come to extend far beyond the war on terror.

Most importantly, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have even come to recognize that our enduring relations are bound by much more than oil. We have a number of important pillars that support our relationship. I can think of six: oil, trade, the war on terrorism, Middle East stability, military cooperation, and the mutual fondness that we have for each other. These pillars form our foundation. They define our interaction and provide us with concrete reasons why our nations continue to work together successfully.

But where do we go from here? How do we continue to improve our relationship? There are still many issues left unresolved. There are still sticking points.

To address the challenges before us and the challenges ahead, the first thing we have done is to put in place stronger links between our two governments and an institutional framework to better manage the many complex issues we have on our common agenda. The clearest example of how this is taking shape is the Saudi-U.S. Strategic Dialogue.

This new mechanism is intended to institutionalize relations between our countries, to overcome inevitable differences and to align our resources and capabilities to a greater extent. The Strategic Dialogue is progressing through regular meetings between the Saudi Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State and the establishment of Working Groups from both governments to work constructively and comprehensively, on a continuous basis, in a range of issues of importance to both countries.

The first meeting occurred during King Abdullah’s visit with President Bush last year in Crawford, and since then Foreign Minister Prince Saud and Secretary of State Rice have met twice for the Strategic Dialogue. The gatherings are open to candid discussion in a collegial atmosphere. There are also meetings of the six Working Groups, which include: Energy; Economic and Financial Affairs; Consular Affairs; Partnership, Education, Exchange and Human Resources; Military Affairs; and Counterterrorism.

I shall tell you now, how the Strategic Dialogue works. In the beginning of May, President Bush invited me to a “getting to know you meeting” at the White House. During a thorough review of issues, I made the point to the President that solving the Palestinian Problem will allow us to go on to solve the other problems in the area. Three weeks later, the meeting of the Strategic Dialogue took place.

Prince Saud delivered to the President a letter from King Abdullah offering to work with the President in solving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The President, then, instructed Secretary Rice to follow up with Prince Saud on the details. Alas, the capture of the two Israeli soldiers led to the Israeli invasion, and destruction of Lebanon. The King sent Prince Saud back, in July, to stress to the President the need for an immediate cease fire; and, again, to press for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

Prince Bandar bin Sultan and Adel Al-Jubeir accompanied Prince Saud, and in August, they came back to Washington to follow up on these issues. The present activity is a direct result of these joint efforts. The next meeting of the Strategic Dialogue will take place in Riyadh in December.

Another step we are taking to improve relations is to increase our people-to-people contact. The Kingdom is encouraging more delegations of officials, and business leaders, and citizens to come to the United States to share their views and to learn in kind. We have also expanded a scholarship program to send our students to college abroad. Many of our students will be coming to the United States. More than 10,000 are already studying here. They will not only be receiving a world-class education, they will be forming the next generation of friendships and bonds between Saudis and Americans. They will be the true ambassadors.

And yet another thing we can do is develop better relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Congress. This is a priority for us. My colleagues and I have been meeting with members of Congress. We have been working to answer their concerns and questions about the Kingdom, and express to them our concerns and our questions about how we view our relationship with the U.S. There are a lot of issues on this level, as your representatives in both Houses of Congress are some of our toughest critics.

But, as the saying goes, “it takes two to tango.” There are also things that the U.S. needs to do, such as facilitating visas for Saudi citizens, encouraging U.S. trade delegations to visit the Kingdom, and promoting dialogue between intellectuals in both countries.

For a country of such critical importance to American, regional, and global affairs, we encourage American representatives to come to the Kingdom. We want them to see our country. We want them to meet our businessmen. We want them to hear from our citizens – our men, our women, and our children. I am confident that if they come to the Kingdom, their outlook will change for the positive.

This brings me to my last observation on how we can improve our relationship in the future. I think the type of discourse between the United States and Saudi Arabia needs to change. We don’t mind being criticized. There is a well-known saying in Arabic: “Your true friend is one who is honest with you, not one who agrees with you.” But it is the way in which Americans criticize – whether it is politicians or public figures or thought leaders – that causes us concern. We often hear political rhetoric and bombast, and not constructive commentary.

Americans want to see and hear about reform and change in Saudi society and political culture. This is on the agenda. But we’re not going to change just because you tell us to. We are changing and reforming our society because it is the right thing to do for our country. And we will do so in our own way, in accordance with our traditions and culture. Making dictums leads nowhere. Constructive comments, on the other hand, are more helpful.

We also want to see reform in the United States. Your reform of campaign contributions is essential and needed, yesterday, not tomorrow. Your policy towards the Arab World must change and be reformed in order to overcome the slump in America’s standing in my country, and in every other Arab and Muslim country.

Why not productively engage us instead of engaging in rhetoric that seems designed to drive us apart? Currently, we find the analysis of Saudi Arabia lacking. It does not have a clear and real understanding of what is going on in the Kingdom, and appears to be emotionally driven. It needs to be less revealing of political agenda, and more of good sense and plain dealing. That would be helpful to both sides.

Your opinions, your thoughts, and your analyses are not just considered by Americans. They are considered by Saudis, too. And, if we want to improve the state of our relations, it would behoove us to improve every level of our communications. Our interests are too intertwined. If you look at the problems we’re facing today – the war on terrorism, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, energy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – none of these problems can be faced alone. We must work together to find solutions to these challenges.

Our relationship today has matured. It was tested by the tragic events of 9-11 and emerged stronger than before. Officials in both countries recognize the need to put in place institutional frameworks to further solidify the relationship. This effort, I am pleased to report, is proceeding very well, and I am confident that the future of our relationship will be – God willing – a bright one.

I hope this has provided you with an idea of where the Saudi-U.S. relationship is heading. I now look forward to hearing your perspective, and would be glad to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

Source: SaudiEmbassy.net

Related Links
A Force for Peace and Stability – Prince Turki al-Faisal – SUSRIS IOI – Jul 14, 2006
I Think We Need to Talk – SUSRIS IOI – Jun. 20, 2006

Tackling the Information Gap – Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to U.S. Promises Openness and Engagement – Patrick W. Ryan – SUSRIS IOI – Mar 8, 2006

Outreach and Engagement: A Conversation with Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to the United States – Part 1 – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 9, 2006

Perspectives on Conflicts, Cooperation and Crises: A Conversation with Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to the United States – Part 2 – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 14, 2006

Issues of the Day: Saudi Ambassador to the US On Sunday Talk Show – SUSRIS IOI – Feb. 6, 2006

Community and Cooperation – Prince Turki Al-Faisal – SUSRIS IOI – December 2, 2005

The Global Scourge of Terrorism: Ambassador Prince Turki al Faisal Shares His Outlook – SUSRIS Item of Interest – Nov. 8, 2005

Prince Turki Al-Faisal’s Views on Terrorist Attacks and Bin Laden – SUSRIS IOI – Dec. 7, 2004

Prince Turki al-Faisal Talks With Charlie Rose – The Charlie Rose Show – PBS – February 13, 2006
— Part 1 – Relations, Oil — Part 2 – Iraq, Iran, War on Terror — Part 3 – Middle East Peace

About Prince Turki al Faisal

Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Bio

BBC Profile

Global Security.org

Highlights from Prince Turki’s Meetings with Americans – Selected Speeches

June 18 – Observations as an Arab in America – Prince Turki Al-Faisal – ADC Convention, Washington, DC

June 7 – Prince Turki Address to the Kentucky World Affairs Council – Louisville, KY

June 6 – Saudi Ambassador to the US Prince Turki Al-Faisal at the Nashville Chambers of Commerce, Nashville, TN

May 10 – Prince Turki’s keynote Address to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Conference

Apr 21 – Prince Turki address at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy

Mar 24 – Saudi Ambassador to the US Prince Turki Al-Faisal address to the World Affairs Council of Seattle, Washington

Feb 28 – Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States before the Georgia Chamber of Commerce, Atlanta, Georgia

Feb 16 – Prince Turki al-Faisal, Ambassador to the US / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, MA / “Saudi Arabia in the Global Community”

Feb 15 – Prince Turki Al-Faisal address at Harvard’s Kennedy School – “Facing Global Challenges Together”

Feb 8 – Prince Turki Al-Faisal address at Thunderbird, the Garvin School of International Management in Glendale, Arizona

Feb 7 – Prince Turki Al-Faisal address to the Committee on Foreign Relations of Phoenix, Arizona

Feb 7 – Saudi Ambassador addresses the World Affairs Council in Houston

Feb 7 – Prince Turki Al-Faisal address to the Dallas World Affairs Council – “Saudi Arabia and the Global Community”

“..Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held midnight talks with Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah on Monday on the first leg of a five-day swing through the Middle East to rally Arab allies against the growing momentum of militant movements in the region. The Bush administration is trying to line up support among an informal new bloc — including the six Persian Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan — to help stabilize the region after the 33-day war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel..” Washington Post

This SUSRIS Special Report provides remarks to the press from Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal in Jeddah on October 3, 2006 and an extensive collection of resource links.

[US State Dept Transcript]

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD: (In Arabic.)

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much, Foreign Minister Saud. I very much appreciate the warm welcome here again in Saudi Arabia. I want to thank very much His Majesty for seeing me last night. I think we’ve had very extensive and fruitful discussions here in Saudi Arabia, as is usually the case. We are discussing, of course, a period of time in the Middle East when there is much that is changing and much that is challenging.

We have had a very extensive discussion of the situation in the Palestinian territories and the desire to find a way for the Palestinians to resolve their political crisis so that we might have progress again toward a two-state solution as envisioned by President Bush and, in fact, as envisioned in the Arab Initiative and which was once the Crown Prince Initiative, the initiative of then Crown Prince Abdullah.

We have talked also about the need to support the young states of Lebanon and Iraq, young democracies that are under considerable pressure, Lebanon in particular, after the war to support its reconstruction, to support its rearming and reform of its armed forces, which now are being used to extend Lebanese authority throughout the country.

We talked about the need for resolution for the United Nations relating to Lebanon to be fully implemented. And that includes for there to be respect for the arms embargo that the UN has recognized so that there will be no arms to any group, and that includes Hezbollah, any group except to the authorized Lebanese security forces.

We have also discussed in considerable detail the support that Saudi Arabia is providing to the Iraqis as they try to find their way toward national reconciliation. We appreciate that support very much as do the Iraqis. Iraq has the opportunity to be a unified country, a country that can be a democracy in which Sunni, Shia, Kurds and others are all fully represented, but it must get past, at this point, a very challenging security environment, great violence. And the Iraqi people who want a better life appreciate the support of their neighbors and their friends like Saudi Arabia. And indeed Saudi Arabia is working with us on the international compact, which will support the Iraqi national compact.

Finally, of course, we discussed our concerns about Iran, about the Iranian nuclear program. I was able to brief His Royal Highness and earlier King Abdullah about the lack of progress in the Iranian nuclear problem. We continue to hope that Iran will decide to suspend its nuclear programs, but we have no indication at this point that they intend to do so. In fact, the statements of the Iranian President are to the contrary. And so there will be shortly consultations among the members of the P-5+1 because we have a clear route ahead, which is under Resolution 1696 to return to Security Council measures under Article 41, Chapter 7 should Iran refuse to take the generous package that has been offered to it by the international community.

But all in all this has been a very useful discussion. Over dinner last night we had a chance to talk about some of the changes that are going on here in Saudi Arabia and about the progress of reform. We, of course, have a strategic dialog that deals in larger part with many issues of our bilateral relations, and that has not been so much the focus of our conversations today because Prince Saud and I, of course, are preparing for — preparing to meet our colleagues at the GPC+2 in just a few hours in Cairo.

So thank you very much, Foreign Minister, and I look forward to seeing you in Cairo.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, could you comment directly on the violence that has occurred between Hamas and Fattah forces in Gaza and to some extent in Ramallah over the last couple of days? Is there not a limit to what the United States and regional partners like Saudi Arabia can do even as the political differences have now spilled over into violence?

And Your Royal Highness, could you tell us what you think are the dangers if the United States does not make a more sustained effort to resolve or to find a way back to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, on the violence, obviously Palestinians — innocent Palestinians are caught in this violence and in this crossfire, and we call on all parties to stop, that the Palestinian people deserve calm. The immediate problem is to find a political solution by which the Hamas, which was duly elected, and we recognize that, but has been unable to deliver for the Palestinian people because it has been unable to join the consensus, including consensus in the Arab world, that the route to a better life for the Palestinian people is through the roadmap, through the Arab Initiative, and through a two-state solution.

There is that road should Hamas choose to take it. They face a choice. Clearly they cannot govern in a circumstance in which they cannot represent a responsible government before the international system. And so I would hope that they would take up what I understand to have been many overtures by the duly elected President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, who is after all a man who is committed to the agreements that the Palestinians have signed over the last decade or so, committed to the roadmap, committed to the Arab Initiative and committed to the two-state solution.

I think the answer politically is for the Palestinians to find a government that can be committed to the principles outlined by the Quartet but embodied in all of those international documents that have been accepted by Palestinians for decades.

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD: Whenever there is an answer to question in justice and the rights of people are not responded to, it’s a breeding ground for extremism. There is a very short step from extremism to terrorism. And ever since the problem arose of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the region has been destablized. Like a disease on its — the body, it calls for other diseases to attack that weakened body. And therefore, we think it’s a core problem, if settled, would have beneficiaries on all the other core problems of the region. And I think this conclusion is of almost universal acceptance now, and it is the hope that the present efforts of the United States will restart the peace process and lead the region to peace and stability that will benefit all in that instance.

QUESTION: Minister Rice, how is the relation between the Saudi citizen who may live in U.S. and the U.S. Government after what happened with Mr. (inaudible)? And why you are not giving visas to Saudi student to go to American University? Why the U.S. Government want to detain the Saudi media people inside U.S.? What is the latest update about the Iran’s (inaudible)? And what the American strategy can do to solve this problems?

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD: Is that one question? (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Practically you are visiting Saudi Arabia seeking for them help for Iraq. But why in Ramadan? And what kind of help you are asking for? Like what about your trip to Egypt, is it also asking for them help to Iraq or what? Thank you.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much. First of all, on Saudi citizens in the United States, I would hope that Saudi citizens who are abiding by our country’s laws are well treated in the United States. We’ve gone out of our way to increase the number of Saudi students going to the United States. In fact, the Saudi Government and the United States undertook an initiative I believe last year to increase the number of students going to the United States. And we now have crossed the threshold as I’m told of about 12,000. So we are very much pleased that we are having that kind of people-to-people exchange.

As for Iran, as I said, we are continuing to hope that Iran will suspend its enrichment activities, but we have no evidence that it intends to do so. And should it not, then the only choice for the international community is to live up to the terms of Resolution 1696 and that means to bring sanctions under Article 41, Chapter 7.

And finally, I believe that it is in all of our interests to have a stable situation in Iraq. This is Saudi Arabia’s neighborhood. It is the neighborhood of Egypt and Kuwait and others. And so the efforts that these governments are making to support the Maliki Government are in their best interest, they’re in the interest of the Iraqis and they’re in the interest of the international community as a whole.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary –

SECRETARY RICE: I’m sorry. Go ahead, Anne.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, do you think the Hamas Government is close to collapse or perhaps to capitulation? And are you confident that Mahmoud Abbas
could pick up the pieces if that occurred?

And for the Foreign Minister, has the Saudi Government continued its financial support for Hamas since the government formation in March either directly or indirectly? And if so, by how much?

SECRETARY RICE: I can’t make a judgment about what Hamas will or will not do. I do know that the Palestinian people need to have a government that can serve their needs. And we are all trying to support President Mahmoud Abbas. One of the reasons that I will go to the Palestinian territories is to talk with him about what more we can do to support him. If you remember, at the Quartet meetings we expanded the possible uses of the temporary international mechanism to try and deal with some of the near-term problems of the Palestinian people, and we would hope also to be able to help him with security sector reform and a number of other matters.

I might note, too, the Foreign Minister talked about how important it is to have an active diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian front. We could not agree more that an active diplomacy is extremely important and hope, too, that that diplomacy will be not just that it’s carried out by the international community and the United States but also that at some time in the near future Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert will be able to meet and to talk about some of the issues that need to be resolved.

It would be enormously helpful if some of the short-term problems could be resolved. I know the Egyptians have been working hard for the return of the Israeli soldier, Corporal Shalit. And I would hope that the Israelis can see their way forward to make some progress on movement in access for the territories because the economic situation in the Palestinian territories is, of course, made very much worse if there is not the ability to move through some of the crossings.

And so there is a very busy agenda of trying to help with the near-term problems that the Palestinians and the Israelis face. But in the long-term, of course, the best answer is to return to an active process of engagement between the two and their engagement with the international community.

QUESTION: Foreign Minister, what about the question about the money?

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD: Pardon?

QUESTION: The question about the money to Hamas.

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD: Me?

QUESTION: We asked whether you, the Saudi Government, had continued its financial support to Hamas?

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD: We support the Palestinian Authority not support a party. But may I say that the Arab League has funds for the Palestinian Authority, which is unable to relate to them. And especially at this time of great need and great hardship for the Palestinian people, we hope that these issues can be facilitated and resolved as quickly as possible.

Last question.

QUESTION: (In Arabic.)

SECRETARY RICE: Well, thank you. First of all, we have made very clear that we believe that all parties now in the region need to be dedicated to helping particularly these young government in places like Lebanon and Iraq and to help the Palestinians. But the way that one does that is to support the moderate forces that are fighting those who are extremists and are fighting those who would use terror as a political weapon.

The Syrian regime has not been one of the regimes that is supporting those moderate forces, in fact, quite the opposite. Syria has been a major transshipment point for weapons from Iran to Hezbollah. Syria’s negative role in Lebanon is well known. Fortunately, Syrian forces were forced to leave Lebanon under international pressure and the pressure of the Lebanese people last year, but Syria continues to be a force that could stabilize Lebanon and that engages in continued intimidation of those leaders.

And so it’s extremely important that Syria make a choice. This is not a choice for the United States to make; it’s a choice for Syria to make. And that is does it intend to be a part of the consensus that is represented by states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and others that the Middle East should be a place in which the Palestinian Authority is supported not those like Palestinian Islamic Jihad or the Hamas based in Damascus that continues to frustrate the hopes of the Palestinian people or the — those who would destabilize Lebanon. It’s a choice for Syria to make. Thank you.

Released on October 3, 2006
Source: US State Dept.

Related Material
Travels With Secretary Rice – Middle East, October 1-5, 2006

Rice kicks off regional tour with Saudi talks – AFP – Oct. 3, 2006

Rice Meets With Saudi King on Trip to Rally Arab Allies – Washington Post – Oct. 3, 2006

GCC underlines importance of FMs’ Cairo meeting – KUNA – Oct. 3, 2006

Rice, on trip to Saudi Arabia, appeals for end to conflict among Palestinians – Canadian Press – Oct 3, 2006

Rice in Saudi, Iran issue on top of agenda – Gulf Times – Oct. 3, 2006

Rice seeks Saudi support for Abbas – Haaretz – Oct. 2, 2006

Rice seeks Saudi help to stabilise Iraq – The Peninsula – Oct. 3, 2006

President Bush Addresses the United Nations General Assembly – Sep 19, 2006

Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace – Sep 20, 2006

Middle East Crisis – July/August 2006 – Israel/Lebanon/Gaza – SUSRIS Special Section

US-Saudi Arabia Strategic Dialogue – Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal – Press Conference – SUSRIS IOI – May 21, 2006

Secretary Condoleeza Rice and Prince Saud Al-Faisal Remarks to the Press – SUSRIS IOI – May 21, 2006

Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Saud Al-Faisal interview with US print media – SUSRIS IOI – May 21, 2006

US-Saudi Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement – SUSRIS IOI – May 21, 2006

Other Related Material

Perspectives on US-Saudi Relations from Foggy Bottom: A Conversation with Assistant Secretary of State C. David Welch – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 30, 2006

Perspectives on Conflicts, Cooperation and Crises: A Conversation with Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to the United States – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 14, 2006

Outreach and Engagement: A Conversation with Saudi Arabia’s New Ambassador to the United States – SUSRIS Interview – Mar. 9, 2006

Secretary of State Rice and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal – Remarks to the press in Riyadh – SUSRIS IOI – Feb. 23, 2006

Saudi-US Strategic Dialogue – Secretary Rice, Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal – Meeting the Press – SUSRIS IOI – Nov. 13, 2005

Secretary Rice Roundtable with Saudi Media – SUSRIS IOI – Jun. 21, 2005

Secretary Rice, Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal Meet the Press – SUSRIS IOI – Jun. 21, 2005

Crawford Summit Perspective: A Conversation with Thomas Lippman – SUSRIS Interview – May 9, 2005

Press Briefing on the President’s Meeting With the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (Rice/Hadley) – SUSRIS IOI – Apr. 25, 2005

Reporting on Other Saudi Bilateral Relationships

Saudi Arabia – United Kingdom

Two Kingdoms’ Dialogue: Round Two of Saudi-UK Forum – SUSRIS NID – Apr. 22, 2006

Two Countries: Facing the Challenges Ahead: UK – Saudi Conference – SUSRIS IOI – Mar. 19, 2005

Saudi Arabia – People’s Republic of China

Saudi-Sino Relations: President Hu in Riyadh – SUSRIS NID – Apr. 24, 2006

China Visit Wrap-Up – SUSRIS NID – Jan. 27, 2006

King Abdullah Prepares for China Visit – SUSRIS NID – Jan. 21, 2006

Saudi Arabia – Germany

Germany, Kingdom Set Out New Broad Vision of Bilateral Relationship – Arab News – Oct. 3, 2006

“..Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held midnight talks with Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah on Monday on the first leg of a five-day swing through the Middle East to rally Arab allies against the growing momentum of militant movements in the region. The Bush administration is trying to line up support among an informal new bloc — including the six Persian Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan — to help stabilize the region after the 33-day war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel..”

- W