Nuclear Reality in the Gulf – Cordesman

July 22, 2010

Editor’s Note:

Last month the United Nations approved a new round of sanctions against Iran in an effort to derail or inhibit its nuclear enrichment program. American diplomats worked for months to reach the point where 12 of 15 Security Council members would approve the measure, which President Obama called, “the toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government.” However, there was little optimism the sanctions would achieve their intended purpose, getting Tehran to back down. Indeed, shortly after the vote Iran rejected the call to change course, as has been the case with the passage of three earlier sanctions measures.

The question of Iran’s nuclear program challenge to Gulf security is on the short list of topics for the U.S.-Saudi bilateral agenda. For an update on the Iranian nuclear issue and its impact on American and Saudi regional security interests we turned to Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, a preeminent authority on Gulf affairs and a host of other critical national security questions.

In this SUSRIS exclusive interview with Cordesman we explored the state of the Iranian nuclear challenge, UN sanctions, Saudi perspectives, American courses of action and regional consequences. We also were treated to a preview of his new book on the strategic partnership with Iraq. We thank Dr. Cordesman for his prolific contributions to the dialogue on these critical issues and for spending time with SUSRIS to share them with you.

Nuclear Reality in the Gulf: A Conversation with Anthony Cordesman

SUSRIS: Assessing Iran’s nuclear program and the implications for the region has been a challenge for decision makers in Washington and Riyadh for many years. What is the current state of play in terms of the nature and imminence of the threat?

Anthony H. Cordesman

Dr. Anthony Cordesman: It is striking that when the U.S. Director of National Intelligence provided an assessment of the Iranian nuclear missile program earlier this year he was extremely careful to qualify that assessment, to state that there was not, as yet, conclusive evidence that Iran was pursuing the actual production of a nuclear weapon. So, we need to be very cautious.

He also was careful to note that the evidence as to Iran’s capacity, at least at the unclassified level, did not allow anyone to produce a clear conclusion, but it appeared that it would be several years before Iran could have a nuclear device.

For people who look at this issue at a political level, this is often analysis they don’t really understand. No one has ever described the point at which Iran could actually produce nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs. It has not been described if these would be crude, fission devices of the kind North Korea produced. It’s important to note that North Korea has never really conducted a successful nuclear test. It has simply had an “event” at very low yields. It is similar to the situation of India and Pakistan. Both countries have grossly exaggerated the yields they achieved over time, although they have far more advanced efforts than Iran.

So we’re looking at a country, Iran, that has all of the elements of a nuclear program. It has all of the technology to produce at least a fission weapon. It has moved to the level of enrichment where it is clear that over time it could produce fissile material. However, we do not have any estimate from a reliable source of when it could actually deploy significant nuclear weapons or what kinds.

It’s also important to understand that the assessments that the U.S. provides, and I think these are reliable, are that Iran would need to have long-range missiles to have a credible strike capability. They would need to thwart the advanced air defenses in the countries around it. Iran is only beginning to develop that capability. The Shahab-3 ballistic missile, which is a system many people cite, is still in the developmental phase. It hasn’t been tested sufficiently to allow Iran the confidence about its reliability or accuracy. It, like a nuclear device, is several years away. Moreover, it seems to be shifting to solid-fuel rocket boosters, which again would push the envelope out to 2013-2014.

These are areas of uncertainty, which we need to take very seriously because some people are in a state of denial. They keep ignoring what the International Atomic Energy Agency says. They ignore what the U.S. Intelligence Community says. They ignore very reputable outside analysis from groups like ISIS, Global Security, and the Federation of American Scientists. But one thing is very clear, that is Iran has all of the tools to move forward.

SUSRIS: Last month the U.N. Security Council approved another round of sanctions against Iran over its nuclear activities [UNSCR 1929]. What are the prospects for sanctions in altering Iran’s behavior and achieving compliance in its nuclear program?

Cordesman: It’s important to note that these sanctions won’t block Iran. It’s quite clear that if Iran makes the necessary sacrifices it can move forward, unless there is some almost devastating military strike of the kind, in practice, only the U.S. could mount. And such a strike would require the support – at least tacitly – of the Gulf States.

The problems for effective sanctions are two-fold. First sanctions must put constant pressure on Iran, which will slow the program down. It will help create the political conditions that would lead Iran to decide to not move forward in weaponizing its nuclear program. It would also make it clear to Iran that if it does halt these efforts there will be strong incentives on the part of the U.N. and particularly Europe and the United States, for it to do so.

Second, sanctions also have to create a situation where Iran is prevented from expanding more than its nuclear programs. They need to limit expansion of Iran’s missile programs and its acquiring advanced conventional weapons. How effective these efforts prove to be is up to member countries.

It is important to remember that while sanctions have failed in many cases in many ways, the sanctions on arms transfers for countries like Iran have been very effective. For example, Iraq got virtually no meaningful military transfers as long as the U.N. sanctions were in place. This is important because the kinds of pressures on Iran extend beyond the nuclear program.

It’s equally important to remember that there is a long list of incentives for Iran to stop. Will that affect this government at this point in time? The answer is clearly no. But this is a process that extends over time. It is not intended to somehow stop Iran in its tracks.

SUSRIS: Saudi officials have sent mixed signals about American courses of action vis-a-vis Iran. What is your impression of what Riyadh wants the U.S. to do and the U.S. not to do?

Cordesman: We need to be very careful because Riyadh is like the United States, there is no “one Saudi.” All of us face alternatives where we try to choose between containment, sanctions, military options, defense, and deterrence. They’re very hard choices, and it’s quite clear that the United States itself has yet to decide exactly what it would do if Iran moved forward.

The Saudis clearly want to avoid a military option at this point. At the same time, they want to do everything possible to have Iran’s effort halted. If that fails they want, at a minimum, to be reassured that the United States will provide them and the GCC with the kind of capabilities to deter Iran and to contain it.

To ask that any Saudi official state in public that Saudi Arabia is willing to have an open confrontation with Iran is, I think, unrealistic. To try to read too much into the signals being sent is simply dangerous.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States live, to put it mildly, in a dangerous and unstable area. What they want most from the United States is a combination of caution and the ability to trust the United States to provide the level of security that is both feasible and stabilizing.

SUSRIS: What would be the impact in the region should Iran develop and demonstrate a nuclear weapons capability?

Cordesman: A lot depends on something none of us knows. It isn’t just that Iran has a bomb in the basement. It’s reached the point where everybody believes they may have a weapon but they’re not sure. The moment Iran tests a device, everybody’s perceptions are going to change, and you can probably count on the Gulf States, the United States, Israel and virtually everyone else concerned having a much clearer, more public position.

The reaction would also depend on what kind of test was done, what we know about Iran’s enrichment cycle at the time, and how soon it could have weapons. Then we come down to what are the options? One option already being pursued is improved missile defense, in part because Iran does have the capability to strike any Gulf State with long-range missiles, with conventional warheads. Countries like the U.A.E. are moving beyond the other Gulf States in actually going to procurement of a wide area theater defense system like THAAD [Theater High Altitude Area Defense]. Other countries are pursuing advanced forms of Patriot anti-missile systems. They would certainly seek to have the United States reinforce these missile defenses. Ship-based missile defenses in the Gulf would be a powerful way to provide that additional support.

No Gulf State has publically talked about Secretary Clinton’s statement that the United States would be prepared to offer expanded regional deterrence, which has since been clarified as potentially both nuclear deterrence of an Iranian nuclear posture and conventional deterrence. They see the need for weapons, not of mass destruction, but of mass effectiveness against key aspects of Iran’s military or economic base.

It’s easy to talk about the Gulf States developing nuclear weapons, but the time horizons are more on the order of seven to twelve years if they have to do it themselves. That effort would have to be made in the face of major resistance from the United States and from the rest of the international community.

What is more troubling than potential proliferation among Gulf States is that Pakistan is acquiring two new reactors from China. It is developing a surplus capability to produce enriched material relative to what we know about its delivery systems and requirements. The transfer from Pakistan of a nuclear weapon is a possibility. There is the fact that at least one country in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, has long-range missiles, which it acquired from China. These are conventionally armed, and experts debate whether they’ve been upgraded and improved. We do know they’ve never been tested, and that the designs are out of date, and not suited for delivery of nuclear weapons. That means if a country like Saudi Arabia, which is really the only country with the wealth and base for significant nuclear capabilities, was to buy a weapon, it would also have to buy missiles. However, all of the major suppliers of missiles have agreed not to provide those missiles with the possible exception of Pakistan. It is developing its own improved missile systems, and might sell or transfer these systems. So there is a very wide range of uncertainties.

There is also the possibility of an Israeli strike, a prospect for which it is difficult to produce any estimates of effectiveness. There is the possibility that if Iran was too provocative or proved to be too advanced the United States would launch a military strike.

SUSRIS: What are your thoughts about the calls for a United States preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear targets?

Cordesman: Again we need to be very careful. The United States has said that it has a military option. It has said that it will keep developing it. But every senior American official has made it clear that the United States does not see any such strike as imminent, and it’s pursuing diplomatic options in cooperation with the U.N., with European allies, with China, and with Russia.

We have seen more than a dozen reports that the United States was posturing and deploying forces to strike Iran. Every single one of them has proved false. Most of the reports have focused solely on carriers even though the carrier is not a base for launching stealth aircraft or for sustaining the sortie rates necessary. They have all ignored cruise missiles. So we are talking about more than half a decade of panic, rumors, misinformation – perhaps deliberate misinformation – in reporting that ranges from Gulf media to the British press, and a flood of nonsense on the Internet.

So while the United States has a military option no one is talking about exercising it. We need to remember that Israel is constantly sending signals. They are attempting to bring more pressure on Iran to stop. They are signaling Iran that these efforts are not only dangerous, but could culminate in what is, already in some ways, a nuclear arms race.

Israel improved its missile capabilities more than a decade ago, according to most unclassified reports, to be able to reach any Iranian target with a nuclear-armed missile. It is pursuing a submarine-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile deployment capability. There is scant recent reporting on how it bases its land-based missiles, but there is satellite evidence that they are both silo-based and mobile. Unlike Iran, which would have to go through a cycle of relatively crude fission weapons to get to a thermonuclear weapon, Israel probably has very effective thermonuclear designs by way of access to French technology until 1968. That means Israel now has at least the same capability to conduct an existential strike against Iran, that Iran might develop against Israel in, say, five to seven years.

This is the reality in a Middle East where countries also have chemical weapons. where our intelligence estimates indicate that many countries – Iran, Syria, Israel, Egypt – have the capability to develop very advanced biological weapons. When we talk about this arms race we need to remember that while it’s at least possible that you can still develop an arms control regime for nuclear weapons, the United States has effectively rejected the technical feasibility of such a regime for genetically-engineered and advanced biological weapons. Many countries in the Middle East will have that technology for medical and civil reasons in the next few years.

This is a genie that doesn’t fit back in the bottle. The grim reality is although we may be able to contain the rise of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East to some extent, achieving a meaningful weapons of mass destruction free zone is not technically feasible.

SUSRIS: Talk about your recent book, “Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region,” and what you learned in writing it.

Cordesman: One area that was impressive was in the improvements made in readiness and training. Many of the problems that were noted after the Gulf War have been at least partially corrected and Saudi Arabia has moved forward in air, naval and ground capabilities. It is still very much a defensive power – it is not a state that threatens its neighbors – but it is a much more capable, conventional military power than it was five years ago.

Saudi Arabia’s plans and force development efforts, its procurement requests, for example arms sales from the United States, reflect a much more sophisticated and advanced degree of timing.

What I found most impressive, however, is how well Saudi Arabia has developed the capability to deal with the threat of terrorism. It has bought about not only improvements in its counterterrorism capabilities, but a program to bring Saudi young men back into Saudi society. It is a broad-based way of fighting terrorism with internal reform. So looking at what has happened in Saudi Arabia over the last few years, its military progress is impressive, but what is far more impressive is the focus Saudi Arabia has made on dealing with the threat of terrorism and extremism. Above all is the fact that it has seen that reform and bringing people back into Saudi society is as important as direct counterterrorism activities.

SUSRIS: And you have a new book coming out?

Cordesman: We have done a book on strategic partnership with Iraq. If you look at the interests of the United States and the interests of the Arab world one of the most critical problems we face is how to create a strategic partnership in which Iraq is fully sovereign, fully independent, and is a country which is respected in the region.

At the same time it is a country that needs help to move forward to the point where it can develop its own national security and defense capabilities. It needs help to move the economy to levels of employment and income that meet the needs of the Iraqi people. Iraq needs a bridge over the three to five years it’s going to take to put the economy back on track and have enough expansion of petroleum exports so it can finance its own development without outside aid.

The book raises the point that Iraq faces two critical problems. First, the threat from insurgency and sectarian and ethnic violence isn’t over. Second, Iraq still has to develop a level of governance that can provide stability and security for the Iraqi people. And that, at this point, is in limbo. Months have passed while everyone waits to find out what Iraqi government is going to be selected and whether it will meet national rather than sectarian requirements. But more than that, once that government is chosen many of the people in it will be inexperienced and will have deep divisions with their colleagues. It will be at least a year before we know whether it can actually govern in ways that meet Iraq’s needs.

So again, this strategic partnership is based on uncertainty, but if we want stability in this region, if we want stability for petroleum exports, if we want stability in the world economy, it’s absolutely critical.

SUSRIS: Thank you for sharing your insights on these important Gulf security questions.

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Anthony H. Cordesman

About Anthony H. Cordesman

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS and acts as a national security analyst for ABC News. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. During his time at CSIS, he has completed a wide variety of studies on energy, U.S. strategy and defense plans, the lessons of modern war, defense programming and budgeting, NATO modernization, Chinese military power, the lessons of modern warfare, proliferation, counterterrorism, armed nation building, the security of the Middle East, and the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. (Many of these studies can be downloaded from the Burke Chair section of the CSIS Web site at http://www.csis.org/program/burke-chair-strategy.) Cordesman has directed numerous CSIS study efforts on terrorism, energy, defense panning, modern conflicts, and the Middle East. He has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies on the wars in those countries, and he was a member of the Strategic Assessment Group that assisted General Stanley McChrystal in developing a new strategic for Afghanistan in 2009. He frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counteterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries.

Before joining CSIS, Cordesman served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He directed the analysis of the lessons of the October War for the secretary of defense in 1974, coordinating the U.S. military, intelligence, and civilian analysis of the conflict. He also served in numerous other government positions, including in the State Department and on NATO International Staff. In addition, he served as director of policy and planning for resource applications in the Energy Department and as national security assistant to Senator John McCain. He had numerous foreign assignments, including posts in the United Kingdom, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran, as well as with NATO in Brussels and Paris. He has worked extensively in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

He is the author of a wide range of studies on energy policy, national security, and the Middle East, and his most recent publications include (CSIS, 2010), Iraq and the United States: Creating a Strategic Partnership (CSIS, 2010), Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region (Praeger, 2009), Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? (Praeger, 2009), Withdrawal from Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces (CSIS, 2009), and Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces (CSIS, 2009).

Source: CSIS

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Full List of Anthony Cordesman’s Publications (Source: CSIS) [LINK HERE]

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Articles and Interviews on SUSRIS by and with Anthony Cordesman

[GulfWire Articles are being added to SUSRIS. Please check Dr. Cordesman's SUSRIS page for updates.]

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